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COMPENSATION AND REWARD FOR
SAVING LIFE AT SEA
Steven F. Friedell*

I. INTRODUCTION
A few hours after the Titanic sank on April 15, 1912, another
British passenger vessel, the Carpathia, rescued the 712 survivors
and the lifeboats in which they had taken refuge. 1 Under British
law, the owners of the Carpathia could have recovered a salvage
award, limited to the value of the lifeboats, from the owners of
the Titanic, 2 and the British Board of Trade had the statutory
discretion to make an additional award for the saving of human
life.3 By contrast, if the American law at the time had applied to
the case, the salvors could have received no more than the value
of the lifeboats, and if no property had been saved, they could not
have recovered a penny. 4 A few months after the Titanic disaster,
Congress enacted legislation5 codifying a 1910 multilateral treaty
that was intended to increase the rights of life salvors.
This Article explores the life salvage rules under the general
• Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers University at Camden. B.A. 1971, Brandeis University; J.D. 1974, University of Michigan. The author wishes to thank Professors William
W. Bishop, Jay M. Feinman, and Roy F. Proffitt for their helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this Article, Professor Kermit L. Hall for providing information about Judge
William Marvin, and Margaret S. Manoogian for her help in translating the materials
relating to the Brussels Salvage Convention.-Ed.
1. "Report on the Loss of the Titanic," Cd. 6352, at 41 (1912), S. Doc. No. 933, 62d
Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (report of formal British investigation). One of the survivors died
shortly thereafter. Id. In their petition to limit liability, the owners of the Titanic alleged
that 711 persons were saved. The Titanic, 209 F. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). A congressional
resolution honoring the Carpathia's captain recites that 704 persons were saved. S.J. Res.
111, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., 37 Stat. 639 (1912).
2. Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Viet., c. 60, § 544. The word "salvage" is
used to describe either the act of saving or the award given. M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF
SALVAGE, § 2, at 2 (1958).
3. See text at note 48 infra. Apparently the Carpathia's owners, the Cunard Line,
made no request for a reward from the British government. Letter from Search Department, British Public Record Office, Nov. 1, 1978. Congress appropriated up to $1000 to
purchase or make a gold medal for the captain of the Carpathia. It also expressed its
thanks to the captain and "through him to the officers and crew." S.J. Res. 111, 62d Cong.,
2d Sess., 37 Stat. 639 (1912). One Senator said, "[T]he American Congress can honor
itself no more by any single act than by writing into its laws the gratitude we feel toward
this modest and kindly man [Captain Rostron of the Carpathia]." 48 CONG. REC. 7283
(1912).
4. See text at notes 19-20 infra.
5. Act of Aug. 1, 1912, 37 Stat. 242.
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maritime law and under the 1912 life salvage statute. 6 Surprisingly, some life salvors had greater rights under the general maritime law than they have under cases construing the statute. 7 This
6. 46 U.S.C. § 729 (1976). As will be discussed below, the provision was based on the
Brussels Salvage Convention of 1910. Another provision enacted at the same time and also
based on the treaty, 46 U.S.C. § 728 (1976), imposes criminal penalties on masters of
vessels who fail to save persons "found at sea in danger of being lost" unless the rescue
would present "serious danger to his own vessel, crew, or passengers."
An international conference called in response to the Titanic disaster imposed on
masters a duty to respond to distress signals unless they are "unable" or consider it
"unreasonable or unnecessary in the special circumstances of the case" to render assistance. International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea [hereinafter cited as SOLASJ,
art. 37 (translation submitted to the Senate), S. Doc. No. 463, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 18
(1914). The French and Belgian governments differed over whether the Brussels salvage
treaty imposed such an obligation. See also The Roanoke, 214 F. 63 (9th Cir. 1914)
(suggesting that 46 U.S.C. § 728 would apply to such a case). In any event, the provision
in SOLAS states that it does not "prejudice" the obligation laid down in the earlier treaty.
SOLAS art. 37. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, S. Doc. No. 463, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 97
(1914). The 1914 treaty was not generally put into force, but subsequent treaties have
contained similar provisions. E.g., International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
1960, ch. V, reg. 10, 16 U.S.T. 185, 502-04, T.I.A.S. No. 5780, 536 U.N.T.S. 27, 332-34.
The obligations to render aid at sea under the 1910 treaty and under SOLAS are codified
in article 12 of the Convention on the High Sea, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82 (1958). Unlike England, the United States does not impose a criminal penalty
on a master who violates his duty under SOLAS. (Violation is a misdemeanor under 12 &
13 Geo. 6, ch. 43, § 22 (1949).) The Coast Guard, however, can suspend or revoke a
master's license, for "bad conduct" or "inattention to his duties." 46 U.S.C. § 226 (1976).
A tort suit against the master might be possible. Cf. Warshauer v. Lloyd Sabaudo S.A.,
71 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 610 (1934) (suggesting that a master who
violates the duty imposed by the 1910 treaty may be civilly liable to the one who is not
rescued).
7. Several other commentators have studied life salvage and the related topic of the
possible liability of those who fail to save life. E.g., M. SHAPo, Tm: DUTY TO Ar:r (1977);
Thomas, Life Salvage in Anglo-American Law, 10 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 79 (1978); Landes
& Posner, Altruism in Law and Economics, 68 AM. EcoN. REv. 417 (1978); Landes &
Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of
Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978); Bockrath, The American Law of Life
Salvage, 7 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 207 (1975); Wade, Restitution/or Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1183 (1966); Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio, The Altruistic
Intermeddler, 74 HARV. L. REv. 817 (1961); Jarett, The Life Salvor Problem in Admiralty,
63 YALE L.J. 779 (1954); Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability
(pts. 1-2), 56 U. PA. L. REv. 217 & 316 (1908); Cunningham, Life Salvage, 17 GREEN BAG
708 (1905); Dunlop, Life Salvage, 15 SCOT. L. REv. 44 (1899); Note, Restitution for Life

Salvage in the Wake of Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Overseas Oil
Carriers, Inc., 30 HASTINGS L.J. 227 (1978); 4 BROOKLYN J. lNTL. L. 114 (1977); Comment,
2 CAL. W. lNTL. L. J. 146 (1971); Comment, Compensation for Life Salvage at Sea, 2
HASTINGS L.J. 53 (1951). See also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, Tm: LAw OF ADMIRALTY§ 8-12,
at 570-74 (2d ed. 1975); Tm: Goon SAMARITAN AND THE LAw (J. Ratcliffe ed. 1966).
Property salvage has parallels in the Roman law of negotiorum gestio (see Dawson,
supra) and in several medieval sources. See M. NoRRIS, supra note 2, §§ 8-11, at 7-12. The
"Rhodian Law", thought by some to date from the tenth century B.C., also contains some
passages on property salvage. See M. NORRIS, supra note 2, § 5, at 4. Others have argued
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Article suggests that courts have given insufficient attention to
the purposes of the Brussels Salvage Convention of 1910, which
inspired the 1912 statute, and that American courts should .remain free to recognize all rights that life salvors possessed before
the Brussels Convention.
This Article then considers whether American courts should
further expand the rights of life salvors by awarding life salvage
even when no property is saved. A few courts have resorted to
some ingenious devices to compensate rescuers or would-be rescuers of human life who would not have been entitled to any life
salvage under the established rules of law. This Article suggests
that if a case like the Titanic were to come before an American
court today, the court should compensate the life salvors for their
personal injuries and reasonable expenses and should have the
discretion to reward them for extraordinary acts of heroism. The
same relief should also be available to certain classes of unsuccessful rescuers. In all cases American courts should formally
renounce the vestiges of a doctrine that denies those who save
lives an award that is given to those who save property.
that the "Rhodian Law" dates from the eighth century A.D. E.g., Benedict, The Historical Position of the Rhodian Law, 18 YALE L.J. 223 (1909).
The Jewish and Christian religions have long been concerned with the duty to save
life and property and, to some extent, with the right to compensation for saving life. E.g.,
Genesis 4:9 ("[A]m I my brother's keeper?"); Deuteronomy 22:1-4 (duty to restore lost
articles and to assist one whose ass or ox has fallen down on the road); Luke 10:30-37
(parable of the Good Samaritan); BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 73a ("Whence do we
know that if a man sees his fellow drowning in a river, mauled by beasts, or attacked by
robbers, he is bound to save him? From the verse, 'Thou shalt not stand by the blood of
thy neighbor.' (Lev. 19:16).") One was also obligated under Jewish law to pay others if
necessary to save one in danger. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 73a; CODE OF
MAIMONIDES, Laws of the Murderer and of Protecting Life 1:14 (1180). Commenting on the
passage in the Babylonian Talmud, Rabbi Asher ben Yehiel (c. 1250-1327) wrote that one
who saves another's life is entitled to recover his expenses from the person saved.
SANHEDRIN, Rabenu Asher, c. 8. Although violation of the obligation to rescue another did
not subject one to flogging, under the usual rule that flogging cannot be imposed when
no overt act is involved, Maimonides considered the obligation to be an important one.
CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Laws of the Murderer and of Protecting Life 1:16. Several American
courts have used religious allusions in their description of the rights of life salvors. E.g.. ,
In re St. Joseph-Chicago S.S. Co. (The Eastland), 262 F. 535 (N.D. Ill. 1919), affd. without
opinion sub nom. Mattocks v. Great Lakes Towing Co. (No. 2,804) (7th Cir. June 3, 1920),
cert. denied, 258 U.S. 644 (1920) [hereinafter all references to the opinions at the various
stages of this case will be cited as The Eastland]; The Boston, 3 F. Cas. 932 (C.C. Mass.
1833) (No. 1,673) (Story, J.); Taylor v. Twenty-five Thousand Dollars, 23 F. Cas. 806
(D.S.C. 1801) (No. 13,807). See also Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257,260, 44 A. 809,
810 (1898), where the court said, "[T]he priest and Levite who passed by on the other
side were not, it is supposed, liable at law for the continued suffering of the man who fell
among thieves, which they might and morally ought to have prevented or relieved."
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II.

RIGHTS OF PROPERTY AND LIFE SALVORS UNDER THE GENERAL
MARITIME LAW AND UNDER THE BRITISH MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT OF

1854

Generally, a volunteer receives property salvage under the
general maritime law if he rescues or at least helps to rescue
property that is in peril.8 The court determines the amount of the
award by examining a variety of factors affecting the volunteer's
merit9 and generally allows the salvor to recover his expenses,
including lost profits. 1°Courts reward volunteer property salvors
8. The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384 (1879). See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note
7, § 8-2, at 534-36. A volunteer is one who has no contractual or official duty to save. A
large number of wrecked or endangered vessels are salvaged without charge by the Coast
Guard in performance of its official duties under 14 U.S.C. §§ 2, 88 (1976) and by private
parties under contract. For years it was thought that the Coast Guard could not legally
receive salvage awards, but that may be changing. United States v. American Oil Co.,
417 F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1036 (1970). See G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, supra note 7, § 8-5 at 549-51. Judge Marvin wrote in 1858 that he could see no
reason in law or policy for denying salvage to the crew or officers of a revenue cutter -if
they exceeded their duty. W. MARVIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF WRECK AND SALVAGE, §
151 n., at 166 (1858). Contracts for salvage may be made either during the emergency or
after it has passed. Most salvage contracts are on a "no cure-no pay" basis, meaning
that payment is contingent on success in the salvage operation. See generally G. GILMORE
& C. BLACK, supra note 7, § 8-15 at 578-85. Ordinarily, crew members who salve their own
ship are not entitled to salvage because of their contract to serve the ship and in order
not to tempt a crew to put a ship into a dangerous position. M. NORRIS, supra note 2, §
52, at 81.
Generally, one who saves the property of another on land without the request of the
0°wner to do so is denied any compensation, even if he expected to be compensated. See 2
G. PALMER, THE LAw OF REsTlTUTION, § 10.3, at 369 (1978). Professor Palmer has criticized
that rule, saying, "It is unfortunate that judges have been generally unwilling to turn . . .
a strongly felt moral obligation into a legal obligation. The policies underlying such decisions are seen to be questionable when compared with the rules of maritime salvage. . . ."
Id. at 370.
9. Among the factors considered are (1) the labor expended by the salvors in rendering the salvage service, (2) the promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in rendering the
service, (3) the value of the property employed by the salvors in rendering the service and
the danger to which such property was exposed, (4) the risk incurred by the salvors in
securing the property from the impending peril, (5) the value of the property saved, and
(6) the degree of danger from which the property was rescued. The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 1, 14 (1869). Another factor affecting the property salvor's award is whether he
saved life in connection with the saving of property. E.g., The Emblem, 8 F. Cas. 611 (D.
Me. 1840) (No. 4,434); Grand Union (Shipping) Ltd. v. London Steam-Ship Owners'
Mutual Ins. Assn. (The Bosworth (No. 3)), [1962] 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 483 (Q.B. Commercial Ct.). See text at notes 14-17 infra.
10. E.g., St. Paul Marine Transp. Corp. v. Cerro Sales Corp., 505 F.2d 1115 (9th Cir.
1974); Atlantic Transp. Co. v. United States, 42 F.2d 583 (Ct. Cl. 1930); The Bosworth
(No. 1), [1959] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 511 (Adm.), modified, [1960] 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 163
(C.A.). See generally M. NORRIS, supra note 2, §§ 210-19, at 338-54; G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, supra note 7, § 8-9, at 562-63. Some expenses are disallowed if they are deemed
too remote or too speculative. See M. NORRIS, supra note 2, §§ 214, 218 at 346-47, 351-53.
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primarily to encourage efforts to save property from destruction
at sea and to discourage embezzlement by salvors. 11
The general maritime law has treated most life salvors less
favorably than property salvors. 12 A life salvor has no claim
against the person saved13 and does only slightly better when he
seeks compensation from the owner of the ship or its cargo. If the
salvor saves both life and property ("the life-property salvor"),
11. The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1, 14 (1869); Mason v. The Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 240 (1804); St. Paul Marine Transp. Corp. v. Cerro Sales Corp., 505 F.2d 1115,
1121 (9th Cir. 1974).
12. Courts in states where slavery was legal and courts in England before the abolition of the slave trade viewed slaves as property and gave a reward for saving the life of a
slave. E.g., Flinn v. The Leander, 9 F. Cas. 275 (D.S.C. 1808) (No. 4,870); Cox v. Two
Negroe Men, (N .Y. Vice Adm. 1751), reported in REPORTS OF CASES IN THE VICE ADMIRALTY
OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW Yoruc AND IN THE COURT OF ADMIRALTY OF 'l'HE STATE OF NEW YORI<,
1715-88, at 173 (C.M. Hough ed. 1925); The Trelawney, 165 Eng. Rep. 592 (1802), Slavery
was not abolished in New York until the nineteenth century. Laws of 1817, c. 137; Laws
of 1841, c. 247; Arents v. Long Island R.R., 156 N.Y. 1, 6 (1898); Lemmon v. People, 20
N.Y. 562 (1860). One federal court located in a free state refused to award salvage for
saving slaves. Gedney v. L'Amistad, 10 F. Cas. 141, 145 (D. Conn. 1840) (No. 5,294a),
modified on other grounds by the Circuit Court of Connecticut (unreported), modified on
other grounds sub nom. United States v. The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet,) 518 (1841).
13. See S. REP. No. 477, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1912). It would have been unthinkable
to sue a free person in rem for life salvage, for this would have meant detaining and selling
the person saved. See Knauth, Aviation and Salvage: The Application of Salvage Principles to Aircraft, 36 CoLUM. L. REv. 224, 228 (1936). The exemption of seamen in England
and the United States from having to pay life salvage seems related to the British and
American courts' traditionally benevolent attitude toward seamen. Cf. Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 387 (1970); F. WISWALL, JR., THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMIRALTY
JURISDICTION SINCE 1800, at 24-25 (1970) (seaman is a ward of the admiralty). The exemption of passengers from paying salvage probably rests on similar grounds. Salvage is
not due even for saving the clothing or personal baggage of the crew because those who
escape a shipwreck "usually find themselves in a strange land, without friends and without resources" and the "common feelings of humanity require that their clothing should
be restored to them forthwith, unburdened with salvage." The Rising Sun, 20 F. Cas.
828, 830 (D. Me. 1837) (No. 11,858). The personal baggage and clothing of passengers is
also exempt. The Willem III, 3 Adm. & Eccl. 487,490 (1871). See also W. MARVIN, supra
note 8, § 123, at 133. Money found on a dead body has been held to be a subject
of salvage. Broere v. Two Thousand One Hundred Thirty-three Dollars, 72 F. Supp. 115
(E.D.N.Y.1947) (motion), 78 F. Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y.1948) (decision); Gardner v. NinetyNine Gold Coins, 111 F. 522 (D. Mass. 1899). But see The Amethyst, 1 F. Cas. 762, 765
(D. Me. 1840) (No. 330) (thirty dollars found on a body ordered to be given to the heirs of
the deceased). In contrast to British and American admiralty law, as of 1900, the Netherlands and possibly Belgium and Italy required the persons saved to contribute to the
salvage award. See CoMITE MARITlME INTERNATIONAL, BULL. No. 9, 152-53 (1901). The
Brussels Salvage Convention provides that, in the absence of a contrary national law, the
persons saved are not liable for salvage. See text at note 90 infra. Some state courts have
permitted doctors and hospitals to recover from a patient's estate for unsolicited benefits
rendered in an emergency even though the patient never regains consciousness. See, e.g.,
In re Crisan's Estate, 362 Mich. 569, 107 N.W.2d 907 (1961); Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark,
601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907). See generally 2 G. PALMER, supra note 8, § 10.4, at 374-77.
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courts generally reward him only indirectly for saving life, tl'.eating it as just one element to be considered in determining the
amount of property salvage. If the salvor saves life when no property is saved ("the pure life salvor"), courts will not reward him
under the general maritime law. Finally, if the salvor saves life
while others save property ("the independent life salvor"), courts
have split over whether to reward him.
This Section takes a close look at the judicial treatment of
the three classes of life salvors in England and the United States.
As we will see, judges occasionally voiced their unhappiness
about the restricted rights of life salvors, and sometimes found
ways to expand those rights.
A. Life-Property Salvors

Courts advanced two reasons to support the practice of giving property salvors a greater reward if they save life while they
are saving property . 14 One is that property salvage is an
"honorary" reward, and in determining the amount of that reward the court may consider the salvors' moral qualities demonstrated in saving human life. 15 Under this theory, the salvor is
compensated only indirectly for life salvage; indeed, the court
usually does not specify how much of the award reflects the enhanced merit shown by saving life. 16
A second reason expressed by courts for increasing awards to
life-property salvors is that saving life at sea furthers the general
interest of shipowners and cargo owners. 17 This reason emphasizes
14. E.g., The Emblem, 8 F. Cas. 611 (D. Me. 1840) (No. 4,434); Grand Union (Shipping) Ltd. v. London Steam-Ship Owners' Mutual Ins. Assn. (The Bosworth (No. 3)),
[1962] 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 483 (Q.B. Commercial Ct.). See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra
note 7, § 8-12, at 570.
15. Lamar v. The Penelope, 14 F. Cas. 977 (E.D.S.C. 1858) (No. 8,007). See also The
Plymouth Rock, 9 F. 413, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1881); The Fusilier, 167 Eng. Rep. 391, 396, 16
Eng. Rep. 19, 26-27 (P.C. 1865).
16. See Grand Union (Shipping) Ltd. v. London Steam-Ship Owners' Mutual Ins.
Assn. (The Bosworth (No. 3)), [1962) 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 483 (Q.B. Commercial Ct.).
17. In addition to the shipowners' and cargo owners' humanitarian interest in the
welfare of the passengers and crew, life salvors benefit shipowners and cargo owners by
reducing the costs that arise from a disaster at sea. Even in the days when shipowners
were not liable for the wrongful death of seamen, courts recognized that increasing the
safety of seamen benefits the shipowners since it helps assure an adequate supply of men
ready to risk the hazards of the sea. See, e.g., Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480 (C.C.D.
Me. 1823) (No. 6,047) (Story, J.). Also, the payment of life salvage is in the interest of
shipowners and cargo owners because it further encourages people to engage in salvage
activities. See generally The Emblem, 8 F. Cas. 611 (D. Me. 1840) (No. 4,434); The
Fusilier, 167 Eng. Rep. 394, 16 Eng. Rep. 19 (P.C. 1865).
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the general benefit to the owners of rescued property rather than
the valor or moral qualities of the salvor. Under this theory, the
salvor is compensated directly for saving life, and the court may
specify the reward that is due.
Although these two theories stress different aspects of saving
life at sea, they are not incompatible and may even complement
each other. In one case a court considered the rescue of some lives
a part of the "general service" rendered a vessel in distress,
merely affecting the merit of the property salvage, but it characterized the rescue of some other lives as a ccspecial service" and
specified particular rewards for those efforts. 18
The reason a court gives for compensating life salvage might
affect the size of the award. For example, a court might be embarrassed to announce a nominal award for saving life at the same
time it generously rewards saving property. It can avoid such
embarrassment without increasing the life salvage by awarding a
lump sum for saving both life and property. Of more general
concern, the reason a court adopts for enhancing a life-property
salvor's reward may influence its attitude toward rewarding independent life salvors and pure life salvors. If the court believes
a life-property salvor deserves an enhanced reward only because
saving life increases a property salvor's merit, then it may be reluctant to reward a life salvor who does not save property. If,
however, the court believes a life-property salvor deserves an
enhanced reward because saving life at sea furthers the interests
of marine commerce, then it may be more willing to reward pure
and independent life salvors. We turn now to the courts' treatment of those two types of salvors.

B. Pure Life Salvors
Although few cases have actually ruled on the issue, 10 courts
18. The Bremen, 111 F. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1901). See also The Mulhouse, reported in
Rigby v. The Cargo and Materials from the Wrecked Ship Mulhouse (pamphlet printed
by Baker and Godwin, New York (1859)) (contained in 1 PAMPHLETS COLLECTED BY
ELBRIDGE T. GERRY 681, part of the large Gerry Collection of the United States Supreme
Court) [hereinafter cited as The Mulhouse (pamphlet)]. The court awarded life salvage
to the master and crew of the Tortugas separately from a property salvage award to the
vessel. Unfortunately, the property salvage aspect of the Tortugas's service is not men•
tioned in the condensed report of the case generally available, 17 F. Cas. 962 (S.D. Fla,
1859) (No. 9,910).
19. The clearest ruling was in The Zephyrus, 166 Eng. Rep. 596 (Adm. 1842), discussed in text at notes 27-35 infra. The case was followed in The Johannes, 167 Eng, Rep.
87, 90 (Adm. 1860) (denying salvage to independent life salvors because the court had no
jurisdiction "to deal with cases of pure life salvage"). In The Renpor, 8 P.D. 116 (C.A.
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and writers have tended to agree that the general maritime law
gives no reward for saving life when no property is saved. 20 The
British High Court of Admiralty first enunciated the proposition
in 1822 as dictum in The Aid. 21 In that case, twenty-two men were
aroused from their sleep and set out in four boats for the express
purposes of saving life in a raging winter storm. There was no
prospect of saving property when they set out. At great risk to
themselves, the salvors managed to save not only life but also
property worth over £6,000. 22 Lord Stowell ruled that a "liberal
salvage remuneration" was due, and he awarded them one tenth
of the property's value, plus their expenses. 23 In reaching that
result, the court said,
1883), and The Cargo ex Sarpendon, 3 P.D. 28 (1877), two cases decided after passage of
the Merchant Shipping Act, which gave the Board of Trade the discretion to reward pure
life salvors, the courts ruled that an owner of a lost ship has no personal liability to pay
life salvage. In Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, 418
F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), revd., 553 F.2d 830 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 889
(1977), the district court denied recovery of expenses to a ship that diverted to pick up
an ill seaman partly on the basis of the doctrine denying pure life salvage. The court of
appeals reversed, using a restitution theory to afford relief. See text at notes 201-42 infra.
Although not actually ruling on the issue, the courts denying awards to independent
life salvers under 46 U.S.C. § 729 (1976) would probably also have denied pure life salvage.
For example, one of these cases, The Eastland, 262 F. 535 (N.D. Ill. 1919), assumed that
independent life salvors had no right to salvage under the general maritime law. See also
The Admiral Evans, 286 F. 442 (W.D. Wash. 1923) (denying life salvage under 46 U.S.C.
§ 729 and apparently under the general maritime law even though the ship was later
raised). Cf. The Shreveport, 42 F.2d 524 (E.D.S.C. 1930) (court grants a reward under the
1912 salvage statute to independent life salvers but assumes that they have no reward
under the general maritime law). If a court denies independent life salvage under the
general maritime law, it will certainly deny life salvage when no property is saved.
20. E.g., The Plymouth Rock, 9 F. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1881); The Emblem, 8 F. Cas. 611
(D.C. Me. 1840) (No. 4,434); Sturtevant v. The George Nicholaus, 23 F. Cas. 333 (E.D.
La. 1853) (No. 13,578); Grand Union (Shipping) Ltd. v. London Steam-Ship Owners'
Mutual Ins. Assn. (The Bosworth (No. 3)) [1962) 1 Lloyd's List L.R. 483 (Q.B. Commercial Ct.); The Cargo ex Schiller, 2 P.D. 145 (C.A. 1877); The Willem ill, 3 Adm. & Eccl.
487, 494 (1871); The Fusilier, 167 Eng. Rep. 391, 16 Eng. Rep. 19 (P.C. 1865); The Aid,
166 Eng. Rep. 30 (Adm. 1822). See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 7, § 8-1,
at 532; M. NORRIS, supra note 2, § 24, at 37; Jarett, supra note 7. In his treatise on wreck
and salvage, Judge William Marvin cited The Zephyrus for the proposition that "the court
has no authority to remunerate salvers for saving life merely." W. MARVIN, supra note 8,
§ 121, at 131. A year later, in The Mulhouse, 17 F. Cas. 962 (S.D. Fla. 1859) (No. 9,910),
Judge Marvin was slightly less categorical. After stating the rule of The Zephyrus he
wrote, "Indeed, if no property is saved, no means are supplied by which the court can
reward the salvor. A suit in personam, for salvage for saving the life of a free person, would
be a novelty and probably could not be maintained, unless under very special circmstances, of an express contract." 17 F. Cas. at 967.
21. 166 Eng. Rep. 30.
22. 166 Eng. Rep. at 30.
23. The expenses apparently included compensation for one of the salvers' boats,
which was crushed during the rescue. 166 Eng. Rep. at 31.
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The mere preservation of life, it is true, this Court has no power of
remunerating; it must be left to the bounty of the individuals; but
if it can be connected with the preservation of property, whether
by accident or not, then the Court can take notice of it, and it is
always willing to join that to the animus displayed in the first
instance. 2~

It was unnecessary for Lord Stowell to assert in The Aid that
the court lacked power to award pure life salvage since the salvors
in that case also saved property. 25 Perhaps because his assertion
was dictum, the judgment cited no authority and gave no reason
why pure life salvors should have no enforceable right to salvage.
Nonetheless, courts in England and the United States have generally accepted that dictum as a valid statement of law. 26
The Zephyruszr was the first reported case to hold that no
reward can be given for pure life salvage. Salvors saved the master and crew of a ship that was in great danger, but failed to save
the vessel or cargo. They sued the owners of the vessel for as much
salvage as the court might think fit. In a judgment by Dr.
Lushington, 28 the court denied their claim, in light of "general
24. 166 Eng. Rep. at 31.
2_5. A federal district judge had reached a similar result about twenty years earlier
in Taylor v. Twenty-five Thousand Dollars, 23 F. Cas. 806 (D.S.C. 1801) (No. 13,087). In
that case the salvors rescued the passengers and crew of a schooner that was wrecked upon
some shoals two miles from the South Carolina shore. While they were saving people, the
salvors also saved $25,000 of the captain's money. They may have intended to save some
cargo when they initially approached the wreck; indeed, on a second trip that the salvors
made to the wreck they saved some trunks and luggage. The opinion, however, seems to
suggest that the salvors initially intended to save only life. Judge Bee said:
[The parties'] motives were generous and disinterested, and their assistance no
less prompt than voluntary. Many others, in their situation, would have remained
snugly on shore. It is true, that they consulted their feelings, and did not calculate
their interests. This is their highest praise; and though it has been said, that their
reward is laid up in heaven, I see no reason why they should not receive such as
may be decreed to them on earth.
23 F. Cas. at 807.
The court awarded $5,000 as compensation for the salvors' risk, services, and "humanity,"
and as "an inducement to others to 'go and do likewise.'" 23 F. Cas. at 807. See also The
Emblem, 8 F. Cas. 611 (D. Me. 1940) (No. 4,434) (libellants rescued passengers of a
wrecked ship and returned two hours later when they learned that there was valuable
property aboard. Quoting The Aid and taking into account the saving of life, the court
thought that the award should be liberal even though the salvage of property was of "no
extraordinary merit").
26. See notes 19 & 20 supra.
27. 166 Eng. Rep. 596 (Adm. 1842).
28. Dr. Stephen Lushington was Judge of the High Court of Admiralty from 1838 to
1867. He was also a Member of Parliament from 1806 to 1808 and from 1820 to 1841. F.
WISWALL, JR., supra note 13, at 40.
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principles and ... the established practice of the Court,"29 and
explained:
The jurisdiction of the Court, in salvage cases, is founded upon a
proceeding against property which has been saved, and I am at a
loss to conceive upon what principle the owners can be made answerable for the mere saving of life. The authority of decided cases
is directly against any such proposition, and I have always understood it to have been settled by Lord Stowell as the law of the
Court, that it is impracticable for parties to prefer a salvage claim
in the Court of Admiralty, merely on account of having saved the
lives of individuals from impending danger or destruction. 30

That explanation for denying pure life salvages leaves much
to be desired. It does not identify any cases demonstrating that
the "established practice of the Court" opposed such a reward.
Presumably the court had The Aid in mind as the case that
settled the rule, but as we have seen, the comments in The Aid
concerning pure life salvage were simply dicta. (Indeed, the
holding in The Aid that a liberal reward is due even though the
salvors' only intention when they set out was to save life could
be read to demonstrate a highly favorable attitude towards life
salvors.) Thus, it seems that the issue in The Zephyrus was one
of first impression, and since it could find no "established practice" of awarding pure life salvage, the court was unwilling to
create a new right.
More difficulties spring from the court's assertion that
"general principles" required it to deny a pure life salvage award.
It ruled that there must be a proceeding against property that has
been saved - a proceeding in rem - for it to have jurisdiction.
Since no property was saved in The Zephyrus, no proceeding in
rem was possible, and not finding any other principle to support
the salvors' claim, the court denied relief. Again it appears to
have overstated the matter. Although salvage suits apparently
were traditionally brought in rem, cases before The Zephyrus had
permitted property salvage claims to be brought in personam. 31
29. 166 Eng. Rep. at 596.
30. 166 Eng. Rep. at 597.
31. The Meg Merrilies, 166 Eng. Rep. 434 (Adm. 1837) (the salved vessel was on a
voyage when process was served); The Trelawney, 165 Eng. Rep. 441 n. (Adm. 1801)
(salvors refrain from arresting vessel at the request of the vessel's owner); The Hope, 165
Eng. Rep 440 (Adm. 1801) (court was not disposed to sustain objection to the proceeding.
The shipowner argued that the only mode of proceeding for salvage was by warrant of
arrest of the ship). The mode of proceeding in each of these cases was by monition, an
instrument that required the person served to appear and show cause. See also The Cargo
ex Schiller, 2 P.D. 145, 149 (C.A. 1877) (Brett, L.J.). Wiswall points out that the proceed-
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Therefore, the fact that the suit in The Zephyrus was in personam
should not have been a sufficient basis for denying jurisdiction.
If property salvage cases suggest any general principle, it is that
in order to encourage salvors to make their best effort, successful
services are generously rewarded and no award is made for unsuccessful efforts. But that principle would require that courts reward successful life salvage efforts generously in order to encourage potential salvors to do their utmost to save life. 32
ing by monition differed from a form of in personam proceeding not used after the
eighteenth century that involved the arrest of the body of the defendant. F. WISWALL,
JR., supra note 13, at 62-64. In The Rapid, 166 Eng. Rep. 460 (Adm. 1838), the court dismissed a salvage suit that was brought by monition because the owners had been prejudiced by an eight-month delay in bringing suit. Although recognizing that "there may
be some cases of special circumstances where salvors have been allowed to proceed by
monition,'' the court was unhappy that suit had not been brought in rem, "the real
foundation of this jurisdiction." 166 Eng. Rep. at 461.
Apparently the first English statute to provide for admiralty suits in personam was
the Admiralty Court Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Viet. c. 78, § 13. The original rule allowing in
personam admiralty suits in federal courts was rule 19, promulgated in 1844. 44 U.S. ix
at xii. Before rule 19, federal courts generally entertained such cases more freely than their
British counterparts. See Morrison, The Remedial Powers of the Admiralty, 43 YALE L.J.
1 (1933). The rules were restrictive at first. The 1854 English statute was applicable only
to cases in which a party had a cause of action against a ship, freight, goods, or other
effects. The federal rule was applicable only to salvage suits performed at the request of
and for the benefit of the person sued. These restrictions were removed by legislation and
judicial decision. Admiralty Court Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Viet. c. 10, § 35; United States v.
Cornell Steamboat Co., 202 U.S. 184 (1906). See also Admiralty Rule 18, promulgated in
1920, 254 U.S. App. at 8 (effective March 7, 1921). The current provision allowing suits
in personam in England is the Administration of Justice Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c, 46 §§
3, 4 (1956) as amended by the Courts Act, 1971, c. 23, § 56(4), sched. 11, pt II. The relevant
American rule is Supplemental Rule C of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
32. Cases before The Zephyrus had endorsed that principle. See The Henry Ewbank,
11 F. Cas. 1166, 1170 (C.C.D. Mass. 1833) (No. 6,376) (Story, J.); Rowe v. The Brig, 20
F. Cas. 1281 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818) (No. 12,093) (Story, J.); The Emulous, 8 F. Cas. 704,
707 (C.C.D. Mass. 1832) (No. 4,480) (Story, J.); The William Beckford, 165 Eng. Rep. 492,
492 (Adm. 1800) (Lord Stowell, then Sir William Scott); The Sarah, 165 Eng. Rep. 188 n,
(Adm. 1800).
Several years after The Zephyrus, Dr. Lushington himself applied the principle to a
difficult fact situation. In The Fusilier, 167 Eng. Rep. 391, 16 Eng. Rep. 19 (Adm. 1864),
affd., 167 Eng. Rep. 395, 16 Eng. Rep. 25 (P.C. 1865), the salvors saved a ship, its cargo,
and 95 passengers; the issue was whether the cargo owners were liable under the Merchant
Shipping Act of 1854, 17 & 18 Viet. c. 104, to contribute for the saving of life. Although
he restated the proposition that pure life salvors could not maintain a suit in the Court of
Admiralty under the general maritime law, 167 Eng. Rep. at 393, 16 Eng. Rep. at 21, Dr.
Lushington held the cargo owners liable for life salvage on the facts before him. He
explained that life salvage is awarded under the statute not only to encourage the saving
of life, but also to encourage salvors generally, "for such reward operates as a further
incentive to salvage exertions." 167 Eng. Rep. at 393, 16 Eng. Rep. at 21. He noted that
the general maritime law required cargo owners to pay life-property salvors an enhanced
reward for the same reasons. Even though the shipowner and cargo owner receive no direct
benefit from the life salvage, they are greatly interested in having such services performed.
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The Zephyrus's explanation seems even more curious when
one notes that after Parliament enacted corrective legislation, Dr.
Lushington denounced the rule denying life salvage as strange
and grossly anomalous. 33 Why did he deny pure life salvage in The
Zephyrus? It may be that he actually believed the Court of Admiralty lacked the power to grant pure life salvage in the absence
of express authorization by Parliament. One cannot help but
speculate, however, that he was using the jurisdictional argument
to cloak a reason he felt uncomfortable articulating: he may have
considered it less important to reward life salvors than to encourage maritime commerce by limiting cargo owners' and shipowners' losses. 34 A more remote possibility is that Dr. Lushington
feared allowing life salvage suits to be brought in personam
33. The Coromandel, 166 Eng. Rep. 1097, 1098 (Adm. 1857); Silver Bullion, 164 Eng.
Rep. 312, 314 (Adm. 1854).
34. A similar policy apparently underlay the British limitation-of-liability statutes,
which limited a shipowner's liability to the value of the ship and its freight for "losses or
damages" that happen to cargo or other vessels without the shipowner's fault or privity.
53 Geo. 3, c. 159, § 1 (1813), amending 26 Geo. 3, c. 86 (1786) and 7 Geo. 2, c. 15 (1734).
In Cail v. Papayanni (The Amalia), 15 Eng. Rep. 778, 779 (Adm.1863), affd., 15 Eng. Rep.
778, 779 (P.C. 1863), in which the court allowed a shipowner to limit its liability under a
limitation statute for collision damages, the court quoted Dr. Lushington: "'The principle of limited liability is, that full indemnity, the natural right of justice, shall be
abridged for political reasons.'" In The Clara, 166 Eng. Rep. 986, 987 (Adm. 1855), Dr.
Lushington said that the limitation of liability statutes were enacted "upon the principle
that unlimited liability was prejudicial to the maritime interests of this country." But see
KENNEDY'S C1v1L SALVAGE 162 nn. 10-11 (4th ed. 1958), suggesting that the British limitation statutes did not apply to the liability to pay salvage.
The first American statute limiting liability was enacted in 1851, based in part on
the British example. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 7, § 10-2, at 818-19. The
statute limits liability not only for loss and damage but also for "any act, matter, or thing,
• . . done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge" of the owner. 46
U.S.C. § 183 (1976). An amendment added in 1884 provides that owners may limit their
liability for their "debts and liabilities." 46 U.S.C. § 189 (1976). As amended, the federal
statute applies to property salvage claims incurred without the privity or fault of the
owner. The San Pedro, 223 U.S. 365 (1912).
Even without the benefit of the limitation statutes, the salvage rules limit the salvage
award to the value of the property saved. Indeed, the salvage rules are less favorable to
life salvors than the limitation of liability statutes. For example, the denial of pure life
salvage and the limitation of awards for life-property salvage to the value of the property
saved limit the cargo owners' liability to the amount of the cargo saved. By contrast, the
limitation statutes do not limit a cargo owner's liability. Also, when a ship is lost a life
salvor has no claim against the freight and passage money that is earned. M. NORRIS,
supra note 2, § 37, whereas such moneys are subject to claims in a limitation action. The
Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122 (1894). Further, in contrast to the limitation statutes, the
pure life salvage rule exonerates the shipowner even if the perilous situation is caused by
the owner's fault or with its privity and knowledge. For some time now, American courts
have been reluctant to limit a shipowner's liability under the statute and have expanded
the use of the privity and knowledge exceptions. See note 167 infra.
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against the shipowner lest other plaintiffs seek to recover in personam from the person saved, a situation that would contravene
the court's concern for seamen and passengers. 35
C. Independent Life Salvors
An independent life salvor (one who saves life in a situation
where another saves property) is similar to the life-property salvor in that he seeks a reward when property has been saved. On
the other hand, he is similar to the pure life salvor in that he has
not saved property. Courts have split over whether to reward him
as they do life-property salvors or whether to deny him a reward
as they do pure life salvors.
1. In England

In The Queen Mab, the court awarded £30 to salvors who
saved the crew of a ship and £100 to other salvors who rescued
the vessel. Unfortunately, the judgment did not explain the basis
for its independent life salvage award. The only clue lies in the
argument of the salvors, which referred to a statute giving the
magistrates and justices of the peace of Cinque Ports, over which
the Court of Admiralty had appellate jurisdiction, the authority
to award salvage "for being instrumental in saving the life or lives
of any person or any persons on board." 37
In The Zephyrus, 38 which as we saw was a case of pure life
salvage, 39 Dr. Lushington severely criticized The Queen Mab. In
his view, neither the pure life salvor nor the independent life
salvor should be given a right to any salvage recovery. 40 Although
36

35. This theory does not explain why Dr. Lushington felt that independent life salvors
could not sue the cargo or ship in rem for a reward. See text at notes 39-44 infra. The
inconsistency is not necessarily proof that the theory is incorrect. Commenting on Dr,
Lushington's judicial career, one writer has said, "[J]udicial inconsistency was surely
[Lushington's] greatest and most obvious shortcoming" but that "[f]rom the time of
acting as advocate for the mistreated crewmen of the Lowther Castle [166 Eng, Rep. 137
(Adm. 1825)), he was benevolent to the plight of the mariner." F. WISWALL, JR,, supra
note 13, at 73.
36. 166 Eng. Rep. 395 (Adm. 1835). The life salvage award also covered the salvor's
expenses. 166 Eng. Rep. at 396.
37. 166 Eng. Rep. at 396 (citing 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 75, § 8 (1821)),
38. 166 Eng. Rep. 596, 597 (Adm. 1842).
39. See text at note 28 supra.
40. Dr. Lushington observed that he could not see "any sound distinction between
the case of a vessel salved by one set of salvors, and the crew by another, and a case in
which the crew were rescued and no assistance whatever was rendered to the vessel," 166
Eng. Rep. at 597.
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his comments about independent life salvage were dicta, any
hopes that Dr. Lushington would change his mind were dashed
eighteen years later in The Johannes, 41 where he held that general
maritime law gives no reward to an independent life salvor. The
Johannes gives no reason behind the holding other than a citation
to The Zephyrus and the lack of a contrary precedent in "the
general maritime law of Europe, either in ancient or modern
times. " 42 The opinion is particularly frustrating because it states,
Most true it is that the preservation of human life is a much higher
service than the rescuing from destruction of any property however
valuable. . . . Still, high as the merit confessedly is, the Court of
Admiralty did not deem itself competent to deal with such cases.
Strong reasons might be assigned for this abstinence, but it is not
necessary to travel further; I adhere to my opinion that the Court
had no original jurisdiction to deal with cases of pure life salvage. 43

As in the case of pure life salvage, Dr. Lushington's "strong reason" for not rewarding independent life salvors may have been a
desire to limit the liability of shipowners and cargo owners. 44
Parliament enacted legislation in 1846 - presumably in reaction to The Zephyrus - that seemed to give life salvors a right
to salvage. It, is unclear, however, whether the statute applied
both to pure life salvors and independent life salvors. 45 In any
41. 167 Eng. Rep. 87 (Adm. 1860). The Johannes also denied relief under the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, 17 & 18 Viet., c. 104. See text at note 50 infra.
42. 167 Eng. Rep. at 90. The Queen Mab, 166 Eng. Rep. 395 (Adm. 1835), reached a
contrary result, but Dr. Lushington apparently felt no need to discuss that case, having
disapproved of it in The Zephyrus. See text at notes 38-40 supra. Dr. Lushington also
either chose to ignore or was unaware of Judge Marvin's contrary decision in The Mulhouse, 17 F. Cas. 962 (S.D. Fla. 1859) (No. 9,910), which was based in part on an apparent
misreading of an earlier case by Dr. Lushington. See note 71 infra. Most of the facts and
all of the headnotes of The Mulhouse (not containing any reference to Dr. Lushington's
earlier opinion) were reported in England in The Shipping and Mercantile Gazette, April
25, 1860 at 6, col. 5, about eight months before the decision in The Johannes. In his
autobiography, Judge Marvin recounts that Dr. Lushington entertained him a couple of
days during Marvin's trip to England in the summer of 1860, still several months before
The Johannes, and that they discussed "law and lawyers." Autobiography of William
Marvin (1892) (unpublished manuscript, ed. by K. Kearney and reprinted in 36 FLA. HtsT.
Q. 179, 211 (1958)) [hereinafter cited as Autobiography].
43. 167 Eng. Rep. at 90.
44. It is interesting to note Dr. Lushington's comments in The Pensacola, 167 Eng.
Rep. 376, 379 (Adm. 1864), where he remarked,
[T]he very foundation of the law of salvage - that salvors should be stimulated
by hope of liberal reward to brave difficulty and danger, and go forth to the succor
of vessels in distress . . . applies with the highest force to those cases in which there
is not only property but also life to be saved.
45. 9 & 10 Viet., c. 99, § 19 provides in pertinent part:
[E]very person . . . who shall act or be employed in any way whatsoever in the
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event, in 1854 Parliament passed The Merchant Shipping Act, 40
a comprehensive piece of legislation designed to consolidate and
amend the many statutes that applied to the British shipping
industry. Sections 458 and 459 of that Act give salvors who save
life within the United Kingdom a right to salvage against the
owners of the ship and cargo that has been saved. 47 Furthermore,
the life salvor's claim against the ship is preferred to the claims
of other salvors. If no property is saved, or if the property saved
is insufficient to pay life salvage, then the Board of Trade has the
power to award such sums as it sees fit out of the Mercantile
Marine Fund. An 1861 statute extended those provisions to lives
saved from British ships anywhere in the world and to lives saved
from foreign ships "wholly or in part in British waters." 48 Parliament further expanded the coverage of life salvage provisions in
1863 by giving the Vice Admiralty Courts in the various British
possessions the power to hear "claims in respect of salvage of
any ship, or of life or goods therefrom." 49
saving or preserving of any ship or vessel in distress, or of any part of the cargo
thereof, or of the life of any person on board the same . . . shall . . . be paid a
reasonable reward or compensation by the way of salvage for such service, by the
commander, master or other superior officer, mariners, or owners of said ship or
vessel, or their agent, or by the merchant whose ship, vessel, or cargo shall be so
saved as aforesaid . . . .
(emphasis added).
Some have doubted the statute's effectiveness, saying that the statute does not provide clearly enough by whom the salvage is to be paid or how it is to be enforced. Jarett,
supra note 7, at 782 n.23; MERCHANT SHIPPING Acr OF 1854, at 193 (Dowdeswell ed.), cited
by counsel in The Johannes, 167 Eng. Rep. 87, 89 (Adm. 1860). In The Fusilier, 167 Eng.
Rep. 391, 396-97, 16 Eng. Rep. 87, 89 (P.C. 1865), however, the Privy Council stated that
the provisions of the 1846 Act were "substantially re-enacted" in the Merchant Shipping
Act of 1854.
46. 17 & 18 Viet., c. 104.
47. The right to salvage from cargo owners was somewhat in doubt but was resolved
favorably to the life salvor in The Fusilier, 167 Eng. Rep. 391, 16 Eng. Rep. 87 (P.C. 1865).
See note 32 supra.
48. Admiralty Court Act, 1861, 24 Viet., c. 10, § 9. This statute was apparently
intended to correct the result in The Johannes, 167 Eng. Rep. 87 (Adm. 1860), that denied
a reward to those who rescued some people outside the three-mile limit and brought them
to shore. The Pacific [1898] P. 170; The Heindall (Nova Scotia Vice Adm. 1872), reported
in YOUNG'S ADMIRALTY DECISIONS 132 (Oxley ed. 1882). But see Jorgensen v. Neptune
Steam Fishing Co., 4 Fr. 992 (Scot. Ct. Sess. 1902).
49. Vice Admiralty Courts Act, 1863, 26 & 27 Viet., c. 24, § 10. See The Heindall
(Nova Scotia Vice Adm. 1872), reported in YOUNG'S ADMIRALTY DECISIONS 132 (Oxley ed.
1882), where Judge Young fully discusses the effect of this statute. He rules out the
possibility that Canadian courts have greater freedom than English courts to award life
salvage even though the statutes express no such limitation. YOUNG'S ADMIRALTY DECISIONS
at 133. In 1873, the Canadian Parliament enacted a life salvage statute effective the
following year that was based on the British statute of 1854. The Wreck and Salvage Act,
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The courts gave the life salvage statutes a mixed reaction.
The High Court of Admiralty restricted the 1854 provision to life
saved within three miles of the United Kingdom. 50 The Court of
Appeal held that the statute does not give pure life salvors a
claim against the owners of the ship and cargo; their only right
is to ask the Board of Trade to make a discretionary reward. 51
Further, one judge ruled that life salvors cannot recover salvage
from the owners of a sunken ship even when the owners have
already recovered the value of the ship from a- third party. 52
But not all reaction to the life salvage statutes was negative.
Dr. Lushington praised the reform of the life salvage rules, 53 and
thought that when the statute was applicable, it often required
large awards for saving life. 54 Lord Justice Baggallay also thought
that denying life salvage was unjust. 55 He and Lord Justice James
held for a divided Court of Appeal in The Cargo ex Schiller5 6 that
cargo owners must reward those who saved life even though the
cargo was apparently raised "many weeks" after the saving of life
by the owners' employees, who were not entitled to salvage. 57 The
1873, 36 Viet., c. 55, § 23 (Can.). In The Atlantic (Nova Scotia Vice Adm. 1874), reported

in YOUNG'S ADMIRALTY DECISIONS 170 (Oxley ed. 1882), the court awarded salvage for
saving life in 1873 but did not state the statutory basis for its decree. If one reads The
Atlantic by itself, one may understandably gain the impression, as one writer did, that
Judge Young awarded life salvage in that case under the general maritime law. See 4
BROOKLYN J. INTL. L., supra note 7, at 123.
Under an 1862 act, the life salvage provision can be applied to life saved from foreign
ships if the country to whom those ships belong is willing to have those provisions apply.
The Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Viet., c. 63, § 59. Apparently
only Prussia, in 1864, asked to have the life salvage statutes apply to its ships. See Jarett,
supra note 7, at 782 n.23. The 1854 provision on life salvage as amended was substantially
reenacted in the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, 57 & 58 Viet., c. 60, §§ 544, 545. Some
countries have legislation patterned on this provision. E.g., CAN. REV. STAT., c. S-9, § 515
(1970); Shipping and Seamen Act, 1952, § 356 (New Zealand), 14 REPH. STAT. N.Z. 296.
India and Israel have similar legislation, but lack provisions for discretionary governmental awards. Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, § 402, 14 INDIA A.LR. MANUAL 452. Wreck and
Salvage Ordinance, 2 Laws of Palestine, c. 155, § 19 (1933) (in force in Israel). This was
also the case in Australia under § 315 of its Navigation Act of 1912, but a provision for
discretionary governmental awards was added by § 157(1)(b) of the Navigation Act of
1958.
50. The Johannes, 167 Eng. Rep. 87 (Adm. 1860). That decision was effectively overruled by Parliament in its amendment to the statute the following year. See note 48 supra.
51. The Renpor, 8 P.D. 115 (C.A. 1883).
52. The Annie, 12 P.D. 50 (1886).
53. The Coromandel, 166 Eng. Rep. 1097 (Adm. 1857); Silver Bullion, 164 Eng. Rep.
312 (Adm. 1854).
54. The Eastern Monarch, 167 Eng. Rep. 43 (Adm. 1860).
55. The Cargo ex Schiller, 2 P.D. 145, 158 (C.A. 1877).
56. 2 P.D. 145 (C.A. 1877), affg. 1 P.D. 473 (1876).
57. Although the opinions do not specify the amount of time elapsed between the
saving of life and the raising of the cargo, the defendants alleged that "many weeks" had
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judgment of Lord Justice James exemplifies the liberal approach,
relying
on the words of the statute as they would be understood by plain
men who know nothing of the technical rule of the Court of Admiralty, or of flotsam, lagan, and jetsam. The legislature tells mariners that if they exert themselves to save life, they shall receive
reward on the principle of salvage, and to put a technical meaning
on the words, so as to limit the operation of the enactment, would
be "to keep the word of promise to the ear and break it to the
hope." 58
•

2. In the United States

In 1860, the English case The Johannes held that independent life salvors have no right under the general maritime law to
a reward. 59 As we saw, the case provided little analysis of the
problem. 00 By contrast, an 1859 American case, The Mulhouse, 61
elapsed and the plaintiffs did not challenge this in their reply. 1 P.D. at 474-75. The cargo
owners had argued in the trial court that the life salvors had no claim against property
raised "long subsequent" to their services, 1 P.D. at 475, an argument that the trial judge
thought was "untenable." 1 P.D. at 480. Lord Justice Brett's dissent in the Court of
Appeal was not based on the interlude between the two salvage services. Instead, he felt
that the life salvage statute only applied when wreck, flotsam, jetsam, or lagan were saved
by men entitled to salvage. The cargo raised did not fit these categories, and the men who
raised it received no salvage award, presumably because they were entitled to compensation under their contract whether or not they were successful.
58. 2 P .D. at 161. The last part of James's judgment is derived from Macbeth's lines:
And be these juggling fiends no more believed,
That palter with us in a double sense,
That keep the word of promise to our ear,
And break it to our hope!
Macbeth, Act 5, scene 8, 19-22 (Harrison ed.).
59. An earlier case, The Queen Mab, rewarded independent life salvors but the decision may have been based on the court's reading of a statute. See text at notes 36-37 supra.
60. See text at notes 38-43 supra.
61. The Mulhouse (pamphlet), supra note 18. The report of the case went through a
series of unfortunate condensations. A condensed report first appeared in 22 Monthly L.
Rep. 276 (1858). The last sentence of the statement of facts in that report reads: "The
more particular facts of the case are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court which
we are obliged somewhat to condense." 22 Monthly L. Rep. at 278 (emphasis added).
The Monthly Law Reporter version of the case served as the basis for the report in
Federal Cases, 17 F. Cas. 962 (S.D. Fla. 1859) (No. 9,910), which is the only report
generally available today and which contains the disclaimer quoted above. 17 F. Cas. at
963. The Monthly Law Reporter version was also the basis of the even more abbreviated
report in 42 HUNT'S MERCHANT MAGAZINE 191, which gave only the prefatory statement of
facts and the headnotes. The Hunt's report was reprinted in 31 NEW ORLEANS PmcE
CURRENT, No. 56, at 3 (unpaginated) (March 28, 1860), which was in turn substantially
reprinted in England in The Shipping and Mercantile Gazette on April 25, 1860, at 6. And
the story gets worse! The editors of the Gazette, apparently believing that the headnotes
constituted the full opinion, printed them as one long paragraph and modified the last
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clearly decided the issue in favor of the independent life salvor,
supporting its conclusion with solid policy analysis. 62 Unfortunately, modern American cases have neglected The Mulhouse
and have assumed that independent life salvors have no right to
a reward under judge-made law.
The Mulhouse ran aground off the coast of Florida in 1859.
Numerous salvors worked "off and on as the weather would permit," for about one month, to save cargo and materials from the
wrecked ship. 63 One ship, the Globe, saved the passengers of the
Mulhouse, and another ship, the Tortugas, saved the crew and a
small amount of property. 64 The Globe and the Tortugas were
among the parties to claim a reward from the salvaged property.
Judge William Marvin, an authority on salvage, 65 began his
opinion by accepting the rule of The Zephyrus that no reward is
due for pure life salvage, but he suggested that such an award
might be owed in case of an "express contract." 66 He then endorsed the proposition of The Emblem, 67 an American lifeproperty salvage case, that
the general principles of humanity and of enlarged policy, applicable to these cases, where all are interested in adventures upon the
sentence of the statement of facts to read, "The more particular facts of the case are stated
in the following opinion of the Court:-." See also Digest of Maritime Law Cases, 8 L.T.R.
(n.s.) 440, 441 (1863) (noting the holding in The Mu/house on life salvage).
The records of the Southern District of Florida contain a brief opinion and a decree
delivered by Judge Marvin in open court on May 6, 1859. Federal Archives, East Point,
Ga., Record Group No. 21, Accession 53A418, Retrieval No. 60 [hereinafter cited as Court
Records], at 323.
62. The Johannes did not consider The Mulhouse. See note 42 supra.
63. The Mulhouse (pamphlet), supra note 18, at 26. The prefatory statement offacts
states that the Mulhouse was wrecked on March 26, and that the salvage services continued until April 25 when the ship broke up. The Mulhouse (pamphlet), supra note 18, at
5. Apparently the salvage services began on March 28. Amended libel of Rigby and others,
Court Records, supra note 61, at 317. In the opinion delivered in open court, Judge Marvin
said that the salvage services lasted "until about the 25th of April." Id. at 324.
64. The Mulhouse (pamphlet), supra note 18, at 33-34 (decree of the court).
65. William Marvin was a judge of the Superior Court of the Southern District of
Florida from 1839 to 1847 and was a judge of the newly constituted District Court for the
Southern District of Florida from 1847 to 1863. Judge Marvin published a treatise on
wreck and salvage in 1858. He was a delegate to two conferences on general average, the
Glasgow Conference in 1860 and the York Conference in 1864. A supporter of the Union
while on the bench, Marvin decided many prize cases during the Civil War, and President
Johnson appointed him Governor of Florida in 1865. He was elected to the United States
Senate in the following year but was not allowed a seat because the newly freed slaves
were not allowed to vote in Florida. See generally Autobiography, supra note 42; 11 THE
NATIONAL CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 379 (1909).
66. 17 F. Cas. at 967.
67. 8 F. Cas. 611 (D. Me. 1840) (No. 4,434).

1236

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 77:1218

high seas, and liable to become in turn salvors and the saved,
require that the circumstance of the preservation of life ought not
to be kept wholly out of sight in measuring the reward. 08

Judge Marvin interpreted this "enlarged policy" to mean that "if
life is saved in connection with property, it is proper for the court
to take notice of that fact, and increase the salvage accordingly."69 He reasoned further that independent life salvors have
a right to a reward because otherwise,
if any advantage in the salvage could be obtained by saving the
property rather than the lives - a strong temptation would be held
out to salvors, in many instances, to gratify their avarice at the
expense of their feelings of humanity. 70

These two factors - first, that independent life salvors' efforts
further the general interests of maritime commerce in the safety
of seamen, and second, that there is a need in many cases to
encourage salvors to choose to save life rather than to save property - compelled71 the court's holding: "[I]f one set of salvors
68. The Mulhouse (pamphlet), supra note 18, at 27, (quoting The Emblem, 8 F. Cas.
611, 612 (D. Me. 1840) (No. 4,434)). Judge Marvin also quotes this portion of The Emblem
in his treatise on salvage published one year before The Mu/house. W. MARVIN, supra note
8, § 121, at 131.
69. 17 F. Cas. at 967.
70. 17 F. Cas. at 967.
71. In reaching his conclusion in The Mu/house, Judge Marvin also relied upon a
British case, The Genessee, 12 Jurist 401, also reported sub nom. The Genesee, 6 N.Y.
Legal Obs. 358 (Adm. 1848). (The report of The Mu/house in Federal Cases cites "The
Genesee Chief," 17 F. Cas. at 968. That was clearly not the case Judge Marvin had in
mind. The Genesee Chiefv. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851), was a landmark case
in which the Supreme Court decided that federal admiralty jurisdiction extends to the
Great Lakes. The case says not a word about life salvage. As the complete report of The
Mulhouse (pamphlet), supra note 18, at 27, and the report in 22 Monthly L. Rep. at 288
make clear, Judge Marvin's authority was The Genessee.)
Unfortunately, The Genessee does not provide much support for the holding in The
Mu/house. Judge Marvin believed that in The Genessee, "Dr. Lushington upon general
principles of law and before the passage of 'The Shipping Act,' rewarded some .••
salvors, who had saved the lives of the crew, though the property was saved by others,"
W. MARVIN, supra note 8, § 121 at 132 n. Yet that description of The Genessee is faulty in
several respects. First, the case arose two years after Parliament passed the 1846 act that
seemed to give life salvors a right to a reward. See note 45 supra. Second, for Dr, Lushington to hold that independent life salvors had a right to salvage would be inconsistent with
his holding in The Johannes. See text at note 41 supra. Finally, the life salvors in The
Genessee stood by the distressed ship at night during a gale at the request of her master
or pilot. 12 Jurist at 402; 6 N.Y. Legal Obs. at 359-60. Such services are today well
recognized as salvage services because of their benefit to the ultimate saving of property.
M. NORRIS, supra note 2, § 26, at 39-40. It is clear that Judge Marvin was aware of at
least one case giving property salvage for such stand-by services. Allen v. The Canada, 1
F. Cas. 464 (D.S.C. 1798) (No. 219), cited in W. MARVIN, supra note 8, § 109 n., at 120.
Judge Marvin may also have known of a similar case, The Courier, 6 F. Cas. 647 (Super.
Ct. S.D. Fla. 1836) (No. 3,283) (Webb, J.). Although the reports in Federal Cases show
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saves life and another property, each is to be compensated out of
the property saved, according to the merit of their respective
services." 72 Yet in subsequent cases, the courts misconstrued or
that he cited that Courier in Pent v. The Ocean Belle, 19 F. Cas. 200, 202 (S.D. Fla. 1861)
(No. 10,961), The Philah, 19 F. Cas. 494-95 (S.D. Fla. 1857) (No. 11,091a), and The Ellen
Hood, 8 F. Cas. 515, 515 (S.D. Fla. 1855) (No. 4,377), in fact he was referring in those
three cases to an unreported decision that he had written in 1853, Bethel v. The Courier,
5 Admiralty Records 132-44 (S.D. Fla.) (Federal Records Center, East Point, Ga., Accession No. 53A418, Retrieval No. 53).
Although Judge Marvin's reliance on The Genessee was misplaced, it was certainly
understandable. Dr. Lushington's opinion in that case was ambiguous about why the
salvors who stood by the Genessee-members -0f the crew of the ship Petrel-were rewarded. It was equally vague about the reason for rewarding another vessel, the Fame,
for coming out to the Genessee at the pilot's request. The court said,
The question I have to determine with respect to these two vessels is, whether what
they did towards saving the lives of those on board the vessel, and rescuing the
vessel from peril, will or will not enable the Court to give them a reward. As to their
meritorious exertions, especially those of The Petrel, in laying by to save the lives
of the crew, I think there cannot be two opinions entertained.
12 Jurist at 402; 6 N.Y. Legal Obs. at 360. Without further discussion of their services,
the court awarded the two ships £300. Dr. Lushington rewarded salvors who rendered
much the same service as the Fame in The Undaunted, 167 Eng. Rep. 47 (Adm. 1860).
Judge Marvin's misreading of legal history is, of course, far less significant than the
quality of his policy analysis. In the words of Holmes, "Ignorance is the best of law
reformers." O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 64 (1881) (Howe ed. 1963). Holmes goes on
to say:
People are glad to discuss a question on general principles, when they have forgotten the special knowledge necessary for technical reasoning. But the present willingness to generalize is founded on more than merely negative grounds. The philosophical habit of the day, the frequency of legislation, and the ease with which the
law may be changed to meet the opinions and wishes of the public, all make it
natural and unavoidable that judges as well as others should openly discuss the
legislative principles upon which their decisions must always rest in the end, and
should base their judgments upon broad considerations of policy to which the
traditions of the bench would hardly have tolerated a reference fifty years ago.
Judge Marvin's liberal attitude toward life salvage may be related to the fact that as
a young man he nearly drowned while sailing on the Potomac River with a friend in order
to visit a "handsome young woman" in Alexandria, Virginia. It was Marvin's first attempt
at sailing and he encountered "high head winds and considerable sea." Marvin and his
companion managed to get ashore on their own, but their boat was lost. The incident
apparently had a strong impact on Marvin, who recounted it over sixty years later in his
autobiography. Autobiography, supra note 42, at 183. Marvin wrote, "I was not drowned!
but ought to have been, and perhaps may live to be hung! " Id.
72. 17 F. Cas. at 967-68. The court also displayed a liberal attitude in its reward to
the government-owned vessel, the Tortugas, which saved life and property. The court
awarded each of the other property salvors a share of the particular property it saved, since
the vessel had broken up and each cargo owner was treated as being on his own. 17 F.
Cas. at 964. The percentage awarded depended upon the difficulty involved in raising the
particular property. If this approach had been applied to the Tortugas, the court could
have limited its life-property award to $61, the value of the property it saved. Instead the
court awarded $100 to the master and crew plus about $27 to the vessel for saving the
property. The Mulhouse (pamphlet), supra note 18, at 33-34. The life salvage was paid
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ignored73 The Mulhouse (perhaps because of the abysmal reporting of the case), 74 and one writer criticized it fervently. 75 Until
very recently, the case was the high water mark of life salvors'
rights in the United States.
The retreat from independent life salvage since The
Mulhouse has not been especially graceful. In The George W.
Clyde, 78 Judge Charles Benedict - like Marvin, a respected admiralty judge - denied salvage to the tug Scandinavian, which
rescued passengers and crew after the Clyde collided with another
vessel and after other tugs had begun towing the Clyde to shore.
In contrast, the court awarded $1,000 to the property salvors who
exerted themselves for only fifteen minutes, expending wholly
nonextraordinary efforts in the face of wholly nonextraordinary
risks. The court justified denying a reward to the Scandinavian
as follows:
First, because her services were not needed nor furnished at the
request of the captain of the Clyde; second, because . . . the only
object of her exertions was to take off the crew and passengers.
Services of that character do not give rise to a claim for salvage
against the ship. 77

Thus, without considering The Mulhouse, and without citing any
authority, Judge Benedict held that an independent life salvor
out of the property saved by all of the salvors even though all of the property was not saved
"in immediate connection with the saving of life." 17 F. Cas. at 968.
73. The Mulhouse was misconstrued in The Admiral Evans, 286 F. 442 (W.D. Wash.
1923). See text at notes 79-82 infra. See The Shreveport, 42 F.2d 524 (E.D.S.C. 1930), The
Eastland, 262F. 535 (N.D.Ill.1919), and The George W. Clyde, 80F.157 (E.D.N.Y.1897),
where the courts expressed the view that independent life salvors had no right to salvage
under the general maritime law.
74. See note 61 supra. The condensed report in Federal Cases omits the fact that the
salvage of property lasted a month, and it omits the decree showing that the Tortugas
saved both property and life. It also omits Judge Marvin's quotation from The Emblem
and cites The Genesee Chief rather than The Genessee to support the court's holding on
independent life salvage.
75. In his treatise on shipping, Professor Theophilus Parsons criticized the rule in The
Queen Mab and The Mulhouse. He wrote, "[T]here seems to be no reason why salvage
should be allowed in such a case and not where the crew are saved, but no assistance
rendered to the vessel by any one, and the distinction is repudiated by Dr. Lushington,"
citing The Zephyrus. 2 T. PARSONS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW or SHIPPING 297 (1869).
Parsons's argument may prove too much. If there is no valid distinction between the
situations of the pure life salvor and the independent life salvor, then perhaps the courts
ought to award salvage in both cases, in light of the humanitarian interests at stake. The
situations can be distinguished, of course, by the desire to limit the shipowner's liability
to the value of the ship.
76. 80 F. 157 (E.D.N.Y. 1897), affd. as to the property salvors, 86 F. 665 (2d Cir.
1898). The life salvors did not appeal.
77. 80 F. at 158.
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has no claim for salvage. 78
Nor did the situation improve following The George W.
Clyde. One ironic case was The Admiral Evans, 79 in which the life
salvors alleged that they incurred $2,000 of property damage
while saving the passengers from a sinking ship that was raised
later. 80 The court denied them a reward and any compensation for
their loss, declaring, "Taking passengers from a sinking ship, rendering no service in rescuing the vessel, is not a salvage service." 81
The court cited The Emblem and The Mulhouse to support the
proposition that saving life was a common duty of humanity and
not for reward - a tortured misconstruction of cases that had
rewarded life-property salvors and independent life salvors based
on the humanitarian principles underlying the law of salvage. 82
78. At least one court and two writers have read the case that way. See The Admiral
Evans, 286 F. 442, 443 (W.D. Wash. 1923); G. RoBINSON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES § 98, at 717 (1939); Cunningham, supra note 7.
Judge Benedict could have denied a reward to the Scandinavian simply because the
passengers and crew were not in peril once the other tugs began to tow the Clyde. This is
what the court apparently meant when it said that the Scandinavian's services were "not
needed." Therefore the court's second reason for denying relief, that taking off crew and
passengers is not a salvage act, seems to include taking off crew and passengers when that
service is needed. The parties may not have focused on the life salvage issue. The libels
of the owners and charterers of the Scandinavian did not claim a reward for saving life.
Instead they claimed that they had saved the Clyde from sinking. Federal Records Center,
Bayonne, N.J., Admiralty Cases, Files R. 401, 412. No briefs were filed, and there is no
transcript of any argument before the court.
79. 286 F. 442 (W.D. Wash. 1923).
80. The life salvors also saved the baggage and mail on board the Admiral Evans.
The court held that the ship could not be sued in rem for saving cargo and that United
States mails cannot be sued in rem. 286 F. at 443.
81. 286 F. at 443.
82. Reminiscent of The George W. Clyde, see note 78 supra, the report of The Admiral Evans does not disclose that the life salvors based their claim on their assistance to
the distressed vessel at the request of her master and on their standing by before and after
she sank. Their main argument seems to have been that even though their standby
services ultimately proved not to benefit the vessel, they should still have received a
reward since their services were engaged by the master. Brief ofLibelant at 3, The Admiral
Evans, 286 F. 442 (W.D. Wash. 1923). Viewed in this light, the saving of life was merely
incidental to the services rendered the ship.
The shipowner's brief, which the court heavily relied upon, sheds light on one
problematic aspect of the decision. The last sentence in the opinion is "the Libelant may
have a remedy in personam, but may not recover against the ship." Standing alone, this
sentence seems to suggest that life salvors may be able to recover from the shipowner in
personam, a proposition that one authority said was without support. 1 BENEDICT ON
ADMIRALTY 328 n.23 (6th ed. 1940). But see The Mulhouse, 17 F. Cas. 962 (S.D. Fla. 1859)
(No. 9,910) (suggesting that life salvors may be able to recover from the shipowner if there
was an "express contract"). The shipowner's brief indicates, however, that the court
probably intended to refer only to the salvor's possible right to sue the shipowners in
personam for the services rendered at request. The brief stated,
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Misfortune begat misfortune when Barge 592-Delroy 83 relied
upon The Admiral Evans in 1937. The court denied an enhanced
reward to a life-property salvor, 84 saying that his service of saving
the crew "was not done in connection with the saving of the barge
and its cargo and, therefore, cannot be allowed him." 85 One irony
of Barge 592-Delroy is that it is irreconcilable with The Emblem,86 which gave life-property salvors a liberal reward because
they saved life. 87 A second irony is that Barge 592-Delroy, like
The Admiral Evans, was decided after the United States and
most other major maritime countries had ratified a treaty that
was intended to increase the rights of life salvors. The next Section of this Article deals with the history of that treaty and the
federal statute that it fostered.
ill.

TREATY REFORM AND THE

1912

LIFE SALVAGE STATUTE

The Brussels Salvage Convention of 1910 was signed by 25
nations, including the United States and England, and was designed to unify the life salvage rules. 88 The Convention went
through several drafts89 before producing a treaty that made little
As suggested upon page 3 of Libelant's Memorandum Brief, it may be true that
the furnishing of services to a vessel at the request of her captain may result in a
valid claim for salvage services, but unless such services result in aiding or saving
the vessel herself, no lien can be claimed against her under the authorities above
presented. Libelant, if he had any rights in rem, lost those rights when he surrendered possession of the articles saved, to wit, the baggage and mail. Upon these
alone could he have claimed a lien. If he has any right to compensation for services
rendered at request, such right cannot be enforced in a proceeding in rem brought
against the vessel, but must be by action in personam against her owners.
Trial Brief of Respondent and Claimant at 9-10, The Admiral Evans, 286 F. 442 (W.D.
Wash. 1923).
83. 1938 A.M.C. 57 (E.D. Pa. 1937).
84. The life-property salvor helped to rescue some crew members from a drifting
barge, then returned with another set of salvors a few hours later to bring the barge to
safety. 1938 A.M.C. at 57-58.
85. 1938 A.M.C. at 59.
86. 8 F. Cas. 611 (D. Me. 1840) (No. 4,434).
87. See note 25 supra.
88. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules with Respect to
Assistance and Salvage at Sea. 37 Stat. 1658 (1911-1913), T.S. 576. The Belgian government took a leading role in drafing the convention. It organized the Comit{! Maritime
International, an international organization of lawyers and judges that, among other
things, prepared drafts of the salvage convention. Leading members of the Belgian government headed the Comite and the Brussels Convention. For an analysis of the salvage
treaty and its unifying effect in Belgium, England, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, see I. WILDEBOER, THE BRUSSELS SALVAGE CONVENTION (1965). The Brussels Convention also concluded a collision treaty that many nations, but not the United States,
have ratified. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 403 (1976).
89. Four conferences, beginning in 1905, were required to establish the convention.

May 1979]

Saving Li{e at Sea

1241

change in the Anglo-American rules of property salvage, but
I. WILDEBOER, supra note 88, at 1. The first drafts of the treaty in 1905 left the subject of
life salvage entirely to national legislation. Article 12 provided:
Les presentes dispositions ne portent point atteinte aux prescriptions des lois
nationales concernant la competence des autorites judiciaires ou administratives
en matiere de sauvetage ou d'assistance et la remuneration pour le sauvetage des
vies humaines.
The translation by the Comite Maritime International was as follows:
The present provisions do not invalidate the prescriptions of the national laws
relating to the jurisdiction of the authorities judicial or administrative as to salvage
or assistance and the remuneration for salvage of human lives.
Cor.mi MARITIME INTERNATIONAL BuLL. No. 12, at 96 (June 1905).
The text of article 12 was clarified by a revised draft in October 1905, which provided
in its second paragraph:
Les dispositions relatives a la remuneration ne concernent pas le sauvetage des
personnes, sans que cependant it soit porte atteinte aux prescriptions des lois nationales a cet egard.
PROCES-VERBAUX DU CONFERENCE MARITIME 133 (1905).
An appropriate translation would be:
The provisions regarding remuneration do not concern the salvage of people, however this does not invalidate the prescriptions of the national laws in this matter.
The Committee that prepared the October 1905 draft reported that it intended to leave
nations free to give life salvors whatever rights they thought fit, including a right to a
reward from the person saved. Id. at 134.
In 1909 and 1910 the British proposed amendments dealing with independent life
salvage and life property salvage that were similar to the British law on the subject. In
1909 Sir William Pickford proposed on behalf of the British government that the first
article of the treaty provide that salvage of passengers, crew, and freight be included
within the scope of the treaty. PROCES-VERBAUX DU CONFERENCE MARITIME 61 (1909). He
also proposed amending the eighth article of the treaty to include the danger to the
passengers and crew of the salved ship as an element to be considered by the judge in
fixing the amount of the salvage award. Further, he proposed that the second paragraph
of article 12, quoted above, be deleted. PROCES-VERBAUX DU CONFERENCE MARITIME 62
(1909). Although these proposals appear to call for the granting of pure life salvage, Sir
William Pickford explained that this was not his government's intention. He said that the
amendment "aims only at providing that the salvage of human beings performed at the
same time ("en meme temps") as the salvage of property be considered in the determination of the total amount of reward and in the apportionment of the compensation aipong
the salvors." PROCES-VERBAUX DU CONFERENCE MARITIME 91 (1909) (Translation by\this
writer).
The British proposal as explained by Pickford was generally in line with British
salvage law, which gave no claim against the property owners unless some property was
saved. The Renpor, 8 P.D. 115 (1883). See text at note 51 supra. However, the proposal
did not reflect the British government's statutory authority to make discretionary awards
to life salvors. Also, the proposal's requirement that the life salvors perform their services
at the same time as the salvage of property may have sounded more restrictive than
British and American cases that allowed life salvage even though the property was rescued
several weeks after the saving of life. The Cargo ex Schiller, 2 P.D. 145 (C.A. 1877), The
Mulhouse, (pamphlet), supra note 18. The British and American cases had used the vague
expression that the salvage of life and property must be "connected" in order for the life
salvors to receive a reward but had never specified a time frame for measuring the connection. See, e.g., The Aid, 166 Eng. Rep. 30 (Adm. 1822); The Emblem, 8 F. Cas. 611 (D.
Me. 1840) (No. 4,434); The Mulhouse, 17 F. Cas. 962 (S.D. Fla.1859) (No. 9,910). Pickford
apparently intended something equally vague by his use of the expression "meme temps,"
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had a profound effect - largely not the one intended - on the
which implies a period of time of unspecified duration. See, e.g., LAROUSSE MODERN
FRENCH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY, "Temps," at 698 (1960). Indeed, following the 1909 conference, the British delegates reported that the provision's exclusion of life salvage "unless
there has at the same time been salvage of property" was "a reproduction of the present
English law," citing The Renpor, 8 P.D. 115 (C.A. 1883) and The Annie, 12 P.D. 51 (1886).
British Public Record Office, File FO369/271, case 602. These cases held that life salvage
is not owed unless property is saved which can form a fund to pay salvage. (In The Annie,
a public authority raised the sunken ship, but, as authorized by statute, the ship's proceeds were entirely used to pay the authority's expenses. The court said that no life salvage
was due because "the Annie was not saved.") Although noting that the provision's restriction might be contrary to principle, the delegates reported that the restriction was necessary-to obtain the assent of foreign countries, and that "it may well be urged that it would
not be fair to make the owners of a ship or cargo which has been totally lost pay salvage
in respect of the saving of human life." Id.
The British life salvage proposal did not quite make it through the convention unscathed. The delegate from France, M. Lyon-Caen, the only delegate to speak about the
proposal, said that he supported it. He added, however, "[This reward] is taken out of
the total reward paid by those whose property was salvaged." PROCES-VERBAUX nu CONFERENCE MARITIME 91 (1909). (Translation by this writer.) Not only did the French statement
suggest that life salvage be paid by the property salvors, not the property owners, but it
seems to imply that the saving of life by independent life salvors would not increase the
amount paid by the property owners. That differs from the British proposal that the
saving of life would affect the "total amount of the reward" as well as its apportionment.
Apparently, the British did not immediately grasp the import of M. Lyon-Caen's gloss,
for it was not until the next conference in 1910 that they made their objection. By that
time they were faced with the following provision, adopted at the end of the 1909 conference:
Les sauveteurs des vies humaines qui sont intervenus a !'occasion des memes dan•
gers ont droit a une equitable part de la remuneration accordee aux sauveteurs du
navire, de la cargaison et de leurs accessoires.
Id. at 140.
As later translated by the American delegates, the provision read:
Salvors of human lives are entitled to an equitable share in the .remuneration
granted to salvors of ship, cargo, and accessories, if they have intervened on the
occasion of common dangers.
Report of the American Delegates to the Third International Conference on Maritime
Law, 1909 FOREIGN RELATIONS 664.
As explained in the report to the Brussels Conference by the committee responsible
for the revised draft, article 9 does not provide a reward when life alone is saved,
but if human lives have been saved at the same time [as property, then] it is fitting
that the salvors of human life share the compensation with the salvors of the ship
or the cargo. It should be thus each time that the salvors of human life intervene
on an occasion of common danger, and it is not at all necessary that the intervention
take place at the same moment as the salvage of goods or that they themselves
participate in the latter.
PROCES-VERBAUX DU CONFERENCE MARITIME 140 (1909). (Translation by this writer.) The
report in its original reads as follows:
II resulte du texte qui precede qu'aucune remuneration n'est due a raison du
sauvetage exclusif des vies humaines. Mais si des vies humaines ont ete sauvees,
en meme temps que des risultats materiels etaient atteints, il convient que !es
sauveteurs des vies humaines participent au partage de l'indemnite avec les sauveteurs du navire ou de la cargaison.
II doit en etre ainsi cheque fois que les sauveteurs des vies humaines sont
intervenus a l'occasion des memes dangers et il n'est nullement requis que leur
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American law of life salvage. In the translation used by the Senate, the relevant treaty provision reads:
No remuneration is due from the persons whose iives are saved, but
nothing in this article shall affect the provisions of the national
laws on this subject.
Salvors of human life, who have taken part in the services rendered
on the occasion of the accident, giving rise to salvage or assistance,
are entitled to a fair share of the remuneration awarded to the
salvors of the ship, her cargo, and accessories. 9~_
intervention se produise au meme moment que le sauvetage des choses ou qu'euxmemes participent a celui-ci.
To have the treaty reflect the intention behind their original proposal, the British
delegates sought to change article 9 at the 1910 conference to provide that there should
be "a reward for the salvage of human lives in cases where there is also salvage of goods."
Paoc~-VERBAUX DU CONFERENCE MARITIME 54 (1910). (Translation by this writer.) The
proposal in French reads ("[P]our le sauvetage des vies humaines, ii pourra etre attribue
une remuneration dans Jes cas ou il y aurait eu egalement sauvetage de biens." This
proposal would have given the independent life salvor a right against the owner of the
property rather than against the property salvor. Also, by giving independent life salvors
a reward "in cases" where property is saved as opposed to the draft provision that awarded
life salvors who acted in a common danger with property salvors, the British proposal more
clearly reflected the English case law that rewarded life salvors whose services could be
"connected" with the salvage of property. The committee that drafted the treaty reported
that it rejected the British proposal of 1910 because the Convention's treatment of life
salvage was an absolute innovation for a large number of countries and it therefore seemed
advisable not to change the text for which the directions of adherence had been given. Id.
at 102.
90. 37 Stat. 1671-72 (1911-1913). The official text of article 9 reads:
II n'est du aucune remuneration par !es personnes sauvees, sans que cependant il
soit porte atteinte aux prescriptions des lois nationales a cet egard.
Les sauveteurs de vies humaines qui sont intervenusa !'occasion de !'accident,
ayant donne lieu au sauvetage ou a !'assistance, ont droit a une equitable part de
la remuneration accordee aux sauveteurs du navire, de la cargaison, et de leurs
accessoires.
The final text incorporated a change suggested by the French delegation. Paocis-vERBAUX
DU CONFERENCE MARITIME 46 (1910). The purpose of the French amendment of 1910 was
reported to be to "better render the thinking already set forth in the 1909 report, which
said that it was not at all necessary that the intervention of the life salvors be at the same
moment as the salvage of property or that they participate in the latter." Id. at 102.
("[Q]ui rendent mieux Ia pensee que le rapport de 1909 precisait deja en disant qu'il
n'Jtait nullement requis que !'intervention des sauveteurs de vies humaines se fut produite
au meme moment que le sauvetage des choses ou qu'eux-memes eussent participe a
celuici.")
No official translation of the treaty was made by the conference, and the British and
American delegations each prepared their own translations. The American delegates'
translation of the second paragraph of article 9 reads, "Salvors of human lives who have
intervened on the occasion of the accident which gave rise to the salvage or assistance are
entitled to an equitable share in the remuneration granted to salvors of the ship, cargo
and their accessories." Report of the American Delegates to the Third International Conference on Maritime Law, Schedule A at 4. National Archives, Washington, D.C., Diplomatic: Section, File No. 585.7A2. Although the British and American delegates' translations differed in great detail, the State Department submitted the British version to the
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On its face, the prov1s10n does not require the owners of
rescued ships and cargo to reward independent life salvors. The
burden of paying life salvage falls only on the property salvor, not
the property owner. If read restrictively, parties to the treaty
would be bound to give life salvors no greater rights than those
specified in the treaty. To avoid such an interpretation, the report
of the subcommittee that drafted the treaty indicated that the
text was flexible, that "each nation remains free to give life salvors greater or more specific rights," and that the British formula
giving independent life salvors a right to a reward directly from
the shipowner and cargo owner was free of criticism. Indeed, the
subcommittee said that any nation would be able to give life
salvors a right to salvage even when no property is saved. 01
Senate with only minor changes, apparently because it wanted the two countries to have
the same translation, and because both countries appeared eager to submit the treaty for
ratification. Letter of Charles C. Burlingham, an American delegate to the conference, to
the Secretary of State, Dec. 3, 1910; letter of Charles C. Burlingham to Eugene T. Chamberlain, Commissioner of Navigation, Department of Commerce and Labor, Dec. 4, 1910.
National Archives, Washington, D.C., Diplomatic Section, File No. 585.7A2/233. Burlingham wrote that the differences in the translations
do not affect the substance of the [salvage and collision] Treaties. Our translation
is somewhat more literal; theirs is smoother and more elegant. In one or two articles
they have clarified the text by adding certain explanatory words. Thus in the titles
of the two Conventions they add the words "of Jaw", which do not appear in the
original, so that the titles reads, [sic] "Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules of Law in regard to Collision", which is an improvement, as otherwise the
title might indicate that the Convention related to rules of navigation."
Letter to the Secretary of State, supra (emphasis in original). Burlingham also wrote by
hand that he was enclosing "comments on the British translations, which may possibly
be of service to the translators of the Department." The files contain only a very short
page of handwritten notes not pertaining to the issues before us. Burlingham was an
outstanding member of the bar, specializing in the practice of admiralty law. He was
counsel in some of the most important admiralty cases. See Frankfurter, A Legal
Triptych, 74 HARv. L. REV. 433 (1961). His representation of the owners of the Titanic
prevented him from representing the United States at the conference that drafted the
initial Convention on Safety of Life at Sea in 1914.
91. PROCES-VERBAUX ou CONFERENCE MARITIME 102 (1910). The report stated,
[C]e texte peut d'autant moins donner lieu a doute qu'il n'a aucun caract~re
restrictif; chaque nation reste libre de donner aux sauveteurs-vie des droits plus
grands ou plus precis; rien ne pourrait etre critique dans une loi nationale qui, par
exemple, employerait la formule "que pour le sauvetage des vies humaines il peut
etre attribue une remunerationdans les cas ou ily a egalement sauvetage de biens"
ou qui l'attribuerait meme independament de pareil sauvetage.
It may be translated as follows:
[T]his text is even less likely to cause doubt since it is not at all restrictive; each
nation remains free to give life salvors greater or more specific rights. There would
be no criticism of a national law which, for example, would use the formula, "that
a reward can be given for the salvage of human lives in cases where there is also
salvage of goods" or which would give one even independently of such salvage,
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The 1910 treaty thus stated only the minimum rights that
nations must give life salvors and left much of the treatment of
life salvage to national law. 92 Presumably, either the United
States Congress or the courts could have used the treaty as a basis
for increasing the rights of pure life salvors and independent life
salvors. As we will see, however, Congress and the courts have
ignored the freedom that the 1910 treaty left them. Instead, they
narrowly interpreted the treaty's life salvage provision.
American ratification of the treaty was swift and painless.
The American delegates to the Brussels Convention reported favorably on the life salvage provision and the Senate committee
followed suit. 93 Their reports were brief and general, not mentionThe report accompanying the final draft of the treaty also noted that judges would have
much discretion in applying the provision. Id.
92. The English translation of Wildeboer's work on the treaty states,
No unifying effect was intended by Art. 9. As to the first section this is apparent from its second sentence: the provision does not affect the regulations in the
national laws. Concerning the second section it is apparent from the reports:
[Proces-verbaux du Conference Maritime 102 (1910)] the states remained free to
grant a larger or smaller amount of rights to the life salvors in their national laws,
for instance, to give them a right of remuneration independent of the salvage services rendered to vessel and cargo. However, an important difference between sect.
1 and sect. 2 is that in cases of salvage to which, according to Art. 15, the Convention has to be applied the second section is always applicable, while the first section
only applies if the prevailing national law does not contain a provision divergent
from Art. 9 sect. 1. If a divergence exists the provision of the national law will have
to be applied.
I. WILDEBOER, supra note 88, at 244 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). One reading
of that paragraph suggests, contrary to the conclusion reached in this Article, that when
the treaty is applicable it does not allow nations to grant life salvors greater rights than
those provided in the treaty. Another reading suggests, however, that nations remain free
to give life salvors fewer rights only in those cases which are not covered by article 15,
which provides that the national law, not the treaty, applies when "all the persons interested belong to the same State as the court trying the case." Id. at 279. When the treaty
applies, however, states are free only to increase the rights of life salvors beyond the rights
given in the treaty. The second interpretation is better. The report accompanying the final
draft did not suggest that a country could not give a life salvor greater rights than those
required under the treaty. At least two countries, England and the Netherlands, give life
salvors additional rights. See id. at 249-50.
93. Following the 1909 conference, the American delegates reported:
The second paragraph of Article IX, while not very clearly expressed, must be
regarded as giving to salvors of human lives intervening upon the occasion of a
common danger the right to share in the salvage due from the property saved. They
would not now have this right. We think the provision just and founded upon
motives of humanity.
Report of the American Delegates to the Third International Conference on Maritime
Law, 1909 FOREIGN RELATIONS 662. In their 1910 report the American delegates said,
"Article 9 contains a reasonable provision for salvors of human life, limiting the recovery,
however, to cases where property has been salved." Report of the American Delegation
on the Convention Relating to Salvage, 1911 FOREIGN RELATIONS 14, 15. Similarly, the
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ing that the treaty left each nation free to give life salvors additional rights. 94 The Senate approved the treaty unanimously,
apparently without debate. 95
After that, Congress probably did not need to do anything to
give effect to the life salvage provision. 96 The courts could have
satisfied the treaty's requirements by following The Mulhouse
and rewarding independent life salvors out of the property saved.
Although the treaty provides that life salvage should be paid out
of the reward to property salvors, the Mulhouse rule is in accord
with the intention of the treaty's drafting subcommittee. 97 Nevertheless, when Congress passed an act in 1912 to "harmonize"
Committee on Foreign Relations reported "Article 9 contains a provision for compensation

to salvors of human life, limiting the recovery, however, to cases where property has also
been saved." Report, International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law
with respect to Assistance and Salvage at Sea, Executive K, 62d Cong., 2d. Sess., National
Archives, Washington, D.C., Congressional Section, File No. 4976, Folder 62B-B12. The
report is typewritten with some additions written in by hand. It was not printed.
94. Their reports also did not discuss the dispute between the French and the British
over whether the property salvor or the property owner should pay the life salvors. Indeed,
the reports' description of article 9 as "limiting the recovery, however, to cases where
property also had been salved" more appropriately describes the British proposal that the
conference rejected in 1910. See note 89 supra.
95. 44 J. EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE 117-18, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan, 18,
1912).
96. The final draft of the treaty did not require that the nations signing it put it into
effect by legislation, although such a provision was in an earlier draft of the treaty's
protocol. I. WILDEBOER, supra note 88, at 1. Paragraph 1 of article 12 requires national
legislation to give effect to the provision of article 11, which imposes a duty on masters to
save life at sea. Unfortunately, due to a printer's error, the translation of paragraph 2 of
article 12 that was used by the Senate provided that the "High Contracting Parties will
communicate to one another • • . the laws or regulations which . • . may be hereafter
promulgated ..• for the purpose of giving effect to the above undertakings." 37 Stat, 1672
(1911-1913) (emphasis added). This might imply a duty to give effect to all of the
"undertakings" of the treaty. Actually, as is clear from the French original, 37 Stat. 1664
(1911-1913), and the translations of the British and American delegates, paragraph 2 of
article 12 only required communication about the "above undertaking" namely the undertaking to enforce article 11 by national legislation. The error apparently arose when a
printer used C.C. Burlingham's comparative draft of the British and American translations. Burlingham had changed the words "foregoing provision" in the American translation to match the British translation's, "above undertaking," but the final "g" in Burlingham's handwriting looks something like an "s." (The same is true of the final "g" in
"giving" that appears in the same line.) It is evident from the many printers' marks on
the comparative draft that this document was most likely used in printing the formal text
of the translation of the treaty. The comparative draft is attached to Burlingham's letter
of Dec. 3, 1910, to the Secretary of State. National Archives, Washington, D.C., Diplomatic Section, File No. 585.7A2/233.
97. See note 91 supra and accompanying text. The British Parliament did not modify
its life salvage statute following its ratification of the 1910 treaty. That statute, like The
Mulhouse, gives independent life salvors a claim for salvage against the owner, not the
salvors, of the rescued property.
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American law with the treaty, 98 the statute contained a life salvage section taken virtually word for word from the Senate's
translation of the treaty. 99 There was no debate over the life salvage provision, and there was no explanation of it other than a
brief, cryptic description in a Senate report. 100 No one in Congress
98. On January 30, 1912, only twelve days after the Senate gave its advice and
consent to the treaty, Senator Burton introduced a bill, S.4930, that would give effect to
the treaty. The bill was reported from the Foreign Relations Committee on March 12,
1912, without amendment. S.4930, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912). On April 10, 1912, a bill
was introduced in the House that was identical to S.4930, except that it provided a lower
penalty for masters who violate their duty to save life at sea. H.R. 23111, 62d Cong., 2d
Sess. § 2. On April 18, 1912," the Senate amended S.4930 to conform to the House bill, 48
CONG. REc. 4984-85 (1912), and it passed both houses without debate over the substance
of the bill. 48 CoNG. REc. 4984-85 (1912); 48 CoNG. REC. 9554-55 (1912).
99. 46 U.S.C. § 729 (1976) provides:
Salvors of human life, who have taken part in the services rendered on the occasion
of the accident giving rise to salvage, are entitled to a fair share of the remuneration
awarded to the salvors of the vessel, her cargo, and accessories.
The only difference between the translation of the treaty and 46 U.S.C. § 729 (1976) is
that the statute omits the words "or assistance" following the word "salvage." The omission was probably an oversight that does not change the meaning. The Senate Report
states:
. In its title and throughout the bill the words "assistance" and "salvage" are
used as in the convention itself. Neither in our law nor in the British law is there
any distinction between salvage and assistance. But in the laws of continental
Europe the distinction is maintained. By the term "salvage" - sauvetage (French)
Bergung (German) - as used on the Continent is meant service rendered to vessels
abandoned; while by "assistance" - assistance (French) Hulfeseistung (German)
- is meant service rendered to vessels whose officers are still in charge.
S. REP. No. 477, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1912).
100. In relevant part the report accompanying the bill from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee read,
Section 3 of the bill provides that salvors of human life may share in the
remuneration awarded to salvors of property.
The British merchant shipping act (1894) section 544, expressly provides that
salvors of human life shall be paid a reasonable amount of salvage by the owner of
the vessel, cargo, or apparel saved, and that this salvage shall be payable in priority
to all other claims; and that if the vessel and cargo are destroyed or the value
insufficient, the board of trade may award to the salvor out of the mercantile
marine fund such sum as they think fit. Under our law, no remuneration is due from
persons whose lives are saved, but the convention provides that salvors of human
life are entitled to share in the award made to salvors of property on the same
occasion.
S. REP. No. 477, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1912). Although the report confirms the practice
of not requiring the persons saved to pay salvage, the report is otherwise unclear about
the statute's effect on the judge-made law of life salvage. It even ignored the generally
accepted practice of enhancing the reward of the life-property salvor for saving life, a
practice confirmed by article 8 of the treaty. The report's purpose in summarizing the
British statute is unclear. It is possible that the Committee on Foreign Relations wanted
to reject the British scheme granting a right of salvage against the owner of the property
saved. On the other hand, it is possible that the committee viewed the British law as an
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explained how to determine what share the life salvors would
receive, or what the statute meant by "the occasion of the accident," or whether courts are free to give life salvors greater rights
than those granted by the statute. The courts have struggled ever
since to provide answers to those questions.
IV.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE 1912 STATUTE IN THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT LIFE SALVAGE

CHANGES

A. The Cases
The first case to apply the 1912 life salvage statute interpreted it broadly, but applied it strangely. The Annie Lord 101 was
a case of life-property salvage, where the court faced the question
of whether the Oliver, which had taken the crew off the damaged
Annie Lord, could receive a property salvage award for its assistance in rescuing the damaged ship even though it did not complete the work of saving the property. After taking the crew
aboard, the Oliver tried to tow the Anriie Lord into port, but bad
weather thwarted the attempt. It then brought the crew to shore,
where, at the suggestion of the Oliver's captain, the captain of the
Annie Lord arranged to have a United States revenue cutter bring
in his ship. The United States filed no claim for salvage. 102 At
trial, the court held that the Oliver could recover as long as its
efforts were the proximate cause of the ship being saved. 103 Under
the general maritime law of life-property salvage, the court then
should have considered the saving of life as a factor affecting the
size of the reward. Instead, it did an odd thing: it referred to the
1912 statute, noting that rescuing the crew of the Annie Lord from
"great and imminent peril" constituted the saving of life under
the statute. 104 This reference to the statute was unnecessary, because the Oliver was a property as well as a life salvor. 10• Nevertheless, the court read the statute as supporting a general policy
favoring recovery for life salvors. The court believed the statute
commanded it to find some way to compensate the life salvors.
ideal solution, and it hoped that American courts would interpret the statute to conform
closely to the British treatment of life salvors.
101. 251 F. 127 (D. Mass. 1917).
102. Indeed, the court assumed the United States was not entitled to salvage, since
the Coast Guard performed the service. See note 8 supra.
103. 251 F. at 159.
104. 251 F. at 160.
105. See note 9 supra. The court itself seemed to sense this, since it noted, "it is
perhaps necessary" to determine if the Oliver saved life. 251 F. at 160 (emphasis added).
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That interpretation agrees with the report of the American delegates to the Brussels Convention, which pointed to the humanitarian purpose of the treaty's life salvage provision, 106 and agrees
with the statute's emphasis on the importance of rewarding life
salvors.
Although The Annie Lord read the life salvage statute generously and supported a favorable treatment of life salvors' claims,
the case illustrates a potential problem with claims arising under
the statute: the independent life salvor's chances of recovering
expenses and a reward depend upon the fortunes of the property
salvor. The statute requires that life salvors be given a "fair share
of the remuneration awarded to the salvors of the vessel. " Thus,
if no property salvage is paid, no life salvage can be paid. If, for
example, the government had been the only salvor of the Annie
Lord, or if the sole property salvor had been another private salvor that had forfeited its reward through fraud, 107 there would
have been no property salvage from which the Oliver could have
recovered an award. The irony of this result, under a statute
designed to increase the rights of salvors, is that fifty years earlier
The Mulhouse gave independent life salvors a right to a reward
against all of the property saved even though some property salvors were not entitled to salvage. 108 Thus, despite the broad interpretation of the statute in The Annie Lord, life salvors had potentially fewer rights under the 1912 statute than under the-general
maritime law.
That irony, somewhat obscured by the facts in The Annie
Lord, became more apparent in a case involving one of the worst
maritime disasters in American history. The Eastland, an excursion boat, capsized and sank at its dock on the Chicago River in
downtown Chicago on July 24, 1915, 109 killing 835 passengers. 110
Many people along the shore and the river took part in the rescue
efforts. 111 Most of the life salvage occurred immediately after the
106. See note 93 supra.
107. See, e.g., The Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240 (1804).
108. The Mulhouse, 17 F. Cas. 962, 964-65 (S.D. Fla. 1859) (No. 9,910).
109. The Eastland, 262 F. 535, 536 (N.D. Ill. 1919), affd. without opinion sub nom.
Mattocks v. Great Lakes Towing Co. (No. 2,804) (7th Cir. June 3), cert. denied, 258 U.S.
644 (1920).
110. The Eastland, 78 F.2d 984, 984 (7th Cir. 1935).
111. The affidavit of one of the life salvors, Sherwood Mattocks, recites that he saw
"at least one hundred other persons engaged" in the saving of life and that he was
informed that "several hundred other persons" also saved lives. Affidavit, April 3, 1919,
Federal Records Center, Chicago, Illinois. There were at least ten additional affidavits by
life salvors in the case. One of the salvors, John Hipple, was a passenger on the Eastland.
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sinking, but some life salvors alleged that they worked for three
days. 112 None of those who claimed life salvage claimed property
salvage. The only significant property salvage was performed. by
contract: the day following the last life salvage efforts, the owner
of the Eastland contracted with a towing company to raise the
vessel for $34,500. The towing company began to work about a
week later, on August 4, 1915, and completed the job on August
16, 1915. The life salvors sought, under the 1912 statute, a fair
share of the remuneration paid to the towing company .113 In denyThe life salvors claimed $20,000, more than half the amount awarded by contract to the
towing company that raised the vessel. Claim of Sherwood S. Mattocks, et al., Dec, 5,
1919, Federal Records Center, Chicago, Illinois.
112. The claimants noted that all their work had been performed on or before July
27, three days after the accident. 262 F. at 538.
113. 262 F. at 537. The day after the Eastland was raised, its owners filed suit to limit
their liability to the vessel's value, and a trustee appointed by the court subsequently sold
the ship for $46,000. Shortly thereafter, the towing company filed its claim for the $34,500
promised under the contract. 262 F. at 537.
On July 30, 1915, three days after the owners of the Eastland and the towing company
contracted to raise the vessel, a United States Marshal took "possession" of the steamer
under a writ of attachment issued in connection with a grand jury investigation of the
accident. Evening Star (Washington, D.C.) July 30, 1915, at 12, col. 3. The towing company performed its services while the Department of Justice was protecting the property.
Record, 117-19, Great Lakes Towing Co. v. St. Joseph-Chicago S.S. Co., 253 F. 635 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bishop v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 248 U.S. 578 (1918), 249
U.S. 609 (1919). A commissioner's statement of the facts written many years later in
related litigation might create the mistaken impression that the court authorized the
formation of the salvage contract. The Eastland, 78 F.2d 984,985 (7th Cir. 1935) ("'Under
the petition and libel a trustee was appointed by the Court, who immediately took posses•
sion of the boat as she lay in the Chicago River. Under authority of this Court a no-cureno-pay contract was entered into for the raising of the steamer and removing the wreck
from the path of navigation"'), The description of the Eastland "as she lay in the Chicago
River" actually describes her situation after she was raised, as is evident from both the
petition to limit liability filed August 17, 1915 ("[T]he Great Lakes Towing Company
has raised, righted and pumped out and freed the said Steamer of water and put her afloat
and alongside of the dock in the Chicago river where she now lies") and the transfer to
the trustee dated August 20, 1915. ("[T]he said St. Joseph-Chicago Steamship Company
..• does hereby convey, transfer and deliver to the said Denis Sulivan Trustee, . . • the
interest of the St. Joseph-Chicago Steamship Company in the Steamer Eastland, her
engines, hoilers [sic] boats, tackle, apparel and furniture as she now lies in the Chicago
river.") The petition and transfer are in the Federal Records Center, Chicago, Illinois, The
exchange of letters that formed the salvage contracts shows that the owners of the Eastland and the towing company were the only parties to the contract. Record, 134-36, 156,
Great Lakes Towing Co. v. St. Joseph-Chicago S.S. Co., 253 F. 635 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Bishop v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 248 U.S. 578 (1918), 249 U.S. 609 (1919).
If a court takes custody of a sunken vessel and contracts with a salvage company to
raise it, the property salvor might argue that the amount earned under the contract is
entitled to priority under the rule announced in New York Dock Co, v. The Poznan, 274
U.S. 117 (1927). That case held that even though wharfage services rendered a vessel in
custodia legis do not create a maritime lien, such services rendered for "the common
benefit" ought "in equity and good conscience" to be paid before maritime liens are
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ing their claim, 114 the court read the 1912 statute narrowly. Ironically, the supposedly liberal life salvage statute presented more
obstacles to recovery than did the general maritime law. 115
In district court, Judge Carpenter gave several novel and
restrictive interpretations to the life salvage statute. 116 First, he
wrote that the statute creates a right to life salvage only for those
satisfied. The Poznan is distinguishable, however, from a life salvor's claim to a share of.
the property salvage. Even though the property salvor's claim is preferred to ordinary
maritime liens, the life salvage statute directs that his award be subject to the claims of
life salvors.
114. In addition to holding that the life salvors had no valid claim under the life
salvage statute, the court held that the life salvors' claim was barred by a two-year statute
of limitations. They had waited more than three-and-one-half years after the accident to
file their claims, and did so only after the Supreme Court refused to review an order that
the towing company's claim would be preferred to the tort claims. 262 F. at 537. See Great
Lakes Towing Co. v. St. Joseph-Chicago S.S. Co., 253 F. 635 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Bishop v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 248 U.S. 578 (1918), 249 U.S. 609 (1919). The
life salvors explained their delay by claiming that, since their right was against the funds
awarded to the property salvors, they could not file their claim until a court determined
that the property salvors had rights to a reward. 262 F. at 543-44. Although admitting that
the life salvors' argument was "very seductive for the moment," the court held that the
statute clearly established that suits for life salvage must be brought no later than "two
years from the date when such assistance or salvage was rendered." 262 F. at 544.
115. The irony of The Eastland is diminished somewhat because the court labored
under the belief that the general maritime law did not reward an independent life salvor.
262 F. at 239-40. The brief of the life salvors seemed to support that mistake. It said,
•"Section 3 is a remedial statute to add, if possible, to Nature's promptings an inducement to save human life. Until this statute the man who risked his life to save his brother
went without compensation, but the man who deserted his brother and saved a barrel of
pork would be awarded fair compensation .•.•" Brief No. 1 of Life Salvors at 4-½. This
was hyperbole, of course: property salvors who deserted people in distress would almost
certainly forfeit their award due to their misconduct. See also note 157 infra.
116. In addition to the restrictive interpretations discussed in the text, Judge Carpenter's decision said, "The purpose of the statute being to engage the interest of life salvors
at least equally between human lives and property, it can have no effect in a case where
there was no association or co-operation between those saving lives and those saving ship
or cargo." 262 F. at 540. Since the life salvors in The Eastland completed their work before
the towing company contracted to save the ship, the life salvors did not satisfy that
requirement. Although there is nothing in the statute or treaty that requires one to impose
this condition, the court may have been influenced by the language in the statute that
gives life salvors a fair share in the salvage reward if they "take part in the services
rendered on the occasion of the accident giving rise to salvage." The words "take part in
the services rendered" might connote a cooperative effort or an associated effort between
the life and property salvors. Such an interpretation would be unwarranted. The corresponding treaty provision reads, "Les sauveteurs des vies humaines qui sont intervenus a
l'occasion de l'accident ayant donne lieu au sauvetage" (emphasis added). The American
delegates' literal translation read, "Salvors of human life who have intervened on the
occasion of the accident which gave rise to salvage" (emphasis added). See note 90 supra.
Unlike the statute, the treaty and the literal translation give no hint that the life salvors
must "take part in the services rendered" or that they must be associated with the
property salvors. It is enough that they rendered their services on the same general occasion. The statutory formula is based on the British delegates' translation, which was used
0
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who render service "at the time that the property was saved" 117
and only for those who save life "substantially at the time and
while both lives and property [are] in distress and danger of loss;
not, of course, at the same instant of time, but during the period
of peril. " 118 This interpretation may have support in the reports
of the Brussels conference that state that the saving of life should
be awarded if it occurs at the "same time" even though not at
the "same moment" that property is saved. 119 On the other hand,
the drafters of the treaty may simply have meant by this that no
award is required for pure life salvage, not that life and property
must be saved at substantially the same time. 120 I think it most
likely that the drafters, reluctant to commit themselves to a single rule in such a controversial area, were deliberately vague. If
so, they were leaving a final resolution to the fair interpretations
of national judges. 121 To read the language as strictly as possible,
without weighing the important policies at stake, would probably
be the surest way to misconstrue the drafters' intent. The court's
application of its interpretation to the facts of The Eastland is
particularly troubling. The court denied relief to the life salvors
because it felt that the "period of peril" had passed before the
property salvors began their services. This narrow reading of the
vague "period of peril" concept ignores the humanitarian purposes of the statute. The "period of peril" could easily include the
raising of a vessel a few days after the lives were saved. 122
in order that England and the United States might have a common translation, See also
note 132 infra.
117. 262 F. at 540.
118. 262 F. at 541.
119. See notes 89 & 90 supra. Literally, the statute would seem to grant relief even
when life and property are saved at different times. It is only required that the life salvors
save life "on the occasion of the accident," not on the occasion of the property salvage.
See Bockrath, supra note 7.
120. That is what the British delegates meant by the words "same time." See note
89 supra. Although the 1910 conference rejected a British proposal that would have allowed life salvage in "cases" where property was saved, the objection was apparently to
requiring owners of saved property to pay life salvage directly. See notes 89 & 91 supra.
121. The report accompanying the final draft of the treaty said as much. See note 91
supra.
122. See text at note 148 infra. Compare The Mulhouse (pamphlet), supra note 18.
In that case, salvage efforts lasted an entire month, yet Judge Marvin held that the life
salvors had a claim under the general maritime law against all of the property saved even
though some of that property was not saved in "immediate connection with the saving of
life." The Mulhouse, 17 F. Cas. 962, 968 (S.D. Fla. 1859) (No. 9,910). Cf. The Cargo ex
Schiller, 1 P.D. 473 (1876), affd., 2 P.D.145 (C.A. 1877) (iife salvage awarded even though
property was apparently raised many weeks after life was saved. See note 57 supra),
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Why did Judge Carpenter interpret the "period of peril" test
so narrowly? One reason appears to be the court's expressed desire to protect what it thought was the towing company's right to
a paramount lien on the Eastland, having been the last to render
service to the vessel.1 23 Because it thought that property salvage
liens are always favored over liens that arose earlier, the court felt
that unless the life salvors and property salvers rendered their
services at very nearly the same exact time, they can not have
equal priority. Further, the court felt that unless the property
salvor's lien was kept superior to the claims of life salvors who
performed their services earlier, "no one could have been secured
to raise the Eastland. " 124 Judge Carpenter's concern was similar
to that of another judge, who had disposed of a motion earlier in
the same case by saying, "If dredging companies must divide with
salvors whose names and claims are unknown and unascertainable, then lifting a sunken boat becomes an impossibility." 125
The court's reasoning is faulty in several respects. It includes
the questionable assumption that courts cannot moderate judicially created lien priorities to fulfill the humanitarian purposes
123. 262 F. at 541-42. In making this assumption, the court relied on the court of
appeals' determination earlier in the litigation that the towing company's liens must be
given priority over claims for personal injury and death. Great Lakes Towing Co. v. St.
Joseph-Chicago S.S. Co., 253 F. 638 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bishop v. Great
Lakes Towing Co., 248 U.S. 578 (1918), 249 U.S. 609 (1919). Judge Carpenter's reasoning on the lien priority question closely followed an unreported decision by Circuit Judge
Evans (sitting as a trial judge) in The Eastland that was written before the case was
transferred to Judge Carpenter. Judge Evans wrote:
[I]f the Great Lakes Towing Company was required to share its claim (which
represents only fair remuneration for services rendered) with the salvors of human
life, it would never have engaged to lift the sunken boat from the bottom of the
river. If dredging companies must divide with salvors whose names and claims are
unknown and unascertainable, then lifting a sunken boat becomes an impossibility.
The advantages that accrue to the salvage claimants by reason of the increased
value of the boat due to its position will necessarily be lost.
I do not think Sec. 3 of the Salvage Act [46 U.S.C. § 729] contemplates any
change in the maritime law so far as priority of claims is concerned. Life salvors
are entitled "to a fair share of the remuneration awarded to salvors" of the same
rank or whose claims are on an equal footing as to priority. They are not entitled
to any part of the salvor's claim rendered later and independently of the services
for which the life salvors make claim.
Decision by Judge Evans at 2-3 (July 2, 1919) (Federal Archives, Chicago, Ill., Accession
No. 57A330, Location No. 369410, Location D592), reproduced at Record 73, 74, Mattocks v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 254 U.S. 644 (1920). In the original petition, the life
salvors alleged that their services were performed on only one day. Following Judge
Evans's decision, they amended their petition to allege that their services lasted three
days. Judge Carpenter ruled that the prior decision was not res judicata. 262 F. at 545.
124. 262 F. at 542.
125. Decision by Judge Evans, supra note 123, at 3.
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of the 1912 statute. In the absence of any congressional intent to
the contrary, 126 courts can fairly conclude that the life salvor, like
the seaman seeking his wages, 127 deserves special consideration.
Because the saving of life is at least as important as the saving
of property, life salvors who perform their services a few days or
weeks before property is saved should be on an equal footing with
property salvors and should share in their award. This change in
the priority rules is modest when compared to the British Parliament's determination that life salvors' liens are to be superior to
property salvors' liens. 128 Finally, it is highly unlikely that a prospective salvor would have been deterred from raising the Eastland due to the potential claims of life salvors. Ordinarily, the
property salvor could avoid losing part of its fair award to life
salvors either by increasing its bid to take account of the potential
life salvage claims or by securing a promise from the vessel owner
to reimburse it for any life salvage awards. Although it might
"cost" the property salvor something129 to obtain either type of
protection against life salvage claims, that cost is certainly no
greater than that incurred by any property salvor who is required
by the 1912 statute to share his award with life salvors. Furthermore, in determining what a "fair share" of the property salvor's
award would be, the court can consider what life salvage claims
the property salvor and property owner could have reasonably
anticipated when they arranged to raise the property.
The situation is more complicated when, as ultimately happened in The Eastland, 130 the shipowner is able to limit its liability to the value of the ship and that value is insufficient to satisfy
the claims of life salvors, property salvors, and tort victims. In
that situation a court might refuse to make the property owner
126. The Senate report's paraphrase of the statute merely said that life salvors "are
entitled to share in the award made to salvors on the same occasion." See note 100 supra,
The report mentioned the more liberal British priority scheme but expressed no opinion
about it. The final report of the American delegates to the Brussels Convention and the
Senate report accompanying the treaty said that the treaty limits the life salvor's right to
"cases" where property has been saved. See note 93 supra. The description of the statute
in the Senate report, though still extremely vague, is closer to the text of the treaty than
the earlier reports. See note 94 supra.
127. Seamen's wage claims are generally superior to property-salvage claims even if
the salvage claims arise later. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 7, § 9-61, at 738. Wage
claims might not be preferred if they are "old enough to be called stale." Id,
128. Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, 57 & 58 Viet., c. 60, § 544.
129. For example, in order to ·have its increased bid accepted by the property owner,
the prospective property salvor may have to agree to raise the vessel sooner than it would
otherwise have agreed to.
130. 78 F.2d 984 (7th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 703 (1936).
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pay extra for life salvage if such payment would reduce the funds
available to tort victims. 131 Nevertheless, a court could prevent
any serious deterrence to property salvors by awarding a relatively small sum to the life salvors. 132 Because of these considerations, the final allocation of money in The Eastland may not have
been grossly unfair. Unfortunately, Judge Carpenter's language
understates the attention that the life salvage statute requires
courts to pay to life salvors. The Eastland holding would also
include cases where the available funds are sufficient to fully
reward life salvors, property salvors, and tort victims.
Two leading scholars have attempted to square The
Eastland's application of the "period of peril" test with the statutory provision by arguing that the statute does not reward pure
life salvors and that the life salvors in that case thought they were
performing only pure life salvage. 133 In other words, since no property was being saved when the life salvors rendered their services,
the life salvors probably had no expectation at that time of ever
131. Although much.would depend on the facts of the case, a court might be willing
to pay life salvors' claims for personal injury and expense prior to the claims of injured
passengers and crew in order to encourage others to save life and thereby reduce the total
injuries caused by an accident.
132. Judge Carpenter's concern that rewarding life salvage might deter prospective
property salvors also seems to have manifested itself in a second argument. The opinion
suggests that the statute could apply only when property is saved by noncontract salvors.
262 F. at 540. Since a court fixes the amount of property salvage somewhat arbitrarily in
noncontract cases, G. Gn..MORE & C. BLACK, supra note 7, § 8-10, Judge Carpenter probably
felt that noncontract salvors' expectations would not be seriously frustrated if part of their
award were given to life salvors.
The court's concern for the expectations of contract salvors does not warrant its
restrictive interpretation of the statute. It seems clear that the drafters of the 1912 statute
did not actually consider the problem, but if they had done so, they would surely have
noted that many salvage contracts provide that the amount of the salvage award will be
settled by future negotiation, arbitration, or adjudication. In such cases, a court would
hardly be defeating settled expectations by giving part of the award to a life salvor. Indeed,
Judge Carpenter suggested elsewhere in his opinion that he would not permit property
salvors to defeat the claims of life salvors by maldng a "private settlement" with the
property owner. 262 F. at 544. Furthermore, as shown above, see text at notes 129-31 supra,
when the salvage contract specifies the amount of the award, the property salvor can
usually protect his expectation of a fair award by either increasing his bid or by requiring
the property owner to reimburse him for the amount paid the life salvor. When a court
refuses to make the property owner pay indirectly for life salvage, the property salvor's
expectations will not be seriously frustrated if the court grants a relatively small award
to the life salvor.
It is therefore inconsistent with the purpose of the statute-the just and uniform
expansion of the rights of life salvors-to limit its scope by excluding cases where property
is saved by contract salvors. But see In re Yamashita-Shinnihon Kisen, 305 F. Supp. 796
(D. Or. 1969) (following The Eastland's suggestion that the 1912 statute does not provide
relief against contract salvors).
133. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 7, § 8-12, at 572.
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receiving a reward. But that argument lacks support in the history of the treaty and statute and is not in harmony with American and British admiralty law. To encourage efforts to save life
and property, courts often reward salvors who have no expectation of reward when they perform their services, 134 occasionally
denying rewards to such salvors if the owner of the property saved
reasonably expected the salvage services to be gratuitous. 135 Although it would seem unjust in a nonemergency situation to make
a person pay for unsolicited benefits rendered without an intent
134. See, e.g., Costanzo Transp. Co. v. American Barge Line Co., 35 F. Supp. 929
(W.D. Pa. 1940); The Star, 53 F.2d 890 (W.D. Wash. 1931) (salvage award not barred by
general custom in fishing trade to render salvage services gratuitously); The Emblem, 8
F. Cas. 611 (D. Me. 1840) (the court granted a liberal award to the life-property salvers
primarily on account of the rescue of human life. The salvers did not return for valuable
property aboard the wreck until after they first left the scene with the persons they
rescued); Taylor v. Twenty-five Thousand Dollars, 23 F. Cas. 806, 807 (D.S.C. 1801) (No.
13,087) (life-property salvers "consulted their feelings and did not calculate their interests"). Cf. Nicastro v. The Peggy B., 173 F. Supp. 61, 63 (D. Mass. 1959) (Ford, J.) (the
life-property salver's "first thought" and "primary motive" was to save a "fellow human
being in peril at sea"); The Aid, 166 Eng. Rep. 30 (Adm. 1822) (life-property salvors
entitled to liberal reward even though they set out with the expectation of only saving life).
See also M. NORRIS, supra note 2, § 69, at 107. But see The Vessel Judith Lee Rose, Inc.
v. The Clipper, 169 F. Supp. 885 (D. Mass. 1959) (Aldridge, J.) (the court found that
custom of not charging for salvage services did not apply to the plaintiff, but disapproved
of Costanzo Transp. Co. and The Star and suggested that salvage be denied if the salvor
had no intent to charge when it rendered the service. This dictum in Judith Lee Rose was
itself disapproved in The Peggy B.).
135. The Harriot, 166 Eng. Rep. 636 (Adm. 1842) (custom in South Seas whaling
fishery not to charge for salvage service bars recovery); The Zephyr, 166 Eng. Rep. 160
(Adm. 1827) (ships in Honduras trade that sail in company have a "special agreement to
give mutual protection"). See Nicastro v. The Peggy B., 173 F. Supp. 61, 63 (D. Mass.
1959) (court awarded salvage but suggested that a reward might not be given if the salvor
"expressly agrees to render assistance gratuitously." The person saved, who was the owner
of the vessel, told his rescuers that he had insurance and that they would be compensated). But see The Star, 53 F.2d 890 (W.D. Wash. 1931) (allowing salvage even though
there is a general trade custom to the contrary); The Freiya v. The R.S., 65 D.L.R. 218,
224 (Ex. 1922), revg. 59 D.L.R. 330 (Ex:B.C. 1921) (the Exchequer Court found that the
salvor did not "come within the ambit of [an] alleged custom" to render gratuitous
service to others in the fishing industry. The court expressly left open the issue of the
enforceability of the alleged custom, suggesting, however, that it might be invalid as
"being in clear derogation" of a statute that provides that a "reasonable amount of salvage
including expenses properly incurred" shall be allowed for assisting a vessel in distress.
CAN. R.Ev. STAT. c. 113, § 759 (1906), substantially reenacted in CAN. R.Ev. STAT, S-9,
§ 517 (1970). The statute is substantially the same as the British Mer(¥lant Shipping
Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Viet., c. 60, §§ 510(2), 516, which is in tum based on the Merchant
Shipping Act of 1854, 17 & 18 Viet., c. 104, § 458. Since the British cases that denied
salvage when the general custom was to provide gratuitous service were decided before
the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, it is possible that they may no longer be good law if
the suggestion in The Freiya is followed. One could perhaps argue, however, that the
general custom is not in conflict with the statutory policy, for when all parties expect the
service to be gratuitous, the "reasonable amount of salvage" might be nothing.
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to charge, it is sound policy to reward salvors who are too occupied with an emergency to "calculate their interests." 136 The law
thereby lends its support to people's moral promptings to aid
others in danger .137 Applying those principles to The Eastland,
136. Taylor v. Twenty-five Thousand Dollars, 23 F. Cas. 806, 807 (D.S.C. 1801) (No.
13,087). Judge Webb wrote in the The Howard, 12 F. Cas. 630, 633 (Super. Ct. S.D. Fla.
1838) (No. 6,752a):
The wrecker who, regardless of personal considerations, gallantly rushes into dangers to preserve the lives and property of others, when exposed to the horrors of ship
wreck • . . without stopping to enquire what amount in dollars and cents his exertions will bring to his own pocket, will always receive that liberal reward for his
labors which it is the policy of the law to allow, and which courts feel pleasure in
awarding to generous and manly conduct . . . .
Judge Webb went on to say that the court liberally awards salvage to the professional
wrecker partly because of "the benevolence with which he has pointed out the way of
avoiding [the dangers that surround strangers] without the expectation or even hope of
reward." 12 F. Cas. at 633. See also The D.M. Hall v. The John Land, 7 F. Cas. 770, 772
(N.D. Cal. 1855) (No. 3,939) (amount of salvage award depends "not merely [on] the
value of the services, but [on] the spirit in which they are rendered"); The Calypso, 166
Eng. Rep. 221 (Adm. 1828) (salvage is based on the equity of rewarding spontaneous
services, rendered in the protection of lives and property of others). Although it is presumed that the salvor is motivated by the hope of reward, see The Pensacola, 167 Eng.
Rep. 376 (Adm. 1864), the reward will be reduced if the salvors are "calculating and
mercenary." Pacific Mail S.S. Co. v. Commercial Pacific Cable Co., 173 F. 28 (9th Cir.
1909). Since the salvors' expectations will be influenced by what the law allows, the issue
of whether to reward salvors of life or property is essentially one of policy for the courts to
decide. As stated by Judge Marvin,
The allowance of salvage, at all, in any case, is founded upon the idea that human
nature is selfish, and that sound policy dictates that it should be stimulated by
rewards to do acts at sea, which, if done on land, would be considered as gratuitous
and as prompted by the generous impulses of humanity without the expectation of
reward.
w. MARVIN, supra note 8, at 119n. But cf. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 116 (1937) (an
intent to charge is a prerequisite for restitution for services rendered in an emergency
without request).
137. In The Emblem, 8 F. Cas. 611 (D. Me. 1840) (No. 4,434), Judge Ware commented on the supposed failure of several vessels to rescue people from a shipwreck as
follows:
If this fact is to be taken as a just measure of the humanity of the persons who
frequent those seas, I know not but it may be the part, not only of humanity but of
worldly wisdom, to let them understand that sometimes even in godliness there is
gain, and to tempt them by the allurements of pecuniary profit, if they can be led
by no other to acts of humanity and mercy.
8 F. Cas. at 613. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 23 (Tent. Draft Nos. 17, 1973) ("Standing offers of rewards by governmental bodies . . . may be regarded as
intended to create a climate in which people do certain acts in the hope of earning
unknown rewards"). The Restatement (Second) takes the position that governmental
offers of reward are enforceable even by persons who do not know of the reward when they
perform the desired act, but that a private person's offer of reward is not enforceable if
the plaintiff acts without knowledge of the reward. The Restatement's position on offers
of reward by private parties is in accord with most, but not all cases. See CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 59 at 244-47 (1963). In one of the minority cases the court said:
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the life salvors ought to have shared in the award, for even if they
expected no reward when they rescued lives, there is nothing to
indicate that the shipowner and the towing company expected
that no life salvage claims would arise when they made the contract soon thereafter. Compensating the life salvors for their injuries and expenses, if any, and rewarding them for their heroism
would reinforce the value society places on saving life.
Judge Carpenter also held that life salvors would have a right
to an award under the statute only if they had a choice between
saving life and saving property.138 Applying that standard, the
court denied the Eastland life salvors a reward because they "had
no chance to hesitate in determining whether it was more profitable to save the ship, or the men, women, and children on
board." 139 Apparently the court was uninterested in the fact that
those who saved life through "magnificent and heroic efforts" 140
probably chose to leave their positions of safety. As one writer,
Lawrence Jarett, sarcastically commented, "Not tempted by evil,
the life salvors could not, under the statute, be rewarded for doing
good." 141 The rationale is even stranger because the court itself
seemed unhappy with its interpretation. The judge wrote, "It is
a sad reflection to contemplate this law. However, we may not
inquire into the wisdom of Congress in its passage." 142
Another important case to construe that statute, The
Shreveport, 143 took a view of the statute that complements Judge
Carpenter's opinion (which it did not cite), but applied that view
much more liberally. The Shreveport was a tanksteamer that
Is it not well that any one who has an opportunity to prevent the success of a crime,
may know that by doing so he not only performs a virtuous service, but also entitles
himself to whatever reward has been offered therefor to the public?
Dawkins v. Sappington, 26 Ind. 199, 201 (1866). See also Auditor v. Ballard, 72 Ky. (9
Bush) 572 (1873).
138. The Eastland, 262 F. 535, 540 (N.D. Ill. 1919).
139. 262 F. at 540. The court also said,
What they did was inspired by the spirit which since Christendom has been the
foundation of the great brotherhood of mankind. Their work was done, and well
done. Their reward they have; it never can be taken from them, and it is measured
by a standard greater than money. They would not have done less [sic] for great
promises.
262 F. at 540. An appropriate response might be, "[T]hough it has been said, that their
reward is laid up in heaven, I see no reason why they should not receive such as may be
decreed to them on earth." Taylor v. Twenty-five Thousand Dollars, 23 F. Cas. 806, 807
(D.S.C. 1801) (No. 13,807).
140. 262 F. at 536.
141. Jarett, supra note 7, at 786.
142. 262 F. at 540.
143. 42 F.2d 524 (E.D.S.C. 1930).

May 1979]

Saving Life at Sea

1259

caught fire following several explosions in her cargo tanks. The
accident killed or severely injured several members of the ship's
crew and put both ship and crew in "imminent danger." 144 Another ship, the Aldecoa, picked up the surviving crew members
from life boats, and some property salvors arrived on the scene a
few hours after the Aldecoa had departed. The court granted the
Aldecoa a share of the award made to the property salvors, stating
that the 1912 statute "should be liberally construed with the
humane object in view." 145 The court, like the Eastland court,
emphasized the importance of the salvor's ethical dilemma of
having to choose between saving life and saving property. On the
Shreveport facts, however, it found that the Aldecoa "gave up an
opportunity to save property" in order to save life. 146
The Shreveport displayed a more liberal attitude than The
Eastland toward the time that can elapse between the services of
the life and property salvors. The court recognized that "there
may be cases where the act of saving life and the act of saving
property are so disconnected and wide apart in point of time and
otherwise that the life salvors should not participate," but it gave
the statute a liberal construction, saying that "[l]ife salvors,
even though acting independently of the property salvors, are
entitled to share in the award, provided their services are rendered on the occa~ion of the accident giving rise to salvage." 147
144. 42 F.2d at 526.
145. 42 F.2d at 538. The life salvors received $5,000 out of a total award of about
$47,500. The court said that the life salvage award should be relatively small because the
life salvors faced no risk and suffered almost no loss. 42 F.2d at 539-40.
146. 42 F.2d at 537. Two eminent scholars have said that the life salvors would not
have received a reward if it had been clearly shown that they "would not under any
circumstances have attempted the salvage of the Shreveport." G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
supra note 7, § 8-12, at 573. Another writer disagrees with this reading of the case, and
writes, "the 'foregone opportunity rule' • . . is but an aspect of a wider judic::ial constructional approach, founded upon policy and supportive of the claims of life salvors."
Thomas, supra note 7, at 102. Thomas's view is similar to The Mulhouse's view that there
is a need to encourage seamen to save life rather than property, but there is no requirement
that the life salvor actually be tempted to save property. Whatever was intended in The
Shreveport, an interpretation of the statute that recognizes only the foregone opportunity
of receiving property salvage is too narrow. Such an interpretation ignores the fact that
most life salvors forego some valuable opportunity, be it the opportunity to continue their
profitable enterprise or simply the opportunity to remain safely on their voyage or "snugly
on shore." Taylor v. Twenty-five Thousand Dollars, 23 F. Cas. 806, 807 (D.S.C. 1801) (No.
13,087).
The Shreveport does not adopt another limitation of The Eastland: that there must
be some association or cooperation between the property and life salvors in order for the
latter to share in the award. See note 116 supra.
147. 42 F.2d at 537-38.
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The court said the "occasion" was "the explosion . . . the consequent fire, and the continuance of the fire and peril of the vessel
until she was rescued and placed in safety by the [property salvors] ."148
One could reconcile the facts of The Shreveport and The
Eastland with their disparate holdings, but reconciliation of their
theories is not so easy. In The Shreveport only a few hours elapsed
between the saving of lives and the saving of property; in The
Eastland the lag was several days. But The Shreveport's emphasis on the "occasion" would still lead to a different result under
The Eastland's facts. Surely the "occasion" of the Eastland accident included both the sinking and the "continuance of the . . .
peril of the vessel until she was rescued and placed in safety" by
the towing company. Perhaps Judge Carpenter would have
reached that conclusion if he had construed the statute with "the
humane object in view" instead of insisting that it was a "sad
reflection to contemplate."
B. A Suggested Interpretation of the Statute
How should a modern court apply the 1912 statute to a claim
for independent life salvage? The statute clearly states that life
salvors are to recover a "fair share" of the property salvage award.
Yet this command is self-contradictory in many situations where
any award is inherently unfair to the property salvor. If the life
salvor can be adequately compensated by an award that is small
relative to the property salvor's award, then any unfairness will
be minimal. Also, if the property salvor and life salvor sue jointly,
the judge can diminish the unfairness to the salvors by resorting
to the fiction of awarding a disproportionately large recovery to
the property salvor and then reducing it by a fair amount of life
salvage. 149 But greater unfairness will result if the only award that
can adequately compensate the life salvor is large relative to the
property salvor's award and the court chooses to read the statute
literally without artificially increasing the property salvor's
award. Similarly, the property salvor will be treated unfairly if
he received a fair award in a separate proceeding and has to share
148. 42 F.2d at 538.
149. Professors Gilmore and Black argue that the life salvor's award under the statute
ought always to be borne by the property owner, not the property salvor, by analogy to
the life-property salvage reward. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 7, § 8-12, at 573, A
similar position is taken by Wildeboer, based on the obligation under article 8 of the treaty
to consider the danger to passengers and crew of the salved vessel in determining the
salvage award. I. WILDEBOER, supra note 88, at 247-48.

May 1979]

Saving Life at Sea

1261

a part of it with a life salvor in a later proceeding. The most unfair
of all is when the value of the property saved - the maximum
amount that can be awarded the property salvor - is insufficient to adequately compensate the life salvor and property salvor
for their services.
To resolve such dilemmas it is necessary to probe the purposes of the 1912 statute. Unfortunately, the authors of neither
the statute nor the underlying treaty clearly spelled out the ideals
that motivated their action. Nevertheless, several possible motivations have been suggested. The Eastland apparently viewed
the purpose as one of deterring the evil temptation of those who
can choose between saving life and property; 150 The Shreveport
stated the same theory more positively. 151 That was certainly one
of the purposes of the statute - courts have long recognized
that one of the purposes of all salvage awards is to deter any
form of misconduct by salvors. 152 But, notwithstanding Judge
Carpenter's opinion in The Eastland, that could hardly have
been the only purpose of the statute. Courts reward salvage in
other cases where the potential for misconduct is minimal; why
should independent life salvage awards alone be motivated by
such narrow cynicism?
Although others have proposed interpretations of the life salvage statute, 153 a full statement of the statute's purpose must give
credit to the views of the American delegates to the Brussels
conference, who thought that the provision was based on humanitarian principles. 154 The treaty was intended to set a minimum
level of protection for life salvors, undoubtedly for many of the
reasons that courts generally award salvage - to encourage
people to incur expenses and assume possibly grave personal
risks in order to save the lives and property of others. 155
The treaty was certainly not intended to reduce the rights of
150. 262 F. at 539-40.
151. 42 F.2d at 537.
152. The Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240 (1804); The Mulhouse, 17 F. Cas. 962 (S.D.
Fla. 1859) (No. 9,910). See generally M. NORRIS, supra note 2, §§ 98, 232.
153. One might imagine that the statute was designed to make property salvors pay
a share of their reward to the life salvors who enabled them to devote more time to saving
property. See The Shreveport, 42 F.2d at 540-41. One noted authority suggests that the
statute's purpose "is to encourage a vessel which has picked up injured and dying persons
to proceed at once to get them safe on shore, leaving others to save the property, with the
assurance that the court will apportion the award fairly." A. KNAUTH, THE AVIATION
SALVAGE AT SEA CONVENTION OF 1938, at 11 n.31 (N.Y.U. School of Law Contemporary
Law Pamphlets, Series 1, No. 18 (1939)).
154. See note 93 supra.
155. The Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240 (1804); The Mulhouse, 17 F. Cas. 962 (S.D.
Fla. 1859) (No. 9,910). See generally M. NORRIS, supra note 2, §§ 98, 238.
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American life salvors below their level under American judgemade law. Yet that is exactly what The Eastland's interpretation
does! Like The Eastland, The Mulhouse recognized that denying
independent life salvors a reward might tempt salvors "in many
instances, to gratify their avarice at the expense of their feelings
of humanity." 156 Unlike The Eastland, however, The Mulhouse
did not make the existence of such temptation a prerequisite for
recovery. Rather, the court recognized that "the general principles of humanity and of enlarged policy" favor rewards. 157
Faced with the inherent self-contradictions of the 1912 statute, The Eastland court interpreted it extremely narrowly. Such
an interpretation is erroneous, misconstruing what few clues to
legislative intent are available. Modern courts should abandon
that view and adopt the only approach that would fairly satisfy
156. 17 F. Cas. at 967.
157. The Mulhouse (pamphlet), supra note 18, at 27 (quoting The Emblem, 8 F. Cas.
611 (D. Me. 1840) (No. 4,434)). The Eastland's holding that no life salvage is due unless
life and property are saved at substantially the same time is also more restrictive than
The Mu/house. See note 122 supra and accompanying text. Although The Mu/house is
generally more favorable to life salvors than The Eastland, it is unclear if the Chicago life
salvors would ultimately have recovered under the general maritime law. Although The
Mu/house would have given them a lien against the relatively small proceeds of the
Eastland, they would have had to compete for priority against the claimants for property
salvage, personal injuries, and death. The life salvors could have argued that their claim
ought to be preferred to the property salvor's lien because saving life is more important
than saving property. 1'.'urther, because The Eastland court was bound by a previous
decision to give the towing company priority over the tort claimants, Great Lakes Towing
Co. v. St. Joseph-Chicago S.S. Co. 253 F. 635 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Bishop v.
Great Lakes Towing Co., 248 U.S. 578 (1908), ·249 U.S. 609 (1919), it would logically follow
that the life salvors' lien would be paramount. One objection to this argument is that but
for the towing company's efforts, no property would have been available to satisfy any of
the claims. The Eastland, 262 F. at 541-42. This objection, however, did not deter the
British Parliament from requiring life salvage liens to be superior to property salvage liens.
Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, 57 & 58 Viet., c. 60, § 544(2). The harm to the property
salvors that results from •giving the life salvors priority would be limited because it is
unlikely that the life salvage award would itself exhaust the proceeds available. A more
substantial objection would be that tort victims are more deserving of relief than life
salvors. When the property salvors have exhausted most of the proceeds of the vessel, as
was the case in The Eastland, it is unseemly for the noble life salvors to deprive disaster
victims of whatever compensation might be had.
The 1912 statute would have been particularly useful in cutting the Gordian knot
presented by the competing claims to priority. The statute would give the property salvors
priority over the tort claims, but the life salvors would share in that reward. In that way
the life salvors' award would not be at the expense of the tort victims, provided the court
does not artificially increase the property salvor's award to take account of the amount
that would adequately compensate the life salvor.
Of course, if the courts had not ultimately allowed the owners of the Eastland to limit
their liability under 46 U.S.C. § 183, then the life salvors would have had full recovery if
The Mu/house had been followed. See note 167 infra.
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all the statutory purposes: They should take advantage of the
broad discretion they were given in applying the statute and
should seek to determine in each individual case the amount that
can be awarded the life salvors without seriously deterring people
from saving property. If the amount awarded the life salvors
under the statute is inadequate, the court should exercise its
power preserved under the 1910 treaty 158 to award life salvage
directly out of the property saved or directly from the shipowner.
V.

BEYOND THE 1912 STATUTE - REFORM OF THE
LIFE SALVAGE RULES

Even if courts reward independent life salvors more freely
than they have so far under the 1912 statute, the problem of
whether a court should reward pure 1,ife salvors will still remain.
Traditionally, pure life salvors have received no reward, even
though they may have forgone an opportunity to save property
and even though they may have sustained substantial expense or
personal injury in order to save life. That rule, however, is based
on old English cases that were questionable even when decided
and now are modified by statute. 159 Congress and the courts
should reconsider the rule denying compensation for pure life
salvors.
Perhaps the best approach would be to follow the English
example and create a fund fo:t rewarding pure life salvors. Lawrence Jarett has proposed setting up such a fund to reimburse
persons for "any expenses or losses which are directly attributable
to life salvage endeavors, whether successful or not." 160 His proposal is limited to lives saved in American navigable waters or
from a vessel of American registry anywhere on the high seas. The
fund would be collected from persons whose property is saved by
the Coast Guard. That proposal is attractive because it would
assure payment even if the shipowner becomes insolvent or is
allowed to limit its liability to an amount that is insufficient to
pay the life salvors. Jarett's proposal, if modified slightly, could
be used to reimburse American shipowners who save refugees
adrift on unseaworthy boats. 161 But since Congress has shown no
158. See text at note 91 supra.
159. See text at notes 19-35 & 46-49 supra.
160. Jarett, supra note 7.
161. Cf. New York Times, July 15, 1979, at 1, col. 3 (ships bound for Japan avoid
seas traversed by refugees fleeing Vietnam. The costs of rescue are considered to be
prohibitive).
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interest in establishing such a fund, 162 it would seem wise for the
courts to do what they can to reform the life salvage rules.
One writer, David W. Brown, suggests that courts start
awarding property salvage to those who save lives, because they
save the owner of the vessel from potential liability to the passengers and crew.1 63 This Article proposes a more direct solution:
Courts should use their power to make substantive admiralty
law 164 to overrule the pure life salvage doctrine and to give all life
salvors direct recourse against the shipowner, the party best
placed to compensate them.
The reasons originally advanced for not making the shipowner pay pure life salvage carry little weight today. If The
Zephyrus, decided in 1842, is taken at face value, the British
court denied pure life salvage because salvage suits could not be
brought in personam and because property salvage could not be
awarded unless property was saved. Although it may have made
some sense in England in 1842 to prohibit in personam suits for
life salvage, that rationale was out of place in the United States
even then, since federal courts were more willing than their
British counterparts to allow in personam suits under their
admiralty jurisdiction. 165 Today, it makes even less sense, since
salvors are free in almost all cases to sue in personam. 166
162. Over a century ago, an American newspaper urged Congress to reimburse
shipowners for the expenses of life salvage. See Commercial Bulletin (Boston, Mass.), May
26, 1860, at 3, col. 3, reprinted in The Times (London), June 14, 1860, at 9, col. 6. The
newspaper asserted that the expenses of rescue are often ruinous, and it expressed the
belief that "if vessels saving life were indemnified for the expense . . . hundreds of Jives
might be saved every year, which otherwise would be liable to pass out of sight unheeded."
163. Comment, 2 HASTINGS L.J., supra note 7. See also note 208 infra.
164. In United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975), the Court created
a new rule with respect to comparative negligence in collision cases and said, "[T]he
Judiciary has traditionally taken the lead in the law maritime, and 'Congress has largely
left to this Court the responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty law.'"
Fitzgerald v. United States Line Co., 274 U.S. 16, 20.'' 421 U.S. at 409. In Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970), where the Court created a wrongful death
remedy under the general maritime law, the Court quoted a passage from The Sea Gull,
21 F. Cas. 909 (C.C. Md. 1865) (No. 12,578) that said, "[I]t better becomes the humane
and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy,
when not required to withhold it by established and inflexible rules." 398 U.S. at 387. But
see Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978). The courts have been particularly active in making salvage law. Judge Hough wrote, "No branch of marine law has
grown more since printed reports began, and none is growing more now,. than salvage.''
Canadian Government Merchant Marine v. United States, 7 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1925),
165. Morrison, supra note 31.
166. See note 31 supra. Apparently the only situation in which a property salvor can
sue in rem but not in personam is where the owner does not request the salvage service
and elects not to accept and possess the salved property. See Lambros Seaplane Base, Inc.
v. The Batory, 215 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1954).
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Similarly, it makes little, if any, sense to require someone to
save property before awarding life s~lvage merely because wouldbe property salvors receive no reward for unsuccessful efforts.
While the maritime interests in life and property salvage are
similar, they are not identical. One reason for denying recovery
for unsuccessful attempts to save property is to limit the shipowner's liability. Today's courts, however, are generally unwilling
to limit shipowners' liability even under a statute designed for
that purpose. 167 Therefore, unless a court applies the limitation
statute to the life salvor's claim, no other form of limitation is
consistent with the humanitarian interests of life salvage. Another reason for compensating only successful efforts to save
property is to encourage would-be salvors to make extra efforts
to succeed. In the context of life salvage, however, that policy
would at most prohibit compensation for unsuccessful attempts
at life salvage. And yet such a prohibition might actually discourage people from attempting to save life. If the expense and danger
are great enough, potential rescuers might not make the effort if
the chance for recovery depended on whether the injured victim
survives. Thus, because society values life more than property,
people who make reasonable, though unsuccessful, efforts to save
life should be compensated, even though unsuccessful efforts to
save property go unrewarded. 168
167. Under 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1976), a shipowner can limit its'Iiability to the value of
the ship and its freight for damage incurred without its privity and knowledge. In the past
forty years, courts have significantly narrowed the owner's right to limit liability. The
burden of showing lack of privity or knowledge rests on the shipowner claiming limitation.
If a ship is unseaworthy when it begins its voyage or if the loss of a ship is caused by events
within the owner's effective control, then the owner will most likely be denied the right
to limit liability. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 7, §§ 10-24, 10-25. Among the
conditions that render a ship unseaworthy is an inadequate crew, either in number or
competence. In Cerro Sales v. Atlantic Marine Enterprises, 403 F. Supp. 562 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), the shipowner was denied limitation because the crew was inadequate in number
and inadequately trained to handle a fire emergency. In related litigation, a life salvage
claim was denied on the basis of the 1912 statute. St. Paul Marine Transp. Co. v. Cerro
Sales Corp., 313 F. Supp. 377 (D. Hawaii 1970). But see The Eastland, 78 F.2d 984 (7th
Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 703 (1936). The excursion boat tipped over while at the
dock, due to an engineer's negligence in handling the water ballast tanks. In granting the
owners the right to limitation, the court affirmed the commissioner's findings that "at the
time of the disaster the Steamer Eastland was seaworthy in every respect, properly
equipped and manned and fit for the carriage of passengers if properly handled." 78 F.2d
984, 986.
168. The law of restitution allows those who save or attempt to save life a greater
chance of receiving compensation than those who save property. See 2 G. PALMER, supra
note 8, § § 10.3-.4. Also, in a negligence action for personal injuries suffered by a rescuer,
a person who attempts to save life is less likely to be found contributorily negligent than
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Another frequently offered argument against pure life salvage is that we expect people to save life out of humanitarian
motives and therefore we expect salvors to need less encouragement to save life than property .169 Therefore, some might think it
crass to ask for a reward for saving life. But even if less encouragement is needed to save life than property, it is still fairer and more
efficient to offer monetary compensation for the expenses and
personal injuries incurred. Rescues at sea can involve tremendous
expenses for extra fuel, extra wages, and lost profits, 170 and because of the need for swift action, saving human life may entail
special hazards not involved with saving property. 171 It would be
unfair to life salvors to make them bear those costs, and it would
be inhuman to deter potential life salvors by not assuring them
of reasonable compensation. 172
Finally, one might argue that shipowners should not have to
pay for services that do not benefit them. That concern has not,
however, prevented courts from requiring shipowners to pay enhanced rewards to life-property salvors and, in a few instances,
to reward independent life salvors. Such rewards seem to be
one who undertook the same risks to save property of little value. Berg v. Great Northern
Ry., 70 Minn. 272, 73 N.W. 648 (1897). See also note 200 infra.
169. "Their reward they have; it never can be taken from them, and it is measured
by a standard greater than money. They would not have done less [sic] for great promises." The Eastland, 262 F. 535,540 (N.D. Ill. 1919). See Landes & Posner, 68 AM. EcoN,
REV., supra note 7; Landes & Posner, 7 J. LEGAL STUD., supra note 7.
170. For example, the parties in The Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co.
v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc., 553 F.2d 830, 837 n.7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859
(1977), stipulated that fuel costs resulting from approximately 6½ hour diversion of
a passenger ship cost $8,500. A study prepared in 1976 shows that the daily cost of
diversion for cargo vessels and tankers ranges from $12,400 to nearly $38,000. NATIONAL
MARITlME RESEARCH CENTER, FEAsIBILITY STUDY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF THE
SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM TO PROVIDE SHIPBOARD EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE
(NMRC-KP-155) 18-22 (1976).
171. G. ROBINSON, supra note 78, § 98, at 717-18.
172. See The Emblem, 8 F. Cas. 611 (D. Me. 1840) (No. 4,434); New York Times,
July 15, 1979, at 1, col. 3 (ships bound for Japan are avoiding seas traversed by refugees
fleeing Vietnam in unseaworthy boats, in part because of the costs of rescue); Commercial
Bulletin (Boston, Mass.), May 26, 1860, at 3, col. 3, reprinted in The Times (London),
June 14, 1860, at 9, col. 6 (editorial asserting that hundreds of lives were lost annually
because shipowners could not afford the expense of saving life at sea). Commenting Inter
on the failure of a passing ship to rescue the passengers and crew of a wrecked steamer,
the Commercial Bulletin said:
We fear that her captain may have been one of those men who calculate the cost
of humanity before they undertake it.
Commercial Bulletin (Boston, Mass.) October 13, 1860, at 3, col. 1 (unpnginated). Professors Landes and Posner recognize that the greater the cost of saving life, the less altruism
is likely to generate rescue efforts. Landes & Posner, 7 J. LEGAL STUD., supra note 7, at
104.
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based, at least in part, on the belief that they benefit the shipowner by encouraging people to "come to the rescue" when life
and property are in peril and because all who are engaged in
maritime commerce are interested in the safety of seamen. 173
More importantly, life salvors directly save many shipowners
considerable expense. Because a shipowner owes a high standard
of care to his passengers and crew, his potential liability for their
deaths is great. 174 At the very least, most shipowners have a duty
to incur reasonable costs to save the lives of their passengers and
crew, 175 and life salvors spare the shipowners that expense. Even
173. See The Fusilier, 167 Eng. Rep. 391, 16 Eng. Rep. 19 (P.C. 1864).
174. A shipowner is liable for the wrongful death of a passenger under either the
Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-767 (1976), or the general maritime law.
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978) (The statute applies to death
resulting from wrongful acts occuring more than three miles from shore. The general
maritime law applies in all other cases). Although the cause of action for a passenger's
injury or death is based on a "negligence" theory, the shipowner, like a carrier on land,
owes a high standard of care to its passengers. E.g., Alpert v. Zim Lines, 370 F.2d 115 (2d
Cir. 1966); Allen v. Matson Navigation Co., 255 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1958) (duty to exercise
extraordinary vigilance and the highest skill). The shipowner is also strictly liable for the
"misconduct" of its crew. New Jersey Steamboat Co. v. Brockett, 121 U.S. 637 (1887);
Tullis v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 397 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1968).
A shipowner is liable under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976), and, in case of
death more than three miles from shore, under the Death on the High Seas Act for
negligently causing the death of a seaman. In addition to the more usual cases where a
shipowner's negligence causes a seaman's death, the Jones Act make3 a shipowner liable
if a seaman who becomes ill or injured while serving the ship dies as a result of the
shipowner's failure to take reasonable steps to secure medical' care for him. Cortes v.
Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367 (1932). Also, the shipowner is liable under the
Death on the High Seas Act or under the general maritime law if the seaman's death is
caused by the unseaworthiness of the ship. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S.
618 (1978).
Both the Jones Act and the seaworthiness obligation require a high standard of care
on the part of the shipowner. The standard of care under the Jones Act, though called
"negligence," is generally higher than the negligence standard under the land-based common law. Also, a shipowner is strictly liable under the Jones Act if the seaman's death
results from the shipowner's violation of a statutory duty, even though the statute is not
designed to prevent the type of injury that caused the death. Kernan v. Amerlcan Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958). See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 7, §§ 6-35
to 6-36, at 376-82. The unseaworthiness remedy is a species of absolute liability, not
founded on the fault of the shipowner. A vessel is unseaworthy if it is not "reasonably
suitable for [its] intended service." Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
The shipowner also faces potential criminal penalties for the negligent loss of life. 18
u.s.c. § 1115 (1976).
175. A shipowner has a duty to use reasonable care to rescue a drowning seaman even
though the seaman negligently caused his own distress. E.g., Reyes v. Vantage S.S. Co.,
558 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1977); Di Nicola v. Pennsylvania R.R., 158 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1946);
Kirincich v. Standard Dredging Co., 112 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1940); Harris v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 50 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1931). A shipowner has a similar duty to a drowning passenger.
Hutchinson v. Dickie, 162 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 830 (1947); Melhado
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in the few instances where the life salvor does not save the shipowner any expense, 176 it seems best to place the expenses of the
rescue on the shipowner in order not to deter would-be rescuers
from engaging in expensive and potentially dangerous ventures to
save life. Finally, the shipowner is in the best position to prevent
injuries and thus to reduce the need for costly and dangerous
rescues.
Rewarding pure life salvors calls into question the congressional intent behind the 1912 life salvage statute. Even though
the statute does not explicitly deny pure life salvage, one might
argue that Congress was aware that the courts had not awarded
pure life salvage and did not want life salvors to gain any new
rights beyond those granted explicitly by the statute. But such
an interpretation would glean a lot of specific congressional intent
from a very general congressional silence and "keep the word of
promise to the ear and break it to the hope." 177 Congress passed
the statute to comply with the 1910 treaty. The treaty was intended to increase the rights of life salvors and left each nation
v. Poughkeepsie Transp. Co., 34 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 99 (1882); Horsley v. MacLaren, 22
D.L.R.3d 545 (Can. 1971), overruling Vanvalkenberg v. Northern Navigation Co., 19
D.L.R. 649 (Ont. App. Div. 1913). See also Reed v. Louisville & N. R.R., 104 Ky. 603, 47
S. W. 591 (1898) (railroad has duty to stop and rescue a passenger thrown from a train
without its fault if it is reasonable to do so. If it is unreasonable to stop, it has a duty to
"procure" others to go to the assistance of the victim). Accord, Yazoo & Mississippi
Valley R.R. v. Byrd, 89 Miss. 308, 321, 42 So. 286, 288 (1906) ("for humanity's sake there
should have been something done for him"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A,
Illustration 1 (1965). But see Leslie v. Robinson, 267 App. Div. 965, 46 N.Y.S.2d 638, affd.
per curiam, 293 N.Y. 911, 60 N.E.2d 35 (1944) ("while it appears that there is no legal
duty to attempt a rescue, it may be accepted, for the purposes of this decision, that such
a duty is owed to an invitee who is in peril." Held, defendant was not negligent),
With respect to the obligation owed a seaman who becomes ill aboard ship, the
Supreme Court wrote in De Zon v. American President Lines, Ltd., 318 U.S. 660, 668
(1943):
Although there may be no duty to the seaman to carry a physician, the circumstan•
ces may be such as to require reasonable measures to get him to one, as by turning
back, putting in to the nearest port although not one of call, hailing a passing ship,
or taking other measures of considerable cost in time and money. Failure to furnish
such care, even at the cost of a week's delay, has been held by this Court to be n
basis for damages. The Iroquois [194 U.S. 240 (1904)].
The same duty may be owed passengers. See Nietes v. American President Lines, Ltd.,
188 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1959); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 314A (1965) (common carrier has duty to render first aid to injured passengers and "to care for them until
they can be cared for by others").
176. For example, where a seaworthy ship founders without any negligence on the
part of the master or crew and the master has insufficient time to make arrangements for
the rescue of the passengers and crew. Or, where the owner-operator of the vessel is the
sole survivor.
177. The Cargo ex Schiller, 2 P.D. 145, 161 (C.A. 1877) (James, L.J.).
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free to give life salvors additional rights. 178 Since Congress seems
to have had little desire other than to ensure internationally adequate rules of life salvage, it is more consistent with the purpose
of the treaty to allow courts to compensate pure life salvors for
their expenses and personal injuries. 179
In fashioning a life salvage remedy against shipowners,
courts should be guided by the need to encourage persons to
undertake potentially dangerous and costly rescues at sea. Therefore, life salvors ought to receive compensation at least for personal injuries and reasonable expenses incurred in the rescue.
Although guarantees of indemnity for expenses and personal injuries will remove most of the disincentive to saving life at sea, it
might be appropriate in some cases to reward the life salvor even
further. In cases of extraordinary risk and heroism, the promise
of compensation for expenses and personal injuries may be inadequate to express society's gratitude and inadequate to encourage
others to venture forth in similar circumstances.
All categories of life salvors should receive compensation or
reward for saving life. Life-property salvors already receive reimbursement of their reasonable expenses and an additional reward
178. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
179. Another objection to rewarding life salvors might be that it is impossible to
place a value on saving another's life. This does not seem to have been a serious problem,
however, in the awarding of life salvage either under the general maritime law or under
statute. See, e.g., The Bremen, 111 F. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1901); The Mulhouse, 17 F. Cas.
962 (S.D. Fla. 1859) (No. 9,910); The Suevic, [1908) P. 154; The Heindall (Nova Scotia
Vice Adm. 1872), reported in YOUNG'S ADMIRALTY DECISIONS 132 (Oxley ed. 1882).
The master of a vessel has a qualified duty under 46 U.S.C. § 728 (1976) and under
the Safety of Life at Sea Convention to save the life of a person aboard another vessel.
See note 6 supra. Although one acting under a legal duty to save property ordinarily has
no right to property salvage, see note 8 supra, it seems clear that the duties to save life
aboard another vessel do not prevent one from claiming compensation or a reward. The
provision in 46 U.S.C. § 728 (1976) is based on the Brussels Salvage Convention that also
provides that life-property salvors and independent life salvors are entitled to a reward
for saving life. Those provisions would be virtually nullified, at least with respect to the
master, if the duty to save life barred the salvor from obtaining a reward. Also, the Safety
of Life at Sea Convention specifically provides that it does not prejudice the Brussels
Salvage Convention. Ch. V, Reg. lOe, 16 U.S.T.185, 504, T.I.A.S. No. 5780, 536 U.N.T.S.
27, 334 (1960). The British counterpart to 46 U.S.C. § 728 (1976) and the British statute
that gives effect to the Safety of Life at Sea Convention expressly provide that compliance
with those duties does not deprive the master "or any other person" of their right to
salvage. 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 57, § 6 (1911); 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 43, § 22(8) (1949). See also G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 7, § 8-4. In cases of collision, expenses incurred by a ship
in a search for its seaman who may have drowned are included in the damages recoverable
from the ship responsible for the collision. In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 327 F. Supp.
1024 (E.D. La. 1971).
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for heroism, but probably not compensation for personal injuries.180 Reform of the life salvage rules should give life-property
salvors the right to full compensation for personal injuries connected with the attempt to save life. Similarly, independent life
salvors, like those in The Eastland 181 and The Admiral Evans, 182
who receive no compensation under the life salvage statute, ought
to receive compensation and reward.
A more difficult question is whether an independent life salvor who can recover under the life salvage statute should also be
able to recover under a judicially created remedy. The shipowner
could argue that Congress intended the statute to be the exclusive
means of relief. It would seem fair, however, to allow life salvors
who do not recover all of their expenses by sharing in the property
salvage award to recover their remaining unreimbursed expenses
directly from the owner. Yet allowing such a suit against the
shipowner runs the risk of making the life salvage statute a dead
letter, a result some courts might find unacceptable. 183 Courts
180. Property salvors who suffer personal injuries have a well-recognized right to a
special award. E.g., The Bremen, 111 F. 228, 239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1901). See generally M.
NORRIS, supra note 2, § 220. In The Cyclone, 16 F. 486, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1883), Judge Addi•
son Brown awarded $100 to a salvor "for his expenses and personal injuries arising from
his fall" while extinguishing a fire. One court said that the amount awarded for personal
injuries is viewed as a bonus and is not intended to be full compensation for the injuries
suffered. Nolan v. A.H. Basse Rederi Aktieselskab, 164 F. Supp. 774, 778 (E.D. Pa. 1958),
m,odified on other grounds, 267 F.2d 584 (3d Cir. 1959). See also The Elkridge, 30 F.2d
618 (2d Cir. 1929) (it is fair to give a seaman practically the same salvage award given to
the representative of a seaman who lost his life. Each faced the same risk, and compensation for the loss suffered by the seaman's dependents can be had by statute). But see
Guindon v. Cargoes of Canal Boats Zenith, Adelphi, and Gold Dust, 197 F. 227, 230
(W.D.N.Y. 1912) (awarding $750 "in full compensation" for the $500 in personal injuries
and $200 of property damage sustained "and as [a] salvage award").
181. 262 F. 535 (N.D. Ill. 1919).
182. 286 F. 442 (W.D. Wash. 1923).
183. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978), the Supreme Court
held in a 6-2 decision that the survivors in a wrongful death action cannot recover for loss
of society under the general maritime law if the death occurs more than three miles from
the United States. The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-767
(1976), which applies to such cases, expressly limits recovery to pecuniary loss. 46 U.S.C.
§ 762 (1976). In a case involving death in coastal waters the Supreme Court had said
earlier that the general maritime law allows recovery for loss of society in wrongful death
cases. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974). Some had thought that
Gaudet and its predecessor, Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970),
had made DOHSA a dead letter. Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 534 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1975);
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 7, § 6-33. In Higginbotham, the Court said, however,
"[C]ourts are not free to 'supplement' Congress' answer so thoroughly that the Act
becomes meaningless." 436 U.S. at 625. The Court distinguished Moragne, which had
created the general maritime law right to wrongful death, by saying that that case
"fill[ed] a gap left by Congress' silence" and that "Congress withheld a statutory remedy

May 1979]

Saving Life at Sea

1271

that insist on giving effect to the statute could do so by requiring
independent life salvors to pursue their statutory claims prior to,
or at least concurrently with, their action against the shipowner.
The proposal set forth above for the reform of the life salvage
rules has support in some recent decisions by leading courts.
These decisions have been made not in the name of salvage but
under some creative legal doctrines that may impose certain unnecessary limitations on recovery.

A. Grigsby: Vicarious Seamen
Shipowners, even nonnegligent shipowners, are liable to seamen for personal injuries if they are caused by an unseaworthy
condition of the ship. A ship is unseaworthy if it is not
"reasonably fit for [its] intended use." 184 Although the unseaworthiness remedy is available only to seamen, the Supreme
Court has said that a "seaman" includes someone like a repairman, carpenter, or stevedore who is "doing a seaman's work and
incurring a seaman's hazards. " 185 In Grigsby. v. Coastal Marine
Service, Inc., 186 a shore-based worker named Grigsby attempted
to save two repairmen who had gone into a barge's wing tank that
was low in oxygen. 187 Grigsby died of suffocation when he descended into the tank. The court allowed Grigsby's survivors to
recover against the barge owner for Grigsby's wrongful death,
based on the unseaworthiness of the barge. 188
in coastal waters in order to encourage and preserve supplemental remedies." 436 U.S. at
625. Unlike DOHSA, the 1912 salvage statute need not be read restrictively. See text at
note 158 supra. Arguably Congress left a gap in the treatment of life salvors "in order to
encourage and preserve" such supplemental remedies as paying enhanced rewards to lifeproperty salvors and providing full compensation to independent life salvors. Cf. Plaintiffs Brief Supporting Motion for Interlocutory Summary Judgment of Liability by Defendant at 2 n.2, Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc.,
418 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (in which the P&O argued, "[T]he Congressional
intent [behind 46 U.S.C. § 729 (1976)] was to assure the life salvor's lien on salved
property, without necessarily denying the salvor in personam rights").
184. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960).
185. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 99 (1946). See generally G. GILMORE
& C. BLACK, supra note 7, § 6-54, at 440-41. Such plaintiffs are frequently called "vicarious seamen" or "Sieracki seamen." The longshoreman's right to sue the shipowner for
unseaworthiness has been eliminated by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
186. 412 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1033 (1970).
187. One of the repairmen had gone into the tank to rescue the other. Grigsby was
told that one had fallen and broken his back. 412 F.2d at 1018-19. The wing tank was
intended to supply buoyancy. It was expected to be kept tightly closed for long periods of
time and was not intended to carry people. 412 F.2d at 1030.
188. Recovery was based on the applicable state wrongful death statute as required
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Grigsby's survivors would have had no claim for relief under
the conventional rules of life salvage and under the 1912 statute
because he failed to save life and because no property was saved
from peril. The court, however, used Grigsby's status as a life
salvor to dub him a "vicarious seaman" who could claim the
unseaworthiness remedy . 189 Grigsby became a "vicarious seaman" because he did what "a seaman responding to the call of
the sea would have done." 190 In reaching that result the court took
a broad view of the humane policies underlying salvage law. The
court said,
[O]f all branches of jurisprudence, admiralty must be the one
most hospitable to the impulses of man and law to save life and
limb and property. The law of salvage, a distinctively maritime
branch of the law, is the historical forerunner of latter day doctrines which supposedly reflect the more enlightened and humane
outlook of contemporary society. Maritime law in every way and
in every context encourages the salvor to salve - to save. 191
at the time by The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959). Shortly after Grigsby, the
Supreme Court overruled The Tungus and created a right to recover for wrongful death
based on unseaworthiness under the general maritime law. Moragne v. State Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). Moragne would not change the result in Grigsby, but it
would base the cause of action on federal, rather than state, law.
189. 412 F.2d at 1015, 1022, 1030. The court also suggested that "as a corollary"
Grigsby succeeded vicariously to the repairmen's status as vicarious seamen. 412 F.2d at
1030. A similar result was reached two years earlier in Nikiforow v. Rittenhouse, 277 F.
Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (not cited in Grigsby), in which a member of the Coast Guard
was injured while attempting to pull a yacht off a sandbar. The yacht's stanchion post
broke and struck the plaintiff. The court concluded that the Coast Guard member was a
"vicarious seaman" entitled to recover from the owner of the yacht if the yacht was
unseaworthy. In reaching its decision the court said that the Coast Guard's assistance to
grounded vessels is an activity traditionally performed by those vessels' crews. 277 F.
Supp. at 611. The extension of liability in Grigsby and Nikiforow was rejected in Klarman
v. Santini, 363 F. Supp. 910 (D. Conn. 1973), affd., 503 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1974) (one judge
dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975). In addition, Klarman distinguished
Grigsby on its facts. In Klarman an auxiliary police officer was killed while observing an
attempted tow of a sloop that had run aground. The court held that the observer was not
a "seaman" entitled to recover for unseaworthiness. The court of appeals pointed out that
"while not determinative of this action" Congress had recently provided that an injured
longshoreman may not recover against a ship based on unseaworthiness, Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, §
18(a), 86 Stat. 1263 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976)), and that this "affords an
additional reason why the Sieracki rule [treating longshoremen as vicarious seamen]
should not be extended further in line with Grigsby . . . . " 503 F.2d at 35-36. The court
pointed out that the 1972 amendments also increased the longshoreman's compensation
benefits "thus affording an additional reason for eliminating the longshoreman's claim for
unseaworthiness," but noted that the plaintiff received state workmen's compensation
benefits. 503 F.2d at 36 n.10. Cf. Horsley v. MacLaren, 22 D.L.R.3d 545 (Can. 1971)
(shipowner is not liable for death of rescuer when owner was not at fault in placing a guest
in peril or in failing to rescue the victims).
190. 412 F.2d at 1022.
191. 412 F.2d at 1021.
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Life salvors face terrible risks of death or personal injury, and the
general maritime law denies many life salvors any compensation
for injuries. Grigsby is therefore a great advance, because it opens
one avenue toward compensation· for a life salvor's death or injury.
It would be premature, however, to conclude that Grigsby
gives all life salvors the right to recover against a shipowner for
personal injuries incurred in an attempt to save life. The holding
reaches only unseaworthy ships; although most shipwrecks or
accidents that imperil life probably involve an "unseaworthy"
ship, this is not always the case. 192 Further, it is not clear whether
Grigsby would apply if the rescuer ·were not injured by the unseaworthy condition. In Theodories· v. Hercules Navigation Co., 193 a
man suffered a heart attack when he tried to rescue another who
had fallen into a hold. The trial court, finding the ship to be
unseaworthy because the hold was inadequately lit, granted relief
based on Grigsby. 194 The court of appeals found that the ship was
seaworthy and reversed. Although the court of appeals did not
decide whether Grigsby would apply if the ship had been unseaworthy, Judge Brown, who wrote most of Grigsby, 195 suggested
that making the ship liable for the rescuer's death would be a
sort of for-want-of-a-nail-the-shoe-was-lost 'proximate cause'
[that] stretches both Grigsby logic and the limits of the English
language very, very far, and an audible recitation proves it, for it
sounds more than a little strange to say that [the rescuer's] death
on the well-lighted main deck was 'caused' by inadequate lighting
in hold No. 5. 196

Viewed as an issue of either "proximate cause" or allocation
of risk, th~ question whether the owner of an unseaworthy ship
should be 1iable for a rescuer's death that is indirectly caused by
the unseaworthy condition is fundamentally one of policy. 197 A
192. A ship is "unseaworthy" only if it is "not reasonably fit" for the voyage. Ships
are not required to be "accident-free." Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550
(1960). See, e.g., Griffith v. Gardner, 196 F.2d 698, 702 (9th Cir. 1952) (passenger washed
overboard by "unusual waves which could not have been anticipated nor guarded
against." Held, vessel was not unseaworthy).
193. 448 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1971).
194. 448 F.2d at 704. The lower court's opinion is not reported.
195. Judge Wisdom wrote that part of Grigsby that determined that Louisiana law
gave a wrongful death remedy for unseaworthiness. 412 F.2d at 1023 n.**. The other
member of the panel was Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger.
196. 448 F.2d at 704 n.8.
197. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS§ 42 (4thed.1971); Robertson,
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policy favoring rescue has led courts to compensate injured rescuers in negligence cases even when the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the rescuer's injury is somewhat attenuated.198 It remains to be seen whether the courts will do the same
when the defendant is without fault, as in unseaworthiness and
products liability cases. 199 To hold the owner of an unseaworthy
ship liable for life salvage fits well with Grigsby's broad humanitarian policy of encouraging rescue, at least as long as it creates
no crushing liability for a shipowner. If, for example, a large ship
diverts to rescue a few crew members of a small burning vessel
at sea and sinks in an unexpected storm before reaching the burning vessel, the owners of the burning vessel should not pay for all
of the deaths that would not have occurred but for the diversion.
Reason Versus Rule in Louisiana Tort Law: Dialogue on Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc.,
34 LA. L. REV. 1 (1973). 198. "[A] rescuer is favored in the eyes of the law." Lynch v. Fisher, 41 So. 2d 692,
695 (La. App. 1949) (an employee of the defendants negligently parked their truck on a
highway and another driver, Gunter, collided with it. A third party, Lynch, ran to help
Gunter, found a pistol in Gunter's car and handed it to him. Gunter was temporarily
deranged by the accident and shot Lynch. Held, the defendants are liable for Lynch's
injuries). A less extreme case is Zylka v. Leikvoll, 274 Minn. 435, 144 N.W. 2d 358 (1966)
(one who negligently creates a hazard on a highway is liable to a Samaritan injured by
another oncoming car). Perhaps the best known case is Wagner v. International Ry., 232
N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921) (railroad conductor did not close door on train and a man
fell out as the train turned a curve on a trestle. Soon thereafter, the man's cousin walked
along the trestle in search of him but fell off and was injured. The court held that the
railroad was liable to the rescuer if it had negligently caused the first man's fall and if
the rescuer acted reasonably in the emergency).
199. In one products liability case, rescuers or representatives of their estates re•
covered from a nonnegligent manufacturer even though the rescuers were not injured
directly by the defective product. Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N,Y.2d 460,
255 N.E.2d 173 (1969). ln that case, a sewer worker's gas mask was defective, and he died
in a sewer filled with poisonous gas. Several other sewer workers, not knowing that the
sewer contained gas, rushed in to help without putting on gas masks. Some of the rescuers
died; others were injured by the gas. The court held the manufacturer of the gas mask
liable for the rescuers' deaths and personal injuries. The court said that the doctrine of
"danger invites rescue" applies to breach of warranty cases even though no negligence is
shown. Two judges concurred in the result but would limit the holding to situations
where there is a "great moral obligation" to rescue as here where all involved were "part
of a team of workers all similarly situated in a common effort." 25 N.Y.2d at 466, 255
N.E.2d at 176. Subsequently the New York Court of Appeals termed such products liability cases as cases of strict liability in tort and held that an innocent bystander may recover
from the manufacturer of a defective product. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298
N.E.2d 622 (1973), citing Guarino with approval.
In another products liability case, Fedorchick v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 438 F. Supp.
60 (E.D. Pa. 1977), the plaintiff-rescuer was injured by a runaway loader while attempting
to remove a fellow worker from its path. Applying what it conceived to be Pennsylvania
law, the court held that the manufacturer would be strictly liable in tort under REsTATE•
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) unless the jury found that the rescuer voluntarily
assumed the risk.

May 1979]

Saving Life at Sea

1275

But where the rescuer's injuries are not out of proportion to the
risks created by the dangerous condition of the ship, 200 courts
should award life salvage to encourage sailors to respond to the
call of their fellow mariners.

B. P&O: Reimbursement for Life Salvage Expenses
Grigsby has opened the door to aliowing life salvors to recover
for personal injuries that they incur while attempting to save life.
More significantly, it indicates a judicial attitude favoring reform
of the harsh life salvage rules. A case that may have even greater
importance for life salvors is Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc. (hereinafter referred to
as "P&O"), 201 which allowed life salvors to recover under a restituition theory. William Turpin, a sixty-three-year-old seaman,
suffered severe chest pains ab'?ard an American flag tanker, the
Overseas Progress, in the mid-Atlantic while en route to Baltimore. The tanker had no doctor, nurse, or operating room. 202 Believing that Turpin had suffered a heart attack, and guided by
medical and radio advice from the Public Health Service, the
tanker's officers gave Turpin several morphine injections and glycerin nitrate tablets. The following day, Turpin suffered another
attack. This time the ship's master, W. J. Lidwin, sent a radio
message asking all ships in the vicinity that had a doctor to
answer. Of the three ships to respond, a British passenger vessel,
the Canberra, was the closest. The Canberra had a hospital and
a fully equipped operating room staffed by two surgeons, two
nurses, and a hospital assistant. Captain Lidwin informed the
Canberra of Turpin's condition and requested that the two ships
rendezvous so that the Canberra could take Turpin aboard for
200. Professors Landes and Posner give the following economic analysis of the problem of compensating rescuers for personal injuries:
[I]f the sum of the expected costs of the accident victim and of the rescuer is less
than the expected costs of the accident had no rescue attempt been made, a rational
tortfeasor would gladly have promised to reimburse the rescuer for his injury if, by
[so] doing, the tortfeasor could have induced him to make the rescue attempt. . • . Consistently with this analysis, the rescuer is not permitted to recover
damages from the tortfeasor if the danger of the rescue attempt was disproportionate to the expected loss from the accident.
Landes & Posner, 7 J. LEGAL STUD., supra note 7, at 111.
201. 553 F.2d 830 (2d Cir.1977), revg. 418 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y.1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 859 (1977). The plaintiff did not object to the defendant's petition for certiorari.
Letter of counsel to the Clerk of the United States Supreme Court, Docket No. 77-124,
Aug. 15, 1977.
202. 418 F. Supp. at 657.
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treatment. Captain Snowden of the Canberra agreed; both vessels altered course, and the Canberra increased her speed. The
ships met about six hours later, and Turpin was transferred to the
Canberra, where he was treated. The Canberra maintained its
increased speed and arrived in New York City three days later,
only two-and-a-half hours behind schedule although she had
traveled 232 extra miles to rescue Turpin. Turpin was transferred
to a public health hospital in New York where he received further treatment. He was eventually discharged from that hospita1.203
Before the vessels met, Captain Snowden told Captain Lidwin by radio telephone that the Canberra's owners, The Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Company ("The P&O") might
ask the tanker's owners for reimbursement. When the two ships
met, Captain Snowden confirmed that conversation in a note that
Captain Lidwin signed. The parties later stipulated that Captain
Snowden did not demand reimbursement and that Captain Lidwin did not agree to make reimbursement. The matter was sim'ply left to a future determination by the two shipowners. 204
About a month after the incident, the owner of the Overseas
Progress, Overseas Oil Carriers ("Overseas"), promptly paid a
bill for $248, covering the surgeon's services to Turpin. 205 After
about another month, Overseas received a bill for over $12,000,
of which $500 was for accommodation and nursing and the remainder for the additional fuel consumed by the Canberra when
it increased its speed and diverted to pick up Turpin and bring
him to New York. Overseas refused to pay the second bill, and
the P&O filed suit in federal court. 206
The plaintiff had two theories for recovery. First, it argued
that the case could be viewed as a property salvage case. 207 Using
the theory advanced by David Brown, 208 it said that saving expen203. 553 F.2d at 832-33.
204. 553 F.2d at 833.
205. 418 F. Supp. at 657.
206. 553 F.2d at 833.
207. 418 F. Supp. at 658.
208. Comment, 2 HASTINGS L.J., supra note 7. Brown and the P&O relied on United
States v. Cornell Steamboat Co., 202 U.S. 184 (1906), affg. 137 F. 455 (2d Cir. 1905), which
held that the federal government was liable to pay salvage to those who saved some imported sugar from destruction and thereby saved the government from the need to refund the duties that the sugar owners had paid. That case in turn relied on three foreign
cases: Duncan v. Dundee, Perth & London Shipping Co., 5 R. 742 (Scot, 1st Div, 1878);
Five Steel Barges, 15 P.D. 142 (1890); Cargo ex Port Victor, 1901 P. 243 (C.A. 1901), In
Duncan, the court allowed a salvage recovery in an in personam action against a common
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seas is a salvage act and that it had saved Overseas considerable
expense because it would have taken the Overseas Progress fiftyseven hours to bring Turpin to the nearest shore hospital in Newfoundland, delaying its voyage to Baltimore and adding substantially to its fuel costs. 209 Moreover, the plaintiff argued that it
should recover its expenses under a quantum meruit or unjust
carrier on behalf of salvors who saved the ship and its cargo. The cargo was owned by
"some hundreds of owners." 5 R. at 747. The owners of the ship would have been liable
to the cargo owners had the cargo been lost, and were therefore benefited by the salvor's
saving of the cargo. In Fiue Steel Barges, the builder of some barges was under contract
to deliver them to the government. The plaintiff saved the barges from loss and two of
them were delivered to the government. The builder of the barges was held liable in
personam for the salvage of these two barges, because it would have been liable to pay
damages or to make restitution to the government if the barges had been lost. In Cargo
ex Port Victor, charterers were liable in personam for the salvage of cargo. The charterers
would have been liable to the cargo owners had the property been lost.
In addition to United States v. Cornell Steamboat, courts in the Second Circuit have
reached a similar conclusion on several occasions. In Cowles Towing Co. v. Grain Transit
Corp. (The Barge GL 40), 66 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1933), the insurers of a sunken barge
requested the salvage. The court held them liable and said, "a salvor's remedy in personam is not confined to the legal ownership of the property, but extends to one who has
a direct pecuniary interest in its preservation." 66 F.2d at 766. In Tice Towing Line v.
James McWilliams Blue Line, 51 F.2d 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), revd. on other grounds, 57
F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1932), the court held that the owner of a tug that put a barge and its
cargo in peril is liable to one who saves them. The court said, "[A] salvor is entitled to a
salvage award as against any one whom he may have benefited by successful salvage
services." 51 F.2d at 246. One of the cases relied on by this case was Seaman v. Erie R.R.,
21 F. Cas. 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 12,582), in which Judge Benedict awarded salvage
against barge owners for rescuing the barge and its cargo. The barge owners would have
been liable in case of loss or damage "and that liability they escaped through the services
of this salvor." 21 F. Cas. at 918, 919. See also The Public Bath No. 13, 61 F. 692
(S.D.N.Y. 1894).(bailee liable for salvage). But see The Cardy, 64 F. Supp. 902 (E.D.N.Y.
1945) (charterer not liable for salvage unless he requests the service).
Professors Gilmore and Black termed the language quoted above from Cowles Towing
Co. as "unsupported and perhaps unjustifiable dictum." G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra
note 7, § 8-14. They also said that "it may be that the [Cornell] case stands merely for
the proposition that courts occasionally award counsel who are able to fashion arguments
so fresh and so novel as to tickle the judicial palate." Id. They argue that it would be
unrealistic, for example, to make buyers of goods liable for salvage services which saved
them profitable resales. Id. But when the expenses saved are clearly evident, when salvage
is not payable by another party and when the interest at stake, such as the safety of
passengers and crew, is highly valued, it seems fair to make the benefited party pay
salvage.
209. Based on a study of diversion costs prepared for the National Maritime Research
Center (part of the Maritime Administration), the plaintiff suggested that it saved Overseas $6500 in fuel diversion costs to Newfoundland "plus the cost of getting back on course
to Baltimore." Appellant's Brief at 10 n.5, Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co.
v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc., 553 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977). In its complaint the plaintiff
alleged that it saved Overseas from incurring costs, including possible tort suits by Turpin
or his dependents, in excess of the amount claimed by the plaintiff. Complaint at 8,
paragraphs 54 & 55.

1278

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 77:1218

enrichment theory, because the expenses were incurred because
the Overseas Progress asked the Canberra to perform an obligation that Overseas owed t9 Turpin. 210
The trial court denied relief on the salvage theory saying the
"law of the sea has clearly not allowed an award solely for life
salvage. " 211 The trial court also denied the bulk of the plaintiffs
claim on the contract and quasi-contract theories. It split the
plaintiff's theory into two parts - first that a contract was implied in fact to reimburse the P&O for its expenses, and second,
that the plaintiff should be reimbursed to prevent unjust enrichment. On the first point, the court held (correctly, it seems) that
no contract was implied in fact to pay for the expenses because
the captains expressly agreed to leave the matter open to a determination by their employers, and Overseas did not subsequently
agree to pay. 212
On the unjust enrichment claim, the court held that to have
a valid claim, the plaintiff must show that the defendant has
committed some act of misconduct or fault, such as a breach of
a fiduciary duty. 213 Finding no act of fault or misconduct by Over210. 418 F. Supp. at 657; Plaintiffs Brief Supporting Motion for Interlocutory Summary Judgment of Liability by Defendant.
211. 418 F. Supp. at 658 (citing St. Paul Marine Transp. v. Cerro Sales Corp., 313
F. Supp. 377 (D. Hawaii 1970), and The Eastland, 262 F. 535 (N.D. Ill. 1919)). That
response really did not answer the plaintiffs claim that it was much more than a life
salvor-that by saving Overseas considerable expense it should be considered a property
salvor. The court also rejected the plaintiffs contention that it was asking only for reimbursement of expenses and not a reward for saving life. 418 F. Supp. at 659.
212. 418 F. Supp. at 659. But see United States v. Consolidated Edison, 580 F.2d
1122, 1127 n.9 (2d Cir.1978), where the court suggested thatP&O could have been decided
in favor of the plaintiff based on REsTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 107(2) (1937) and
REsTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 226-236, 245-249 (1932). The section from the Restatement
of Restitution provides "In the absence of circumstances indicating otherwise, it is inferred that a person who requests another to perform services for him • . • thereby bargains to pay therefor." The comment to that section states that it is based on the principle
underlying the sections from the Restatement of Contracts cited above, namely that "the
conduct and words of the parties are interpreted in the light of ordinary usages and it is
the ordinary understanding that a person who asks another to do something for him • . •
will pay for it unless the circumstances under which the request is made indicate otherwise." REsTATEMENT OF REsTITUTION § 107, Comment c (1937). The comment notes that
the inference of a promise can be rebutted if such services are customarily rendered
without compensation. In P&O the captain of the Overseas Progress left open the possibility that Overseas would decline payment, and Overseas alleged that the "long-standing
translations of the sea" are not to charge for rendering this type of assistance. Defendant's
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing the Complaint at 33, 418 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). This would rebut any inference that
Overseas bargained to pay for the service.
213. 418 F. Supp. at 659. The district court cited two cases for this proposition:
Shooters Island Shipyard Co. v. Standard Shipbuilding Corp., 293 F. 706 (3d Cir. 1923)
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seas, the court said that the unjust enrichment theory failed for
most of the plaintiffs claim. 214 The trial court did, however, find
one element of unjust enrichment. It said that the $500 cost for
nursing and accommodation was an expense that Overseas would
have had to incur in port if no public health hospital had been
available. 215 Oddly enough, the court had little trouble allowing
this aspect of the unjust enrichment claim, even though no fault
or misconduct was involved. It said only that payment of those
costs was not life salvage, since the services were rendered after
the transfer of Turpin to the Canberra. 216
Only the P&O appealed from the district court decision. It
no longer argued that property salvage law gave it a right to
reimbursement of its expenses, although it did remark that property salvage is, quasi-contractual and "akin to the law of restitution. " 217 Its major argument was that the district court had mistakenly held that misconduct or fault on the'part of a defendant
is a prerequisite to any unjust enrichment claim. 218 Further, it
relied on sections 113 and 114 of the Restatement of Restitution
for the proposition that it was entitled to restitution because it
acted in an emergency and performed a duty that Overseas owed
to Turpin. 219 Alternatively, the P&O argued for reimbursement
and F.E. Grauwiller Transp. Co. v. King, 131 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), affd., 229
F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1956). In Shooters Island the court held that a first mortgagee was not
unjustly enriched by expenditures made on mortgaged land that were financed by a junior
lienor where the junior lienor knew or should have known that the property was covered
by a prior mortgage. The first mortgagee had not acted improperly and had not taken
advantage of the junior lienor. 293 F. at 214. In Grauwi_ller a person had tortiously taken
a scow from its rightful owner and had made repairs to it. The court held that the owner
was not liable for the repairs, relying on Shooters Island.
214. 418 F. Supp. at 659.
215. 418 F. Supp. at 659. A shipowner has a "maintenance and cure" duty to provide
medical care for seamen who become ill during a voyage. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra
note 7, § 6-8.
216. 418 F. Supp. at 659-60.
217. Appellant's Brief at 7, 553 F.2d 830.
218. The appellant distinguished the cases relied on by the district court and cited
several authorities that state that recovery for unjust enrichment does not always depend
on some fault or misconduct by the defendant. Appellant's Brief at 6-8, 553 F.2d 830,
relying on Berri v. City of New York, 16 N.Y.S.2d 86 (City Ct. N.Y. Co.), affd., 16
N.Y.S.2d 1015 (App. Term 1939), affd., 259 App. Div. 453, 19 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1940) (citing
the Introductory Note to Chapter 7, REsTATEMENT oFRESTIT1JTION at 525 (1937)); Duffy v.
Scott, 235 Wis. 142, 292 N.W. 273 (1940); Chase v. Corcoran, 106 Mass. 286 (1871); and
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, passim (1937)).
219. Appellant's Brief at 5. The sections provide:
§ 113.

A person who has performed the noncontractual duty of another by supplying a
third person with necessaries which in violation of such duty the other had failed
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because Overseas had a maintenance and cure obligation to take
Turpin to the nearest port hospital. 220
In an opinion by Chief Judge Irving Kaufman, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. It agreed with the appellants that section 114 of the Restatement of Restitution221 applied. Overseas had a duty to provide Turpin with speedy medical
attention, and the Canberra acted in an emergency to fulfill that
duty. The Canberra was therefore entitled to restitution. 222
P&O is sound. Only passenger ships are likely to have a
hospital aboard, 223 and the few passenger ships crossing the Atlanto supply, although acting without the other's knowlege or consent, is entitled to
restitution therefor from the other if he acted unofficiously and with intent to
charge therefor.
§ 114.
A person who has performed the duty of another by supplying a third person with
necessaries, although acting without the other's knowledge or consent, is entitled
to restitution from the other therefor if
(a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor, and
(b) the things or services supplied were immediately necessary to prevent
serious bodily harm to or suffering by such person.
fu:sTATEMENT OF fu:sTITUTION §§ 113-114 (1937).
220. Appellant's Brief at 8-9. The duty had been recognized by the district court, 418
F. Supp. at 657 (citing The Iroquois, 194 U.S. 240, 243 (1904) and G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
supra note 7, § 6-13).
221. See note 219 supra.
222. 553 F.2d at 834-35. The measure of recovery allowed under § 114 of the
Restatement is the market value of the services rendered, limited, however, to the amount
by which the recipient has benefited. REsTATEMENT OF REsTITUTION §§ 114, comment d;
113, comment g; 155, comment d (1937). There being no market price for the services
rendered by the Canberra, the court said that the only reasonable value of its services was
the amount of its "reasonable expenses." 553 F.2d at 836. As to possible recovery for
expenses in addition to the fuel expenses involved in P&O, see note 239 infra and accompanying text.
223. A study prepared for the National Maritime Research Center found that usually
the chief mate and occasionally the purser or captain or other ship's officer provide the
medical care aboard ship. The study of 89 merchant ships found that inadequate training
is given to most of those providing medical care aboard ship. Indeed, on 20 of the ships
studied, those providing care had received no formal training and relied only on experience. Of the ships studied, 70% had "sick-bays" with four beds or fewer, 13% had
"infirmaries" with more than four beds, and 17% had no beds designated for patients.
Sixty-five percent of the ships studied had medical reference books that were more than
five years old, 52% had books that were at least 20 years old, and 12% of the ships carried
no medical reference books. NATIONAL MARlTIME REsEARCH CENTER, FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR
THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF THE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM TO PROVIDE SHIP•
BOARD EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICE (NMRC-KP 155) 25-27 (1976). The study concluded
It was readily apparent from all avenues of inquiry that response capabilities in the
delivery of medical care to U.S. merchant seamen suffering illness or injury while
at sea is grossly inadequate and antiquated given the present level of emergency
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tic are therefore likely to be asked to travel large distances to
rescue ill or injured crew members of other ships. 224 It is unreasonable to force those ships to shoulder the expense when they save
the other shipowners the cost of emergency rescue services, and
when in most cases, the owners of the other ships can take alternative steps to reduce the need to call for such aid. For example,
if the Overseas Progress had had a doctor, nurse, or medically
trained officers aboard, it may not have needed to summon the
Canberra. Stricter physical fitness tests for the crew and greater
safety precautions aboard ship may reduce the risks of illness and
injury.
Overseas argued that ships' captains would be reluctant to
call for aid if they knew that their employers would have to pay
the rescue ship's fuel costs. 225 The district court accepted that
argument and thought the matter could be resolved best by legislation or "international compacts."226 The court of appeals, however, stated that a captain who unreasonably refused to call for
aid may be liable for any damages that his refusal causes. 227 The
costs of the rescue are simply one factor that the master must
consider in determining whether to request assistance. The court
concluded that allowing recovery of expenses would encourage
large vessels to render aid and would thus result in "an efficient
and productive use" of the medical facilities of those large vessels. 228
What effect will P&O have on the law of life salvage? One
could argue that P&O does not apply to the typical life salvage
situation. The court of appeals distinguished the rule denying
medical care delivery available on shore and the present level of communications
technology.
Id. at 2.
224. "Today the [Queen Elizabeth II] alone remains in scheduled service between
the United States and Europe." Last Watch on the North Atlantic, COMPASS 18
(Spring/Summer 1978). (Compass is published by Marine Office of America Corporation.)
225. 553 F.2d at 836.
226. 418 F. Supp. at 660 (citing Knauth, supra note 13). The Aviation Salvage at
Sea Convention of 1938 provided that the operator or owner of an aircraft would indemnify
a rescuer for his expenses not exceeding 50,000 francs for each person saved, but in no
event to exceed 500,000 francs. If no one is saved and if the rescuer had an obligation to
rescue he may recover up to 50,000 francs from the owner or operator. Art. 3, 6B BENEDICT
ON ADMIRALTY 1255 (7th ed. 1969). The equivalent value of 50,000 francs in 1938 was about
$3,500. A. KNAUTH, supra note 153, at 11 n.30. The 1938 treaty has not been put into force.
6B BENEDICT, supra at 1254. A bill, S.7, was introduced in 1941 to give effect to the 1938
treaty, but no further action was taken.
227. 553 F.2d at 836.
228. 553 F.2d at 836.
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pure life salvage, pointing out that the P&O merely requested
reimbursement of expenses rather than a reward, and also pointing out that the situation was not "a daring 'rescue at sea', but
the transfer of an ailing seaman from one seaworthy vessel to
another." 229 One might thus interpret P&O to apply only when
someone performs a shipowner's duty and saves that owner some
major expense when the ship is not in danger of sinking.
Yet so narrow a reading clashes with the liberal tone of the
opinion. The court's attempt to distinguish its relief from pure
life salvage is weak. 230 The largest share of a claim for life salvage
is likely to be reimbursement for expenses, and the traditional
rule denies pure life salvors any recovery at all. 231 Also, the fact
that the rescue in P&O was not "daring" does not distinguish the
case from one of pure life salvage. In the cognate area of property
salvage, heroism increases the amount of a reward, but those who
voluntarily help to save property in peril are entitled to a reward
even if their services are not heroic. 232 By analogy, since the P&O
voluntarily helped to "save the life of a sailor," 233 its act was an
act of life salvage. To carry the analogy further, if the Overseas
Progress had been in danger of sinking and the Canberra had
made a "daring rescue at sea," the rescue ship would have had
an even more compelling claim for compensation since it would
have risked loss of life and property as well as incurred substantial expense.
229. 553 F.2d at 836.
230. Although there seems to be little merit in arguing that the 1912 life salvage
statute preempts the field of life salvage, the court may have refused to characterize its
relief as life salvage in order to avoid raising the issue. See text at notes 178-79 supra.
Characterizing the relief as restitution, however, does not absolve one of deciding the
preemption issue. One might argue that Congress intended the 1912 statute to be the sole
reform of the rules applicable to people who save life at sea. The court, however, appeared
ready to construe the statute liberally. It said, "[the statute] was intended to remove
the disincentive to life salvage that resulted from the traditional rule, which encouraged
sailors to rescue property rather than aid fellow seamen in jeopardy." 553 F.2d at 836.
Viewing the statute that way, a court can easily decide that increasing the rights of life
salvors is consistent with congressional intent. Increasing those rights is also consistent
with the history of the underlying treaty. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
231. See The Admiral Evans, 286 F. 442, 443 (W.D. Wash. 1923). By contrast, expenses were reimbursed when courts compensated life salvors. E.g., The Annie Lord, 251
F. 157, 160-61 (D. Mass.1917); The Queen Mab, 166 Eng. Rep. 395,396 (Adm.1835); The
Aid, 166 Eng. Rep. 30, 31 (Adm. 1822).
232. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. Indian Towing Co., 232 F.2d 750, 755 (5th
Cir. 1956); Sobonis v. Stream Tanker Natl. Defender, 298 F. Supp. 631, 637 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) ("It is success and not heroics which is the sine qua non to an award of salvage").
Even giving advice can be a salvage act. South America S.S. Co. v. Atlantic Towing Co.,
22 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1927).
233: 553 F.2d at 835.
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Other language in P&O suggests that the court intended its
decision to stimulate broad changes in the life salvage rules. 234
The court attacked the rule denying pure life salvage as
"questionable," of "dubious vitality," "almost univ~rsally condemned,"235 and "irrational." 236 Moreover, the court said in a footnote that to recover its expenses the plaintiff did not need to
confer a monetary benefit on Overseas. Instead,
The value rendered in performing another's duty is sufficient to
permit recovery. Thus, if the Overseas Progress had been totally
unable to reach a shore hospital and the Canberra had been Turpin's only source of aid, it might be argued that her intervention,
although vital to Turpin, did not save Overseas Progress from incurring any additional expense. Canberra could nonetheless have
recovered for providing such assistance. 237

Although it is not entirely clear, the court apparently meant by
this statement that the P&O could recover its expenses even if
234. A recent nonadmiralty case in the Second Circuit supports the proposition that
P&O was intended to make sweeping changes in life salvage law. In United States v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 580 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1978), the court said that the panel in
P&O had taken a general principle of law and "us[ed] the opportunity to overrule
specifically the outdated admiralty rule of 'pure life' salvage." 580 F.2d at 1130. The
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) incurred substantial costs when it released large
amounts of electricity to Consolidated Edison (Con Ed) during a power shortage. The AEC
told Con Ed that it would look to it for reimbursement of its additional costs, and the
court allowed the AEC its costs under the "emergency assistance doctrine" as embodied
in § 115 of the Restatement of Restitution. The section is similar to § 114 of the
Restatement, except that it involves performing another's duty by providing services
"immediately necessary to satisfy the requirements of public decency, health, or safety."
Basing its interpretation of that section on P&O, the court said that the AEC could recover
because it performed Con Ed's "duty to acquire and maintain adequate supplies of electrical power" during an emergency and with an intent to be reimbursed. 580 F.2d at 1127.
Con Ed protested that it owes no absolute duty to the public, and that its duty under New
York law is only to avoid intentional or grossly negligent cutoffs of power. The court
discarded that objection by saying, "Duty is a flexible concept. Its existence depends -on
calibrating legal obligations to factual concepts. One may have only a duty to avoid gross
negligence, but that is a duty nonetheless and one potentially cognizable by the emergency
assistance doctrine." 580 F.2d at 1127-28. Drawing attention to P&O's statement that
the Overseas Progress had a "manifest duty" to provide Turpin with medical attention,
the court concluded that a "manifest duty" is a sufficient prerequiste for restitution,
and found that Con Ed had a "manifest duty" to supply its customers with electricity
and to acquire electrical power.
Consolidated Edison illustrates the looseness of the concept of performing another's
duty. It was not necessary for the AEC to show that but for their release of electricity Con
Ed would have incurred actual liability to its customers. It was enough to demonstrate a
"manifest duty" of Con Ed to acquire the power.
235. 553 F.2d at 836.
236. "The irrationality of providing rewards for property salvage but not requiring
payment for rescuing lives has been under attack for many years." 553 F.2d at 836 n.6.
237. 553 F.2d at 835 n.4.

1284

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 77:1218

Overseas had no alternatives to calling the Canberra, in which
case some might say that the Canberra did not really "save"
Overseas any expense. 238
P&O appears to give all life salvors a right to recover all their
reasonable expenses. 239 The owners of the Titanic, for example,
probably owed their passengers and crew a duty to exercise reasonable care to rescue them. 240 Under the circumstances, however,
the only reasonable thing - indeed, the only possible thing for the Titanic's owners to do was to offer other ships a reward
if they would rescue these people. Whether or not the offer was
made, the rule in P&O would have required the Titanic's owners
238. The court went on to say that on the facts before it, "where performance of
another's duty and traditional 'unjust enrichment' are present, both rules clearly require
recovery." 553 F.2d at 835 n.4. It is difficult to understand the court's distinction between
performing another's duty and "traditional 'unjust enrichment.' " Under the prevailing
American theory of unjust enrichment, one is "enriched" when another fulfills one's duty
to a third person. REsTATEMENT OF REsTITUTION § 1, comments a & b at 12 (1937); 2 G,
PALMER, supra note 7, § 10.4, at 377. Such enrichment is considered unjust when, for
example, the conditions of§§ 113 or 114 of the Restatement are met. Thus, in Greenspan
v. Slate, 12 N.J. 426, 97 A.2d 390 (1953) a case relied on by P&O, a doctor treated a
teenager whose parents refused to seek medical help. The doctor was entitled to recover
from the parents for unjust enrichment because he fulfilled the parents' duty to provide
medical care for their child.
239. It is unclear exactly what expenses would be deemed to be "reasonable" under
P&O. The only item of expense at issue in the case was extra fuel costs, and one might
argue that reimbursement should be limited to those expenses and should not reach extra
wage, lost profits, and property damage. The court stated:
In determining the proper course of action, [masters] must consider the seriousness of the saman's illness, the availability and adequacy of medical facilities and
the costs that will be incurred in securing aid. Once it is established that the fuel
expenses of a ship rendering assistance is one of these costs, it will simply become
another factor to be considered in the master's calculation. With radio-telegraphy,
it is a simple matter for him to ascertain the size and location of ships in the vicinity
just as the Overseas Progress did and to determine which vessel can be reached with
minimum expense and delay.
553 F.2d at 836.
One reason for limiting a rescuer's recovery to extra fuel costs might be that such items
are often relatively easy for a court to ascertain. See Note, supra note 7, at 246-47. But
fuel costs are often not easy to ascertain with precision, as was the case in P&O, 653 F.2d
at 837 n.7. A more persuasive argument for limiting recovery to fuel costs is that the
master of a ship often must make a quick decision among different alternative means of
rescue and that he should not be forced to enter lengthy calculations of possible costs.
Nonetheless, expenses in addition to fuel costs are generally allowed in property
salvage cases, see note 10 supra, and society generally values life more than property. For
that reason some expenses that are considered unreasonable or too "remote" in property
salvage cases should arguably be allowed in life salvage cases. Surely all expenses beyond
fuel costs that are reasonably foreseeable and easily ascertainable by the master of the
rescued vessel should be allowed. The P&O recovered its medical costs before the case was
appealed, and nothing in P&O suggests that that recovery was improper.
240. See note 175 supra.
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to pay the reasonable expenses of the rescue.
Although P&O, along with Grigsby, broke the philosophical
barrier of denying all compensation to pure life salvors, it actually
gives them both more and less than they would have been given
by simply overruling the pure life salvage rule. If P&O had given
pure life salvors a right to salvage, the P&O would have been
entitled to a reward, not merely reimbursement of expenses. 241
Although the restitution remedy is more restrictive in that respect, it is available in a broader class of cases than pure life
salvage. Under the traditional rules of life salvage, an award is
only available when life is saved; P&O does not require that the
rescuer save life, only that it perform another's duty. If Turpin
had died after the Canberra had diverted, the plaintiff would still
have been able to recover its expenses under section 114 of the
Restatement of Restitution. 242
When all of the waves have calmed, the holding in P&O is
close to the proposal suggested above 243 that life salvors and those
who attempt to save life recover their expenses. P&O is also close
to Brown's suggestion that saving a shipowner the expense of
taking a seaman ashore or of paying another ship to divert to
rescue him is a property salvage act. 244 What difference does it
make whether the court achieves this result under a theory of
restitution or under the approaches proposed by Brown and this
Article? Restitution entitles the salvors only to compensation for
their expenses, whereas my approach and Brown's approach
would give the salvors the possibility of a reward in addition to
their expenses. Because courts tend to give small rewards for
saving life, 245 most life salvors are likely to be satisfied with re241. The P&O disclaimed a right to a reward. 553 F.2d at 836.
242. The fact that [the services] result in no ultimate benefit to the recipient,
as where a physician renders competent services to an unconscious patient who dies
as a result of an apparently necessary and skillfully performed operation, does not
prevent restitution, although it may affect the amount granted.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 113, comment g (1937), which also applies to cases under
§ 114. Id. § 114, comment d.
243. See text at notes 164-83 supra.
244. Comment, 2 HASTINGS L.J., supra note 7, at 55.
245. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 7, § 8-12, at 573-74. One reason for
awarding life salvors less than property salvors may have been that due to the humanitarian impulses of seamen less incentive was needed to save life than was needed to save
property. But see note 172 supra. Another reason for the disparity between the amount of
property salvage and life salvage awards may have been that a diversion to save property
automatically deprived the rescuing shipowner of its hull insurance and made it absolutely liable for cargo lost on account of the deviation. By contrast, a diversion to save
life exposed the salvor to neither risk. See The Boston, 3 F. Cas. 932,935 (C.C. Mass.1833)
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couping their expenses. Still, there may be cases of extraordinary
risk and heroism where federal courts might feel that P&O's
promise of reimbursed expenses may be inadequate to encourage
others to render similar services and inadequate to express society's gratitude.
Whether a life salvor seeks only reimbursement of expenses
or reimbursement and reward will have important procedural
implications. A suit for reimbursement under the restitution
theory, under the approach proposed in this Article, or even
under Brown's salvage theory, can probably be brought in state
or federal court. 246 Suit in a state court could be before a jury, and
a jury would be available in federal court if the requirements for
diversity jurisdiction are satisfied. 247 In addition, the state statute
of limitations or the admiralty rule of !aches would apply. 248 In
contrast, if the life salvor sought to recover a reward in addition
to his expenses, suit would be subject to a two-year statute of
limitations249 and might be restricted to federal court250 with no
(No. 1,673); Scaramanga v. Stamp, 5 C.P.D. 295 (1880); 2 T. PARSONS, supra note 75, at
298. Since the risk incurred by the salvor is one factor affecting the size of its award, it
was logical to reward the property salvor more liberally than the life salvor. Today,
however, the property salvor's risk is reduced because most hull policies allow the shipowner to pay a premium to be agreed on that will continue the insurance coverage in the
event of a deviation. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 7, § 2-6, at 66; Vogel, The
Hull Policy: The Perils and Held Covered Clauses, 41 TuL. L. REV. 259, 276 (1967). Also,
under current statutes shipowners are not liable for cargo losses resulting from deviations
to save property at sea. E.g., 46 U.S.C. § 1304(4) (1976); Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
1971, c. 19, sched., Art. IV(4) (Eng.). The recently agreed-upon "Hamburg Rules" attempt
to increase the liability for cargo losses in cases of unreasonable deviations to save property. United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978, Art. 5(6), 1978
A.M.C. 1036, 1039 (not in force).
246. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976) gives the federal district courts exclusive original juris•
diction of admiralty cases "saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they
are otherwise entitled." That is, a plaintiff can bring an action in state court if the
common law provides a remedy, such as compensation based on quantum meruit, See M.
NORRIS, supra note 2, § 14 at 18. As a practical matter, state courts can hear any admiralty
claim that is brought in personam with the possible exception of claims for a salvage
reward. See Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 CoLUM. L. REV,
259, 265 (1950). But see note 250 infra.
247. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976). See generally Robertson, Admiralty Procedure and
Jurisdiction After the 1966 Unification, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1628 (1976). Although the matter
was not discussed by the courts in P&O, the parties apparently assumed that the suit was
based on diversity of citizenship. Appellant's Brief at 7 n.2, 553 F.2d 830; Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 3, 434 U.S. 859 (1977). The complaint did not identify the claim as an
admiralty or maritime claim, as permitted by rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and the plaintiff requested a jury trial.
248. See McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958).
249. 46 U.S.C. § 730 (1976); The Eastland, 262 F. 535 (N.D. Ill. 1919), af/d. without
opinion sub nom. Mattocks v. Great Lakes Towing Co. (No. 2,804) (7th Cir. June 3, 1920),
cert. denied, 258 U.S. 644 (1920).
250. The Jefferson, 215 U.S. 130, 137 (1909) (a "court of admiralty of the United
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right to a jury trial. 251 Restricting jurisdiction when rewards are
sought is perhaps justifiable because the method of calculating a
salvage award is historically unknown to common law and equity
courts. In contrast, state courts are familiar with the general principles of restitution and reimbursement of expenses. Therefore,
there ought to be no objection to allowing state and diversity
courts sitting with a jury to hear cases when reimbursement of
expenses is the only requested relief, even though federal law, not
state law, applies to the rescuer's reimbursement claim. 252
States" has exclusive jurisdiction over salvage disputes); The Freedom, 1932 A.M.C. 933
(W.D.N.Y. 1932). See also M. NORRIS, supra note 2, §14 at 18; 1 BENEDICT, supra note 226,
§123 at 8-10 to 8-11. But see Light v. Schmidt, 84 Mich. App. 51, 269 N.W.2d 304 (1978)
(saving to suitors clause permits state courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction over
salvage contracts in case involving a contract that does not appear to have been a "no
cure-no pay" contract); O.F. Shearer & Sons, Inc. v. Decker, 349 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.
W. Va. 1972) (a state court may decide a salvage dispute, but must apply federal Jaw);
Young v. Smith, 1966 A.M.C. 2654 (Cir. Ct. Md. 1966) (a state court sitting in equity
awarded salvage based on the usual principles applicable to such cases).
In a Jetter to President Polk, Judge William Marvin wrote, "[T]he rights and interests of owners [of wrecked property], underwriters, salvors and others can only be protected by a court possessing Admiralty jurisdiction. As yet this jurisdiction remains exclusively in the [federal] Superior Court [for the Southern District of Florida]." Letter of
Sept. 15, 1845, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Diplomatic Branch, Appointment
Papers of William Marvin (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). Marvin wrote to
notify the President that he was declining his recent election by the new State General
Assembly to be a judge of the Circuit and Supreme Courts of Florida. He said he "did
not feel at liberty" to leave the federal judgeship vacant, for to do so "wouJd·necessarily
leave, for several months, large and important interests at the mercy of the bravest and
strongest." Id. According to Marvin, wreckers saved and brought into Key West more than
$300,000 worth of property each year. Id.
251. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 38(e).
252. See Kane v. Motor Vessel Leda, 355 F. Supp. 796, 804 (E.D. La. 1972), affd.,
491 F.2d 899 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 865 (1974) (applying federal principles to
an unjust enrichment claim for repairs made to a vessel, but finding "analogies, drawn
from civil and common Jaw [to be] instructive"). Although P&O did not specify whether
it was applying federal or state law, the general rule appears to be that the substantive
Jaw governing maritime affairs is federal unless there is a strong state interest. See G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 7, §§1-17 to -18. Doubt on this matter may be raised by
United States v. Consolidated Edison Co., 580 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1978), where the court
applied P&O to allow recovery for expenses incurred in supplying electric power to a
utility. In rejecting Con Ed's "attempt to limit the [P&O] rationale to maritime situations and to its facts," the court said that P&O "was not applying some peculiarly maritime rule. On the contrary, the court took a more general equitable doctrine and applied
it to a maritime context, using the opportunity to overrule specifically the outdated
admiralty rule of 'pure life' salvage." 580 F.2d at 1130. Similarly, the district court in
Consolidated Edison said that P&O was an application of a "land based principle of
equity to a maritime situation." 452 F. Supp. 638, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Although P&O is
based on general principles of land-based law, it is still federal law, not the Jaw of a
particular state, that is being enforced. A similar situation arises when a federal court
applies "land-based principles of negligence" to a longshoreman's suit for injuries against
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CONCLUSION

The history of life salvage in England has been marked by a
steady increase in the rights of life salvors. At each stage, the law
achieved a balance between salvors' claims to adequate compensation and general skepticism about the need for such compensation by providing the judge or the Board of Trade with great
discretion to determine how much reward, if any, should be
made. The drafters of the 1910 salvage treaty also recognized the
value of giving judges broad discretion in awarding life salvage.
The development of twentieth-century life salvage law in the
United States has been stunted by an unfortunate neglect of the
1910 Brussels Salvage Convention. Courts sought needlessly narrow constructions of the statute that codified the treaty's life
salvage provision, ignoring the purposes of the treaty and failing
to recognize the significance of a well-reasoned independent life
salvage case, The Mulhouse. Grigsby and P&O have recently
opened the door for salvors and would-be salvors to recover for
personal injuries and expenses incurred in saving or attempting
to save life. By following these decisions, American courts will
rejoin the general trend of the rest of the English-speaking world
toward granting recovery to all life salvors.
a shipowner under 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1976). See Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 536 F.2d
505 (2d Cir. 1976).
In Silva v. Bankers Commercial Corp., 163 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1947), the court ruled
that state law applied to an unjust enrichment claim for freight paid in advance, but the
court may have been influenced by its belief that a federal court's admiralty jurisdiction
does not include the power to hear claims for unjust enrichment. Today it is clear that a
claim for unjust enrichment arising out of a maritime contract like that in Silua is within
a federal court's admiralty jurisdiction. Archawski v. Hanioti, 350 U.S. 532 (1956). In
Sword Line, Inc. v. United States, 228 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1955), affd. on rehearing, 230 F.2d
75, affd., 351 U.S. 976 (1956), the court of appeals said that its admiralty jurisdiction
includes unjust enrichment claims arising out of any maritime transaction. Both the
district court and the court of appeals in P&O went out of their way to indicate that they
would have the power under their admiralty jurisdiction to grant quasi-contract relief. The
plaintiff did not believe that the issue was before the court because the court had diversity
jurisdiction. Appellant's Brief at 7, 553 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977). The defendant did not
question the court's jurisdiction, apparently because it also believed that the court•had
jurisdiction based on diversity. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, 434 U.S. 859 (1977).
The defendants did question the wisdom of substituting "land-based legal theories of
restitution for the traditions of the sea." Answering Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 5, 653
F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977). See also 553 F.2d at 835.
The choice of law question is currently fairly academic, as there is little relevant state
law on the issue of performing another's duty in an emergency. Until such law develops,
courts are likely to treat the matter as one of general principle. Nevertheless, labeling the
substantive law federal law, rather than state law, will increase the chance that such suits
will be treated uniformly.
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Grigsby and P&O do not duplicate the English scheme. The
two American cases provide indemnity, not reward. Also, since
pure life salvors will be compensated by private parties, not by a
government agency, no relief will be available if the shipowner is
insolvent or is permitted to limit its liability to the value of its
sunken ship. On the other hand, Grigsby and P&O go beyond the
English law and allow recovery even if the life salvors do not
succeed in saving life. These differences seem minor, however, in
comparison with the differences that existed a few years ago. The
long-felt injustice of denying compensation to life salvors seems
to be over. Grigsby and P&O demonstrate the tools that judges
have long possessed to help bridge the gap between what precedent allqws-and what fairness and the interests of humanity
require.
I

Problems remain to be worked out under Grigsby and P&O.
What accommodations, if any, need to be made to the 1912
statute? What injuries and expenses are too remote to be entitled
to compensation? Will the state courts be permitted to provide
relief to life salvors under common-law doctrine? Will courts reward pure life salvors in addition to the indemnity allowed for
expenses and personal injuries? This Article has proposed liberal
solutions to these problems that are in keeping with the humanitarian interests at stake.

